10 June 2021
The idea of a collective European security and defence architecture first arose from the ashes of World War II and was driven by the Cold War. The forerunner of the European Union, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was primarily designed to pacify France and Germany, and virtually make war between the two major European powers impossible by tying them economically (Vandersmissen 2018, 16-17). Politically, however, they had different ideas on how such a community might cover security concerns. The very issue of the remilitarisation of West Germany hindered the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC). Ultimately, the project was struck down by the French National Assembly in 1954 to retain sovereignty over France’s armed forces (Trybus 2016). The ratification of the Treaty of Brussels that same year solved the issue by creating the Western European Union (WEU), and approving the creation of the Bundeswehr, which was envisioned as a self-defence force, dependent upon allied support for any meaningful military operation. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation enjoyed exclusive competence over the defence of Europe for most of the remaining years of the 20th century (Vandersmissen 2018, 30; and Trybus 2016). But while Germany seemed satisfied with such an accommodation, France grew increasingly suspicious of American political and military influence over the continent. It left the Organisation’s military command and, in 1966, asked NATO and US troops to leave its soil. It wasn’t until 2009 that France re-joined the security framework (Gjevori 2019).
Only after the creation of the EU with the Treaty of Maastricht and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992, the idea of European defence integration reappeared into the agendas of several member states. The Joint Declaration of European Defence came in 1998 after the St. Malo summit, signed by French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. European countries’ dependence on US military support during the Kosovo War showcased the need to increase autonomous military capacity within the Union. Thus, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was born, which would later become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (Vandersmissen 2018, 20; and Trybus 2016). Since its early days, the design of the ESDP was shaped by Germany’s desire to complement the EU’s renewed integration efforts within NATO’s security framework. Contrary to the wishes of the French, who wanted to see an empowered EU, and the British, who wanted to create a security identity within the Atlantic alliance, German diplomats found a compromise in the merger between the former and the EU in a common European defence policy (Bunde 2021, 251; and Jegen and Mérand 2014).
France and the UK continued to take up the initiative with a series of bilateral summits that led to the ‘Headline Goal 2010’ and the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 (Reynolds 2006). On the other side of the Rhine, Germany faced significant internal challenges. At the political level, German state elites were deeply committed to the best defence option available, NATO, and wary of risking its demise. Policymakers in the country largely saw European defence integration as a necessary means to further integration within the EU, contrary to the French leadership, who had a genuine desire to see a Europe capable of effectively defending itself. On the other hand, the historical anti-militarism rooted deep within German society and leadership presented the strongest hurdles for real capacity-building at the supranational level. The German parliament was committed to maintaining a strong grip over the national armed forces and always preferred bi-lateral, or mini-lateral defence framework initiatives. As for the public has shown that only 31.4% of Germans believe their country requires a strong military to effectively carry out its foreign policy (Bunde 2021, 202-255-256; Brugger 2019; and Gravelle, Reifler and Scotto 2017, 762). However, it is important to highlight the existence of additional competing forces pulling Germany towards the collective European defence project. The country’s security policy after WWII has been fundamentally shaped by international cooperation. In contrast to France’s markedly ‘national’ defence policy, German military officers have traditionally been more inclined to work with international partners. Thus, despite its population’s scepticism about military means, their multilateralism and the strong feeling of belonging to a united Europe, might eventually influence decision makers in Berlin to increase support for European cooperation, and even integration on defence and security (Bunde 2021, 247; and Graf 2018).
These problems have persisted during the operational collaboration attempts between the two countries. The first one dates to 1989 with the Franco-German Brigade, later integrated into the Eurocorps in 1993 (Vandersmissen 2018, 30-72). This unit was composed of 6,000 soldiers from both countries and was not deployed for years until it joined the missions in Afghanistan and Mali. This experience highlighted the need for a common European defence framework. German rules of engagement and France’s reluctance to allocate men to the unit hindered quick action during high-intensity operations. Adding the troops’ incompatible equipment, the Brigade effectively splintered into two different components. The French one pursued its government’s objectives, while the German one focused on UN and EU training missions (Ogden 2020; and Maulny 2016). The EU Battlegroups established in 2005 encountered similar complications. They were envisioned as a quickly deployable European rapid reaction force. German leadership worked hard to shape the political concept behind these units, and attempted to make them fit their traditional leading role within the EU. However, the country has contributed to roughly 20% of their capabilities and, despite declarations of greater military responsibility, prevented them from being used in many instances (Bunde 2021, 253; Iso-Markku and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2020, 65; and Major and Mölling 2010, 22–23).
France and Germany have reacted differently to all these issues. France has resisted offloading its security entirely to the US, maintaining a unique degree of independence within NATO, and emphasising European autonomy. It developed an efficient arms industry, enabling it to run its own missions, especially in francophone Africa (Ibrahim 2019). Germany, instead, has called for a stronger European pillar within NATO that would preserve the transatlantic link, and is adapting to a world in which the EU is an increasingly important global actor. In this regard, the CSDP has been extremely helpful in spurring debates regarding what a European grand strategy should look like outside of the national interests of 27 small nations (Wieslander 2020; and Cunha 2020).
In 2013, the decision to revive the CSDP opened the path towards new and bolder initiatives to pool European military capabilities. Supported by the German political class, Jean-Claude Juncker became President of the European Commission, and dedicated the Council to defence capacity building and developing new cooperative programmes in security. The process was fastened by Brexit, which forced member states into proposing multiple collaborative defence projects. Important in this regard was the 2016 EU Global Strategy. Following the terrorist attacks in France in 2015, it provided the EU with a new realistic security approach. Stemming from the common desire to increase European, autonomous military capabilities, it paved the way for a greater degree of political agreement and cooperation (Maulny 2016; Cunha 2020; and Novillo 2021, 27-32-34).
The strategy saw its peak in November 2017, when 23 member states, including France and Germany, signed the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to further integrate their national armies, tightening collaboration in defence. Together with Italy and Spain, France and Germany played a major role in its approval during the months of negotiations with the High Representative. The plan, however ambitious, was still the result of a compromise between the two main European powers. In line with their previous beliefs, the French wished for a smaller, more exclusive group of states tied by tighter defence integration and swiftly moved to secure it outside the PESCO framework. Germany was instead seeking to include the maximum possible number of nations and prevent territorial differentiation and disintegration (Bunde 2021, 251; Novillo 2021, 48; and Zandee 2018, 2). In the end, the Germans prevailed. Though a symbolical sign of renewed openness towards European security integration, the inclusive approach presented political and operational downsides. As previously mentioned, the French looked for collaborative defence projects outside the PESCO framework and advocated for the European Intervention Initiative (E12). Much stricter in its participation criteria, it only involved a limited number of nations, Germany included (Bunde 2021, 246; Blockmans 2018; and Howorth 2019). Arguably, both countries had their way through different ad-hoc initiatives.
The real turning point came in 2018. The looming Brexit, US President Donald Trump’s unilateral approach to international relations, and the rise of China as a global power highlighted the necessity for further steps to be taken. French President Emmanuel Macron called for a ‘true European army’ that year. The time was ripe. German Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed, as did her successor as leader of the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, former German Defence Minister and current President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, and Germany’s Social Democratic Party (Ibrahim 2019). During the 2018 Munich Security Conference, von der Leyen was quick to express this sentiment by officially endorsing France’s project, while sticking to Germany’s goal of promoting European integration in general. Both countries have the potential to provide an example for smaller nations and trace a path towards the common goal of collective defence. Germany seems particularly apt, thanks to its soft power abilities (Bunde 2021, 255; and Cunha 2020). Still, whether EU countries will follow through with this commitment remains to be seen, especially in Eastern Europe and Africa, where rival powers and terrorist groups threaten European security. Another question mark is Germany’s goal. Whether it is to really see a united European security apparatus or just to avoid difficult questions regarding its defence policy and capabilities, and the reconfiguration of the Bundeswehr (Ogden 2020; Ibrahim 2019; and Cunha 2020).
On the 22nd of January 2019, France and Germany signed the Aachen Treaty to build a ‘common military culture’ and foster joint deployments. Separate from the EU, it aims to strengthen the two countries collaboration in foreign policy, security, and defence, while echoing their long-term commitment to creating a European army. To achieve this, it will be important to establish a proper framework including smaller European nations, starting with Benelux countries (Nguyen 2020; and Ibrahim 2019). Two other multilateral initiatives might ease rowing in this direction. The E3 format between France, Germany, and the UK has been primarily focused on defence issues.
Additionally, the Franco-German proposal for a ‘European Security Council’ would improve the EU’s ability to become a forceful security and foreign policy player. Together they have the potential to keep the UK involved in Europe’s security policy and strengthen the continent’s cohesion (Wieslander 2020). The French EU Presidency in the first half of 2022 will undoubtedly give fresh impetus to new security and defence initiatives like the ‘Strategic Compass’ and help develop a common vision with shared strategic perspectives to navigate the challenges of the coming decades (Molenaar 2021, 4; and Wieslander 2020).
Written by Lorenzo VERTEMATI, Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre
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