Since its establishment in December 2017 by the Council of the European Union under the Council Decision 2017/2315, the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which consists of all EU Member States (MS) minus Denmark and Malta, has supervised the development of 47 projects (PESCO Secretariat, 2021). Among these projects is the Military Mobility (MM) project, founded in 2018 and characterized by the nearly full participation of PESCO Members, apart from Ireland. Coordinated by the Netherlands, the MM project aims to simplify and standardise cross-border military transport procedures, side-stepping long bureaucratic procedures for the movement of military personnel and equipment through or over the EU MS (PESCO Secretariat, 2021), thereby enhancing the availability, interoperability, flexibility, and deploy-ability of the forces of the MS, as required by Article 2(c) of Protocol 10 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). This purpose is coherent with the binding Commitment 12, undertaken by PESCO participating states, which requires states to simplify and standardise “cross border military transport in Europe for enabling rapid deployment of military materiel and personnel” (PESCO Secretariat, 2021; Latici, 2019, 2).
The same Council Decision which established PESCO allows for the possibility of an exceptional invitation of third non-EU MS for their participation in individual PESCO-coordinated projects (Article 4(2)(g) Council Decision 2017/2315). The general conditions and requirements for the participation of third states should be outlined with a Council Decision (Article 9 Council Decision 2017/2315). The Council indicated these conditions and requirements in November 2020, including sharing the fundamental values of the EU as laid down in Article 2 TEU (Article 3(a) Council Decision 2020/1639) and the principles and objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) listed in Article 21(1)(2) TEU (Article 3(a) Council Decision 2020/1639.). In addition, the third state should provide substantial added value to the project. It should contribute to achieve its objectives (Article 2(b) Council Decision 2020/1639) and, more generally, strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Article 2(c) Council Decision 2020/1639).
The ability to include third states in PESCO projects was quickly put into practice. In May 2021, the Council accepted the requests of Canada, Norway, and the United States to participate in the MM project, authorising the Netherlands, as coordinator of the project, to invite the three states (Council of the EU, 2021). This decision was welcomed by Josep Borrell, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, based on the expertise of the three states in the area of shared priority and common interest in the transatlantic relations (Council of the EU, 2021).
More recently, in May 2021, Turkey expressed its interest in joining the MM project by formally sending a request to the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands (Brzozowski, 2021). A key NATO Member in the Middle East area and one of the main actors involved in the Syrian civil war, Turkey has strained military and diplomatic relations with two EU and PESCO MS, namely Cyprus and Greece, due to the Turkish occupation of the northern half of the island of Cyprus and conflicts over maritime zones in the Aegean Sea.
According to Turkish diplomatic sources, the cooperation of Turkey in the context of PESCO would lead to a normalisation of the relations between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece and to an improved cooperation between the EU and NATO (Sanz, 2021). In this direction, Spain’s Minister of Defence, Margarita Robles, stressed the importance of the possibility for NATO Members to join PESCO projects, including the MM project, which she called a great opportunity due to its importance for the Alliance (Government of Spain, 2021).
At the same time, critical voices of a possible Turkish participation in the project have arisen. In May 2021, four Italian members of the Identity and Democracy group at the European Parliament (Zanni, Campomenosi, Bonfrisco, Ceccardi), in a parliamentary question addressed to the Council, labelled a possible participation of Turkey in the MM project as a matter of concern for the European defence apparatus. They argued this due to the aggressive tendencies manifested by Turkey against several EU MS and the continued deterioration of relations between the EU and Turkey (European Parliament, 2021). Similarly, the Minister of Defence of Austria, Klaudia Tanner, affirmed in July 2021 that Turkey does not fulfil the admission requirements for third countries, namely sharing the democratic values of the EU and having good neighbourly relations with the EU (CoE, 2021). In addition, the Minister indicated the current lack of dialogue between Turkey and the EU on key defence and security issues as another obstacle (Noyan, 2021).
The aforementioned criticisms reflect more general concerns which have been expressed regarding the deterioration of the relations between the EU and Turkey. As pointed out by a Resolution of the European Parliament in May 2021, the “continuous and growing distancing from EU values and standards” pursued by the Turkish government and the “unilateral actions in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as […] provocative statements against the EU and its Member States” necessitated a “reassess[ment of] the current state of these relations and their framework” (European Parliament, 2021). These concerns, read along with Article 3(a) of Council Decision 2020/1639, constitute a noticeable barrier for an approval by the Council of Turkish participation in the MM project.
In its first three years of existence, the MM project has experienced quick development, with the participation of three non-EU MS in the project. Turkey is a fundamental actor in the Middle East scenario and hosts the second-largest army within NATO, of which it remains a key member. This is notwithstanding long-lasting conflicts with fellow NATO member Greece, recent frictions with other EU MS and the United States and closer commercial and military partnerships with Russia, including the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system by the Erdogan administration (Macias, 2021). However, it is unlikely that Turkey will join the MM project in the foreseeable future, due to the various concerns regarding the relationship between Turkey and the EU and the acceptance by Ankara of the fundamental EU values, an essential condition for the acceptance in the MM project.
Written by Luca Vignati
Bibliography
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