12 April 2021
Russia is displaying an unprecedented military might in the Arctic region by testing its newest nuclear torpedo in a region currently freed from ice due to climate change. This is part of a chain of actions to secure its northern coast as the Arctic terrain is becoming a key issue for security, especially for Russia and the United States.
A few days ago, satellite images surfaced of the infrastructure on Alexandra land island, Arkhangelsk Oblast, designed to advance the creation of the Poseidon 2M39 missile, also named “doomsday” because of its devastating power, which will be tested next summer. “Doomsday” is an underwater nuclear torpedo designed to hit the ocean floor, kicking up a radioactive tsunami that could spread deadly radiation over thousands of miles of land, rendering it uninhabitable, thus threatening the coastline security of the United States (Colson, 2021). Therefore, the Pentagon’s reaction has not been long awaited. Press Secretary John F. Kirby stated that the United States is closely monitoring the progress, and reiterated that the US has its own interests it will defend as well. It was also outlined that the militarisation of the Arctic is not a scenario that the US is happy about (Lopez, 2021).
Experts warn that the torpedo being developed is powered by a nuclear reactor and is intended to sneak past coastal defences to deliver a warhead of multiple megatons. The radioactive waves resulting from the detonation would render part of the coastline uninhabitable for decades. Such a move is of particular interest and concern for the US and its allies because Russia seems to be refurbishing its Soviet-era fleet of nuclear and conventional-powered icebreakers, nuclear torpedoes, etc. The fact that such bases are inside the Russian territory, thus part of legitimate defence of its borders, shall by no means be understood as there-to-stay. The Russian’s Realpolitik strategy is prone to advance at any moment to establish a de facto control over areas of the Arctic circle that are further afield and more ice-free (Walsh, 2021).
The event is part of a broader discussion about the strategic region of the Arctic. The US and Russia are similar in a way that both are placing nuclear deterrence at the centre of their security strategies. Therefore, it is obvious that an increasingly ice-free Arctic due to climate change, new ice cutters, and the enhancement of ports, will make the Arctic more accessible. Moreover, it is not the first time that Russia is testing nuclear weapons in the Arctic. In 2017, it tested the “Skyfall” nuclear-powered cruise missile which is still an experimental and largely speculative weapon. On the one hand, optimistic voices tell that the disputes will be solved by peaceful means following International law as in any other region (Regehr, 2019).
On the other hand, a less optimistic vision warns about a confined nuclear weapon region. One cannot ignore that the construction of the Poseidon 2M39, firstly announced in 2015 on Russian television, is in full-scale development now, intended to be tested next summer. CNN posted a conclusive picture of the infrastructure development since then. The geopolitical calm and lack of direct threats today is not a reason for wishful thinking. Russia’s show of power always comes with concrete objectives in mind, either economic, security, or both (Devyatkin, 2018).
The New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) ratified in 2011, showing Russian and US commitment to a significant reduction in nuclear weapons over the next seven years was a promising step (Simpson, 2012). Under the treaty, Russia and the US were limited to an equal number of deployed strategic warheads and weapons carrying them, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles. It aimed at imposing strict rules for transparency and compliance. Its importance was even greater in the face of the 2019 collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which left the New START as the only pillar for preventing a deadlock between the two. Fortunately, the New START, which was about to expire in 2021, was agreed to be extended until 2026. However, there are still unanswered questions about provisions that the future treaty will include (Reif & Bugos, 2021).
Moreover, it is well known that Poseidon is part of a new generation of weapons pledged by Vladimir Putin in 2018 as a strategic game-changer in a fast-changing world (Hruby, 2019, 4-14). However, Russia insists that it only has economic intentions in the region, as the Arctic is believed to hold approximately 240 billion barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural gas, which is almost 10% of the world’s known conventional petroleum resources (Urban, 2015). It is believed that in the future, oil reserves will come to an end and thus, Russia will preserve its dominant position in oil export.
Nevertheless, one cannot oversee the strategic military objective apart from economic considerations. As the largest of the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean and according to its 2013 Arctic strategy, Russia seeks to maintain the role of a leading Arctic power. The area’s features such as the direct access it provides to the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic, its relative proximity to potential targets, and an array of important defence industry and infrastructure facilities located there, make it well suited for strategic nuclear operations. Russia’s nuclear deterrence remains not only a key element of its security policy and military strategy but serves also as a symbol and guarantee of Russia’s great power status. (Conley et al., 2020, 6-20) Moreover, criticism towards the aforementioned strategy is that it defines the Russian’s Arctic Zone (RAZ) external borders as a matter of military security (clause 18e). Normally, such work is intended to designate the limits of an exclusive economic zone, not for military purposes which directly contradicts the ever-mentioned economic consideration (Heininen et al., 2014, 20).
In the light of aggressive Russian foreign policy in the Baltic Sea region, Syria, and Ukraine and meddling in Western democratic processes, why believe that Russia’s behaviour in the Arctic will remain cooperative? The dichotomy of cooperative versus competitive Russia is not new. For example, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union sold oil and gas to Western Europe and bought Western goods, while maintaining the Warsaw Pact as a strategic buttress against NATO (Klimenko, 2016).
By developing such a powerful nuclear torpedo while negotiating for an extension of the New START, it enhances the evidence that it adopts different foreign policy behaviours depending on the context. Another example is striving to outweigh NATO and US in the Arctic while at the same time being a cooperative member of the Arctic Council. Furthermore, it calls for cooperation in the region while maintaining that NATO is a primary national security threat. At home, Russian leaders express the hope that tapping natural resources and opening a Northern Sea Route will enhance Russian power. Abroad, Russian diplomats insist that Russia is a regional Arctic player that is ready to cooperate through multilateral organisations (Grietsenko, 2016, 3-18).
Without doubt, the Arctic serves to bolster Russia’s “greatness”, however it shall not be perceived as a dominant regional power yet. In both the pan-Arctic and the Barents Sea region, states are wealthy, highly developed, and not dependent on Russia for trade or security. There are EEA members (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) and NATO members (U.S. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway). Despite the violation of sea law by staging large scale exercises and protesting against NATO’s activity in Norway’s Svalbard archipelago, it ultimately requires the support of Nordic countries for investment, finance, and technology to enhance its own energy production and regional development. Coupled with the sanctions over the Ukrainian conflict, it definitely limits its power (Closson, 2017, 2-9).
Nevertheless, the conclusion, based on today’s state of affairs, is that Russian aspirations are not to be neglected, especially in the light of newest events. The Arctic is one of the few regions in the world where Russian and Western leaders meet on an equal level, therefore, abiding by international rule in demarcated boundaries, concluding binding agreements is of tremendous importance for enhancing peace and stability for all.
Written by Mihaela UNGUREANU, Legal Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre
Sources
Colson, T. (2021) ‘Russia is testing a nuclear torpedo in the Arctic that has the power to trigger radioactive tsunamis off the US coast’, Business Insider. [online] Available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-tests-nuclear-doomsday-torpedo-in-arctic-expands-military-2021-4?international=true&r=US&IR=T [accessed 7 April 2021]
Lopez, T. (2021) ‘DOD Closely Monitoring Russian Activities in Arctic’, Defence. [online] Available at: https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2561489/dod-closely-monitoring-russian-activities-in-arctic/ [accessed 10 April 2021]
Walsh, N.P, (2021) ‘Satellite images show huge Russian military build-up in the Arctic’, CNN. [online] Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/05/europe/russia-arctic-nato-military-intl-cmd/index.html [accessed 10 April 2021]
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