It can be argued that the pact represents a further step in Washington’s cutback of its involvement in European security and defence affairs. This policy was begun in earnest under the Trump administration with its emphasis on ‘America First’ and reduced commitment to NATO; however, signs of a broader shift towards the Indo-Pacific region as opposed to Europe could also be observed during the Obama administration.  As such, Aukus could arguably be a continuation of this policy. Despite its involvement of the UK, its current form bypasses the rest of Europe, and its area of operation remains firmly in the Indo-Pacific. The fact that France, despite having a pre-existing submarine agreement with Australia that was cancelled in favour of Aukus – without Paris being informed until shortly before the announcement – might be a further indication of this.

Suppose the pact does represent a growing US American distance from European security affairs. In that case, this could potentially lead to greater cooperation and coordination between states and armies within the continent in pursuit of common interests. From 2016 onwards, partly in response to the quasi-isolationist foreign policy of the Trump administration, the EU developed a number of initiatives to enhance common security and defence policy. For example, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) were approved in 2017 and allowed EU defence ministries across the bloc to cooperate, consult, and inform one another, thus allowing for synchronisation of policies and practices. The European Defence Fund was also set up in April with a €7.9bn budget to be allocated for the enhancement of combined defence efforts and projects. The EU’s “strategic compass” is set to be unveiled in early 2022 “to give… EU security policy a sense of purpose and direction”; it is possible that Aukus might impact this even more in favour of greater “strategic autonomy”. The trend is likely to continue if the US continues to reduce its involvement. Since September, there have already been indications of this effect. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has said that Aukus was “a wake-up call for Europe” and that it was now necessary to “take the initiative”. This echoed Jean-Claude Juncker’s call in the wake of Trump’s election that “if Europe does not take care of its security, nobody else will do it for now”. France has also renewed calls for a greater “strategic autonomy” of geopolitical and military strategy.

Overall, the Aukus Pact is a considerably significant milestone in the future of European security and defence policy. It presents an opportunity for the continents’ states and militaries to engage in deeper cooperation and enhance their capabilities. This is possible whether the US’ focus shifts away from Europe – necessitating an autonomous European policy – or whether Aukus leads to renewed cooperation with the US over defence and security, in which case a more coordinated European approach will also be desirable.