Introduction

The US State Department has approved the sale of eight High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and 24 M30A2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) to Croatia following the Croatian government’s request, totalling a sale of around $390M (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2024). The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) stated that the HIMARS acquisition will help Croatia to increase its deterrence capacity against future threats (Saballa, 2024). Considering its long-range capacity and proven success on the battlefield in Ukraine, HIMARS carry a strategic importance for both Croatia and NATO to securitise the Southern European region, especially after the rising geopolitical tensions between Serbia and the local Kosovar government (International Crisis Group, 2024).

A Strategic Change in Croatian Defence Policy

Croatia’s decision to purchase HIMARS and several other high-end missiles is not a coincidence. In light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Croatian government decided to increase its military spending and improve defensive measures following the examples of other countries in Europe (Felstead, 2024). In August, Croatian Defence Minister Ivan Anušić announced that the country will reintroduce mandatory military service of 2 months starting from 1 January 2025 (AP News, 2024). Croatia has also acquired six Rafale fighter jets this year (NATO Allied Air Command, 2024) and announced its plans to modernise the army in cooperation with the local defence industry (Ministry of Defence of Croatia, 2024).

The Western Balkans, Conflict and NATO’s Position

The Western Balkans is becoming an increasingly significant region where the interests of both Western nations and other actors like Russia and China have become more transparent.  Following the end of the Yugoslav War, Western political and military interest in intervention declined considerably (Mujanović, 2024, p. 5), considering the relative level of peace that was achieved by the formation of new states. Currently, the most significant security threat in the region alongside Russian hostility is the ongoing conflict in North Kosovo, where the ethnic tensions between Serbs and Kosovars threaten to spread to neighbouring countries like Albania and Macedonia (Vovchuk, 2023). 

Another potential threat is the “Serbian World” rhetoric of the Serbian government regarding ethnic Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially within Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) (Bandović, n.d.). In addition to the internal security concerns of Balkan states, Serbia’s special relationship with Russia puts extra pressure on NATO and the EU to build resilience in the region, as Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine might resonate with the ongoing crisis in Kosovo (Nyemann, n.d.). This political pressure has compelled Croatia, a NATO member state, to bolster its defence and strengthen NATO’s southern border. 

Conclusion

The US’ approval to sell HIMARS and guided missiles to Croatia therefore shows the increasing importance of security concerns in the Western Balkans. As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has once again increased the focus of Western nations on Eastern Europe (Cipek, 2024), Croatia’s decision to increase its deterrence capacity presents interesting insights and implications about its relationship with Serbia. Continued modernization of both land and air defences since early this year shows that Croatian officials are able to navigate between peaceful resilience and capacity building as a stakeholder in the region.

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