While the Bundestag’s elections are ending Merkel’s legacy, they symbolise a new era for Brussels. For 16 years, Angela Merkel’s doctrine has been defending the “European unity” and balancing the European and Atlantic security policies (Buras & Puglerin, 2021). In the wake of heated geopolitical tensions, the future Berlin’s government will be expected to take on more responsibility to defend European interests. Given the rising strategic powers of Moscow and Beijing, and the shrinking of Washington’s presence on European soil, Brussels’ shift from “the responsibility to protect” to “the responsibility to act” is needed more than ever (Puglerin, 2021). On that note, this Info Flash raises the question of whether post-Merkel’s Berlin will deepen the EU’s security role, given Germany’s culture of restraint?

Germany, historically France’s ally, has been presented as a “shirker,” a mediator between the EU and NATO, stemming from its anti-militaristic tendencies, low defence spending, and its resulting unwillingness to increase its military power (Buhary Gumez & Baris Gulmez, 2020). Since the end of the Second World War (WWII), Germany has adopted the “culture of military restraint” and the policy of “never act alone,” thus reflecting its attempts to leave behind its traumatic past (Koening, 2018). To Macron’s dissatisfaction, the country has since been acting as a “civilian power,” restraining the use of force in the international arena while propelling multilateralism (Koening, 2018).

Since 2005, Merkel has been following the mantra of “keep the Union together” (Buras & Puglerin, 2021) by bridging the internal divisions and balancing European and Atlantic security policies (Buras & Puglerin, 2021). Merkel’s defence policy is somewhat trapped between the Europeanists and Atlanticists camps. On the one hand, the chancellor has never been a fervent supporter of “hard security” (Puglerin, 2021), distancing herself from the Bundeswehr (Germany’s armed forces) and being somewhat hesitant with agreeing to military interventions. On the other hand, she has encouraged the creation of a European Defence Union and strengthening Germany’s role in NATO (Puglierin, 2021). Regardless of Merkel’s openness towards a European Strategic Autonomy, her reservations regarding defence policy have been putting the brakes on embracing the “responsibility to act” (Hasselbach, 2021). Put differently, the German Chancellor’s foreign policy has been centred around “preserving the status quo,” knowing that “Germany is too small to achieve things by itself,” yet due to its position in Europe, “it is condemned to leadership” (Hasselbach, 2021).

Nevertheless, while the three leading parties have dominated the German elections campaign, Merkel’s era is coming to its end. The front-runners to succeed Merkel are the Social Democratic Party (SPD) under Olaf Scholz, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) with Armin Laschet, replacing Merkel and the Greens under Annalena Baerbock (Knight, 2021). Apart from the leading figures, other parties such as the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Die Linke (The Left) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) are also in the race for chancellorship (Franke, 2021). However, as the clock is ticking away, it looks likely that the SPD will prevail over the CDU, the Greens, and the other parties (Knight, 2021). But following the rising strategic competition, what does this signal for the European security muscle?

Looking at the big picture, the three leading candidates (SPD, CDU and Greens) share the same views on Germany’s foreign and security policy, in contrast to Die Linke and AfD. Both of these parties strive for NATO’s replacement with a collective security structure, including Russia as an indispensable partner. They strongly object to any form of a European military union and military interventions, which would lead to Macron’s efforts for Strategic Autonomy to go up in smoke (Franke, 2021). On the contrary, the FDP and the SPD follow a more Europe-centred strategy, thus underpinning the idea of European sovereignty and a future defence union (Franke, 2021). Scholz advocates creating a European army and recognises the urgency for addressing the Russian danger at Europe’s borders. The politician has declared that “there will be further European integration” in security affairs that will go hand in hand with NATO’s strengthening (Franke, 2021). Notwithstanding, Scholz’s foreign policy towards the Kremlin does not stand out from Merkel’s doctrine (Gehrke, 2021).