9 December 2020
Deterrence – the practice intended to discourage an adversary from taking unwanted actions, mainly concerning military aggression – has been the main subject of European defence policies. However, much of the existing dialogue on deterrence is focused on space and cyber, which are considered to be the new domains of warfare. Although these domains complement the conventional ones, they do not replace them. Therefore, possessing reliable military capability at sea, in the air, and on land is still crucial to any deterrence strategy. Considered that, this Info Flash will focus on land forces, specifically on the importance of armour for increasing both European military power and deterrence.
Although armour is a quintessential component of hard power, it has a practical use across a wide range of conflicts. It has Full Operational Capability (FOC) even in the most hostile environments, allowing land forces to hold ground at any time and in any weather. It also has “the highest levels of firepower, protection, and tactical manoeuvrability of any land capacity” (Kjellgren, 2020). Furthermore, considering its speed and highly destructive and precise firing, the tank’s lethality is unquestionable. Armour is thus a key component of deterrence and Europe’s potential adversaries seem to be well aware of that. For instance, the Russian Federation has been modernising its tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) for the last decade, effectively closing the qualitative gap that once existed between Russian land forces and their European counterparts.
European armour, by contrast, seems to be locked in a time warp. Studies have shown that around 75% of European armoured or mechanised brigades currently hold ageing or outdated equipment, diminishing not only their value in a collective defence scenario but also their ability to deliver a credible deterrence effect. Moreover, even though Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and France each claim to have armoured divisions, they would not suffice in the event of a conflict involving a state level opponent that is able to resort, in part, to modern equipment. In fact, according to Kjellgren (2020), were the United States (US) forces to be excluded, there would be a deficit of at least 2500 tanks in the event of a war with the Russian Federation in the Baltic region. This disparity, however, is likely to grow even larger.
Notably, even if European countries manage to increase and modernise their armour, there would still be a major challenge to overcome: military mobility. The European Union (EU) has not yet established standardised regulations for the transport of military equipment across its territory. In other words, national rules still apply for the transport of dangerous goods, transforming every and each border in a bureaucratic barrier that significantly hinders armed forces from moving effectively and swiftly in crisis scenarios. Certainly, the mobility issue is further complicated by the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, which entails the development of specific regulations between both stakeholders. On top of this, current infrastructure inconsistencies across the EU’s territory still need to be addressed in order to increase efficiency in military mobility, as well as European deterrence.
The Russian military build-up and the deteriorating security environment at the EU’s borders pose a serious threat to European armoured deterrence and ultimately to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. If Europe is to retain its global influence and to be able to protect its values and to meet its adversaries on a relatively even playing field, then it is critical that European ground forces are modernised and equipped with state-of-the-art armour. This will increase the European capability to deal with internal and international security issues and offer a credible deterrence effect.
Although armour is an important element in the US-European relation, the EU should not depend completely on the United States’ armoured forces. To do otherwise would be unduly optimistic and naïve, particularly if one takes into consideration both the domestic and geo-political issues that strain relations between these two international players. Lastly, since there is no legal framework concerning military mobility, the EU must seek the simplification of cross-border movement for better readiness and availability of European armour in crisis conditions. Addressing mobility deficiency is paramount to increase European armoured deterrence. Afterall, there is no point in having a force that cannot be deployed within a reasonable timeframe.
Written by Leandro PEREIRA MENDES, Legal Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre
Sources
Barrie, D. et al (2019). Defending Europe: scenario-based capability requirements for NATO’s European members. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/05/defending-europe.
Kjellgren, J. (2020) Importance of European Amour. Izmir: NATO, Land Power Magazine Fall 2020. Available at: https://lc.nato.int/media-center/landpower-magazine/latest-edition.
Latici, T. (2020) Military Mobility: Infrastructure for the defence of Europe. Brussels: European Parliament, European Parliamentary Research Service. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2020)646188.
Mazarr, MJ. (2018) Understanding Deterrence. RAND Corporation. Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE295.html.
Watling, J. (2020) By Parity and Presence: Deterring Russia with Conventional Land Forces. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Available at: https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/parity-and-presence-deterring-russia-conventional-land-forces.
