European Union military engagement in the Western Balkans: peacekeeping or strategic containment? EU’s mission EUFOR Althea case study

The European Union’s military involvement in the Western Balkans, particularly through European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is grounded in a multilayered legal framework that draws on EU treaties, international law, and regional peace agreements. Established under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1575 (2004), Althea represents a rare example of EU-led military deployment with a UN mandate. It is the largest mission launched by the European Union to this day. While the mission plays an important role in supporting public security and implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement, it also reveals the EU’s limited legal and institutional capacity to address structural issues like constitutional dysfunction, ethno-nationalism, and secessionist threats. The reliance on soft power and minimal military presence reflects the EU’s constrained ability to enforce durable peace, while the continued necessity of EUFOR underscores both the fragility of the region’s stability and the limitations of existing legal instruments in securing long-term constitutional cohesion.

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Restructuring the European Defence Industry: Consolidation and Internationalisation

Defence constitutes a rather atypical industrial sector. Due to the sensitive nature of its products, it has long been strictly protected by states and ‘placed outside the bounds of free-market economy’. Countries with a relevant industrial base have traditionally sought self-sufficiency in arms production for national security. States’ control over their domestic industry has frequently slowed or even hindered attempts at cross-border European cooperation. This has ultimately resulted in a significant fragmentation of the European defence industry. 

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Explaining EU Maritime Security Cooperation through the Coordinated Maritime Presences Tool

Since the creation of the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the Union has launched three naval operations under this framework. The inclusion of maritime security and anti-piracy operations increasingly shows that EU security and defence cooperation has acquired a naval dimension (Nováky, 2022, pp. 56-57). The three designated naval operations undertaken through CSDP measures are Operation Atlanta (EU NAVFOR), a counter-piracy operation to protect maritime traffic off the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean; Operation Sophia (EU NAVFOR Med), which sought to combat the network of human smugglers and traffickers in the Central Mediterranean from 2015 to 2020; and Operation IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI), which is focused on the enforcement of the United Nation’s arms embargos against Libya since 2020 (Nováky, 2022, p. 57).

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European Command and Control Capabilities in Executive CSDP Missions and Operations

The European Union aims to strengthen its security and defence capabilities in an increasingly contested strategic environment. Recent initiatives have pursued deeper military cooperation and integration among the European member States, but also the development of the EU’s platforms and programmes - including in the area of Command and Control (C2). Whereas CSDP missions and operations tended to rely on ad hoc, temporary C2 solutions chosen from an array of designated Command Options, in recent years the EU has taken steps towards their centralisation by creating the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). Today, the MPCC exercises C2 over all non-executive CSDP missions and may also exercise C2 over one executive CSDP mission, albeit limited to the Battlegroup size. Although they allow for greater flexibility to adapt to every specific crisis, the EU’s current C2 architecture suffers from inefficiencies that may hinder its crisis response capabilities in its new strategic environment. This paper contends that creating a standing, permanent C2 structure for all CSDP missions and operations would allow the EU to better achieve its strategic goals.

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