4 June 2021
After more than 20 years since EU member states first discussed the idea of a quick response military instrument, EU Battlegroups are again regaining visibility due to the current institutional efforts to move forward in security and defence.
These military units were first proposed at the 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting. During that time, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was born with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. The Balkan War proved the military’s military inability when facing an armed conflict taking place at its very border. For these reasons, France and the UK agreed to the Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998 on the need for a more autonomous EU with the capacity of taking action in future crisis scenarios, which constituted the base for the future Common Security and Defence Policy (CDSP) (France and UK, 1998). At this moment, the EU was making its first steps towards security and defence cooperation through crisis management operations. In this vein, the EU member states decided to prioritise the implementation of a quick response instrument. Following the positive outcome of the first EU-led military operation in 2003 (Operation Artemis), France, the UK, and Germany launched the first Battlegroup project in 2004, formally approved as a Battlegroup Concept shortly after. However, it was not until 2007 that Battlegroups became fully operational.
According to the aforementioned concept, a Battlegroup consists of a multinational military unit composed of 1.500 personnel, constituting the minimum military unit able to take action in a combat theatre. Battlegroups are designed to carry out single military operations or to intervene in the first stages of larger ones. They are ready to be active for an initial 30 days, which can be extended to 120 days with an adequate supply (European Court of Auditors, 2017, 1). In any case, Battlegroups are the main tool within the EU’s military rapid reaction capacity to respond to emerging crises and conflicts around the world (European Court of Auditors, 2017, 3). For this reason, two Battlegroups are always fully prepared, changing every six months following a rotational logic.
Even though multi-nationality is one of its main characteristics, non-EU countries can also contribute to Battlegroups as long as the principles of interoperability and military effectiveness are implemented (Council of the EU. “11624/14, 14 December 2016, EU Battlegroup Concept”).
Nonetheless, due to political and financial reasons, EU Battlegroups have never been deployed. The unanimity requirement in the European Council has been one of the main obstacles, as it implies that each Member State holds a veto right. Overall, this circumstance has affected the involvement of the EU in international events of recent years, evidencing a limited reaction capacity and a lack of coherence and unity of its foreign policy, which has prevented the EU from playing its intended role in the current global order. Unanimity has proven to be ineffective in foreign policy, defence, and security matters. These are areas where a rapid response is needed and where a great capacity of reaction is vital. In the case of the EU, decisions that should be taken within hours are usually delayed for weeks or months due to endless negotiations that sometimes result in empty declarations or statements.
Another difficulty that member states face in the deployment of EU Battlegroups consists of the financial burden and its division among member states. Unlike the common costs of the EU’s missions and operations financed by the Athena Mechanism, Battlegroups are financially supported by the contributing countries. This means that the member states would have to pay for the deployment of their own armed forces (Schoofs, 2018, 83). While the smaller and less powerful ones are unable to do so, the main European military powers are reluctant to it, given their other military commitments to NATO.
However, during the last years, both member states and EU institutions have acknowledged the need for a more strategically autonomous EU. International events, like Crimea, the migration crisis, Brexit, or the Trump administration induced an unprecedented development of the CSDP. In this context, the 2016 Global Strategy highlighted the need for a more rapid and effective CSDP through the deployment of Battlegroups when needed and suppressing the main obstacles for it.
More recently, the defence ministers from 14 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) have addressed the High Representative Josep Borrell during the Foreign Affairs Council on the 6 May 2021 to create a rapid military response force for early interventions in international crisis (EURACTIV & Reuters, 2021). The proposal includes the creation of a military unit of 5.000 soldiers that could involve aircraft and ships, and that would set the basis for future First Entry Force capabilities (EURACTIV & Reuters, 2021). The issue was brought up again during the European Union Military Committee with the EU Chiefs of Defence on 19 May 2021, where they remarked that “a reinvigorated EU Battlegroups concept could represent a good opportunity for the EU’s preparedness and deterrence in addressing crisis through training, exercises and eventually real deployment” (General Claudio Lozano q.i. Council of the EU 2021). However, they also warned of the current lack of contribution to the Battlegroups and the urgent need to make their deployment easier and more appealing (Council of the EU, 2021). Moreover, crisis management has lately been the focus of the security and defence agenda of the EU, as the future Strategic Compass aims to increase the Union’s readiness and effectiveness when facing foreign policy, defence, and security challenges.
All in all, the deployment of EU Battlegroups could have been a great opportunity for the EU and its involvement in major international events, as these have undoubtedly affected the communitarian affairs and have had endless implications for the EU. However, the aforementioned obstacles and the post-economic crisis scenario of the last years have not been the best landscape for further military spending. Nevertheless, the current institutional and member state-boosted momentum could be the perfect conjuncture to relaunch this useful and powerful tool. The EU is willing to move forward in the security and defence field. The capacity to intervene autonomously would decrease the EU’s dependency on other powers, hence increasing its global influence and allowing for better promotion and defence of its interests and principles around the world.
Written by Carlos BRAVO NAVARRO, Legal Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre
Sources
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