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U.S. Integrated Deterrence and Europe’s Strategic Autonomy: Issues for Deterring Russia

Written by Gonzalo Vidal

Edited by Chiara Nasonte

Supervised by Cansu Macit Karaduman

The Ukraine war has had a myriad of geopolitics outputs in Europe, from grain commerce, energy supply, and to defence architecture of the continent. For the latter concept, it is well known that the United States plays a significant role in the deterrence equation through NATO (NATO, 2022). Nevertheless, the situation before Russian aggression is likely to change, and the burden of forward posture efforts from the different allies will be realigned.

The 2022 National Defence Strategy (NDS) deposited in Congress by President Biden has some concepts that suggest changes in the medium term for Europe’s defence with regard to less American engagement in the continent, which implies greater self-reliance (Martini, et al., 2023). The NDS seeks to rely less on hard power and enduring other pressure measures delving into the broad alliances that the US has in comparison to autocracies, such as China and Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022a).

In the realm of alliances for the US, the one with Europe is long-lasting and one of the closest, which does not entail a status quo. The novel strategy suggests a reduction of US resources, not only in terms of budget, but also in a less forward posture in Europe (Martini et al., 2023), which might suppose the increase of Russia’s boldness to adopt aggressive postures (Cozad et al, 2023), unless it is countered with different deterrence strategies. For that, building strong capabilities to sustain the deterrence effort is critical for Europe.