The Modernisation of the Estonian Armed Forces – A New Approach to Baltic Security

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sparked a renewed concern for Baltic security. Given the hard-earned independence process of Baltic countries, Russia’s aggression and hostile rhetoric push Baltic countries to boost their defensive capabilities. Until 2022 (or the Annexation of Crimea in 2014), Baltic states have relied heavily upon ally stationing and hosting NATO troops in joint operations. However, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the defence strategy of these countries quickly shifted towards increasing their offensive measures and modernising the current inventory. While Baltic countries have always cooperated in many fields since their independence (Vaiksnoras, 2002), military spending requires national-level importance and adaptation. Between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the case of Estonia carries specific attention, as it is the smallest nation (population approx. 1.3 million) and has the highest GDP per capita. The economic advantage also pushes the Estonian Government to test different approaches to the concept of military strategy and be able to deliver better technological advancement to its units.  Estonia’s approach to security presents an interesting case for the Baltic security framework. Unlike traditional firepower or manpower superiority, Estonia relies on a civil-military orientation strategy in which the concept of security expands in different domains (Karabeshkin, 2007). Like the Finnish model, Estonia applies mandatory military service to every male citizen after the age of 18, which enables the mobilisation of the nation as a reserve in case of war, even after military service is finished (Besch & Westgaard, 2024). The Estonian conscription system is also made-up of a part-time volunteer body, which is composed of citizens wishing to stay in the military after their service, and receiving military training for war or crisis management cases. Women can also be a part of the volunteer service under Naiskodukaitse (Women`s voluntary defence organization), taking different roles (Kaitseliit, n.d.) However, the country’s successful branding as an internet-intelligent nation also allows for the local development of technological domains in the defence sector, such as cybersecurity, AI or robotics  (Jermalavičius & Hurt, 2021). The recent success of first-person view (herein FPV) drones, integration of cyber defence command chain and volunteer units with technological know-how are all part of this new “modernisation” process that this paper will discuss.

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Disinformation and EU: The Role of Narrative in Hybrid Warfare within the European Union

The days of winning battles and wars solely on the battlefield are long gone. Warring parties are gaining a significant advantage in the realm of information warfare. The information domain can bring significant advantages or cause a significant harm to one side, with no regard to the actual happening on the battlefield. As the conflicts become more complex, there is a bigger need to win the war not only on the field but also in the people’s ‘heads and minds’. The main aim of this article is to analyse Russian and Chinese influence operations and provide a comprehensive overview of the EU’s institutional response to disinformation and narrative campaigns. The first part of this paper introduces the conceptual framework for understanding narratives and disinformation in the light of hybrid warfare. Secondly, it discusses the various ways in which state actors, notably Russia and China, are influencing the EU with their own narratives and disinformation campaigns. Finally, the paper analyses the EU’s policies and responses to these information attacks, while critically examining the structures and mechanisms EU is implementing to tackle this issue.

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Prisoner Swap Between Russia and Ukraine 

On August 24th, 2024, Ukraine and Russia exchanged 115 prisoners of war (POW) on each side. This deal was the first exchange since Ukraine launched a surprise invasion of the Kursk region on August 6th (Al Jazeera 2024). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) facilitated the deal between the two countries (Al Jazeera 2024). This exchange is a crucial reminder of the human cost of war and the ongoing need for diplomatic intervention. It underscores the ongoing humanitarian efforts amidst the brutal conflict and highlights the importance of diplomatic channels, such as the UAE’s mediation, in easing tensions.

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Poland’s Military Surge: Strategic Investments and Recent Developments in Polish Armed Forces

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland has been among the most active countries in supporting its eastern neighbour to halt the advance of Russian forces and to conduct its counteroffensive. This decision was consistent with Polish strategic objectives, allowing Poland to launch its modernisation project and expand its military capabilities. Although Poland’s strategic rationales vary depending on the political stance of its elites (Pawłuszko, 2022), there are three common denominators: the intent to deter Russia, the need to secure US support, and the ambition to become the Central-Eastern European region’s leading power.  Poland considers strengthening its armed forces as essential for achieving these goals. In fact, Warsaw aspires to build the most potent European land force by the beginning of 2026 (Tilles, 2023). While this objective is ambitious, the Russian invasion has catalysed the modernisation of the Polish military and its arms industry (Cucino & Scarazzato, 2023).This paper will address Poland’s recent strategic investments, aimed at developing multiple components of its armed forces, including land, air, sea, drone, and anti-missile forces, and analyse the potential challenges that such a rapid upgrade and amplification of its military capabilities entail.

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Ukraine Aid and European Defence Procurement: Insights from the Prague 2024 GLOBSEC Conference

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is nearing its third year, yet how to support the war-torn country remains one of the most discussed issues in security and defence circles. At the 2024 GLOBSEC Conference in Prague, discussions centred on what Ukraine’s current battlefield needs are, what the role of the EU in meeting them is, and what lessons the Union can learn from Ukraine’s experience. This paper will dedicate a section to all 3 of these aspects, providing detailed information about European actions in support of Ukraine and the future of European procurement.

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