Over the past few weeks, the discussion over the future of Ukraine has widely caught the attention, especially in Europe, where President Putin and Biden are meeting to re-draw the map of security priorities of the European continent. The increasing military activity of Moscow near the Ukrainian border and its demands can be interpreted as a return to the “Cold-War spheres of influence”.

This seems to be the case also for Sweden and Finland.  “The persistent attempts by NATO to draw those countries [Sweden and Finland] into the orbit of its interests and opportunistic policies haven’t gone unnoticed by Russia,” said the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova on 26 December 2021 (Wion, 2021).

This statement found harsh reactions both in Helsinki and in Stockholm. On the one hand, in the New Year’s speech, Finnish President Sauli Niinisto rejected the right of any other country to dictate Finland’s security arrangements (Eyal, Rusi, 2022) and this stance was also confirmed by Prime Minister Sanna Marin. On the other hand, the Swedish Foreign Minister Lide and Defence Minister Hultqvist firmly excluded the idea that Russia should ever enjoy a veto over our country’s security choices (Wieslander, Rusi, 2022).

Despite these rumours, Sweden and Finland will hardly join NATO. Although the Russian declarations have not passed unnoticed over the last five years, the political agendas of the major political parties do not focus too much on this issue. Yet, it is clear that security options in Europe are narrowing, and the space for manoeuvre for a smaller state is getting smaller and smaller outside of an alliance, which Finland clearly senses, given its history with the Soviet Union (Wieslander, Rusi, 2022).

In this regard, they have pushed for a more assertive role of the European Union for its own security. Given the current US shift of attention towards Asia, there are good pragmatic reasons for the EU to develop its common security and defence policy further, considering the problematic situations in Northern Europe (Wieslander, Rusi, 2022).

Braw, E. (2022, January 5). ‘Finland and Sweden Are Done with Deference to Russia’. Foreign Policy. [online] Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/finland-sweden-nato-russia-putin/

Ojanen, H. (2022, January 10). ‘Between Russia, Sweden, and NATO: Finland’s defence of ‘sovereignty equality’’. European Council On Foreign Relations. [online] Available at: https://ecfr.eu/article/between-russia-sweden-and-nato-finlands-defence-of-sovereignty-equality/

Wieslander, A. (2022, January 7). ‘In the Firing Line: Finland, Sweden, NATO and European Security’. RUSI. [online] Available at: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/firing-line-finland-sweden-nato-and-european-security

Wion (2021, December 26). ‘Russia warns NATO against inclusion of Finland, Sweden’. Wion. [online] Available at: https://www.wionews.com/world/russia-warns-nato-against-inclusion-of-finland-sweden-440093