09 March 2021
Laser and directed energy weapons always seemed to belong to the future. However, in 2021, these weapons are increasingly being integrated into the arsenals of several states. In recent decades, multiple arms manufacturers have been researching and developing directed energy and laser weapons and, nowadays, they are steadily becoming more operational (see Finabel, 2019). Lockheed Martin, for instance, has stated that its directed energy technology is ready to be deployed by 2021 (Lockheed Martin, 2019). In this vein, Lockheed Martin announced in January 2021 that one of its laser weapon systems would be operationally integrated into the U.S. Navy (Lockheed Martin, 2021). Similarly, in 2020, Boeing declared the delivery of its first upgraded Compact Laser Weapon Systems to the U.S. Department of Defence (Boeing, 2020). Whilst some enterprises are already producing and delivering laser weapon systems, others are trying to boost their development and creating partnerships for that purpose. For example, recently, SIGN4L and the French companies MBDA and CILAS signed a memorandum of understanding on the joint development of laser weapon systems (Cilas Ariane group, 2021; Defenseworld.net, 2021).
From the foregoing, it is clear that laser weapons will find their way to the battlefield. These weapons are proclaimed to have financial, tactical, and logistic advantages (Lockheed Martin, 2019; Boeing, n.d.; Rheinmetall Defence, 2016). However, when new weapon systems are deployed in combat, the operational and financial aspects are not the only considerations that come into play. There are also legal principles and rules that have to be taken into account in the assessment of new weapons technologies, such as laser weapons. International law places a duty upon all states to assess whether the employment of new weapon systems would breach applicable international rules (B. Boothby, 2017; W.H. Boothby, 2018).
As laser weapon systems are intended to be used during armed conflicts, international humanitarian rules on the conduct of hostilities and, more specifically, the rules on the means of warfare have become a part of the equation (B. Boothby, 2017; McFarland, 2020). Three well-established principles apply to the means of warfare. The first principle, on the limitations of the choice of means and methods of warfare, asserts that parties to an armed conflict have no unlimited choice in their means of warfare. The limitations on the choice of weapons are specified by the following two principles and other specific humanitarian rules. The second principle on unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury prohibits the use of means of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury (Egeland, 2016). The third principle on indiscriminate means of warfare outlaws the employment of weapons of an indiscriminate nature. We must then ask how laser weapons relate to these principles (B. Boothby, 2017; Darcy, 2014; Anderberg et al., 1992).
The prohibition on weapons causing unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury is a longstanding humanitarian rule which is applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts (Boothby, 2017). The purpose of a weapon under international humanitarian law (IHL) is to achieve a military advantage during armed conflict. Therefore, to assess whether a weapon conforms to this principle, a comparison must be made between the anticipated military advantage and the injury and suffering associated by the normal use of the weapon (Boothby, 2017). The principle is violated if the inevitable injury and suffering is disproportionate to its military utility. Evidently, the assessment gauges the injury and suffering that a weapon causes to persons and not objects (B. Boothby, 2017).
Laser weapons can strike a fair balance between military advantage and human suffering, but they also possess the risk of upsetting this balance. Those which focus on targeting objects such as Unmanned Armed Vehicles and missiles, cause little or no human suffering and, in this light, easily comply with the unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury principle (B. Boothby, 2017; W.H. Boothby, 2018). Additionally, this kind of weapon often intends to dazzle the sensors of a vehicle or its operator (Anderberg et al., 1992). Systems such as Lockheed’s HELIOS have an integrated optical dazzler specifically for this purpose (Lockheed Martin, 2021). Since such weapons only have a temporary dazzling or blinding effect, there appears to be a fair balance between military advantage and human injury and suffering (B. Boothby, 2017). Thus, its use might even be preferable to projectile weapons in terms of human suffering. However, permanent blindness of an adversary caused by a laser weapon amounts to unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury (Anderberg et al., 1992). In this case, the balance between military advantage and superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering is more precarious and could be upset. Hence, military advantage needs to be weighed against the suffering and injury. Hence, a laser weapon that is largely superior to projectile weapons would entail a significant military advantage and, consequently, justify a higher degree of human suffering and injury (Anderberg et al., 1992).
While IHL only prohibits blinding laser weapons if human injury and suffering is disproportionate to the military advantage, international weapons law is more specific. The 1995 protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons adopted under the Conventional Weapons Convention (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention) (B. Boothby, 2017; W.H. Boothby, 2018) prohibited laser weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness. However, laser weapons capable of causing incidental or collateral blindness and those designed to dazzle were, and are not, prohibited under this protocol. Protocol IV and IHL thus, treat these weapons similarly. Only anti-personnel laser weapons designed to cause permanent blindness or affected vision seem to be prohibited by both areas of international law.
As mentioned above, IHL prohibits weapons systems which are indiscriminate. This prohibition is an extension of the humanitarian principle of distinction under which parties to an armed conflict are obliged to distinguish combatants from civilians at all times (B. Boothby, 2017). On the other hand, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits attacks with weapons that cannot be directed at specific military objectives or strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Similar to the previous principle, laser weapons can comply with the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons, but they also have the potential to challenge it. Dr Markus Jung of Rheinmetall Defence noted that “laser weapons offer previously unheard-of precision, making it possible to significantly limit collateral damage” (Rheinmetall Defence, 2016). Due to their precision, they could be more in-line with the principle of distinction compared to projectile weapons. However, laser weapons create high energy beams that only stop after reaching an object that reflects or absorbs the beam. Therefore, there is a risk of hitting civilians or civilian objects crossing the laser beam. Once it has destroyed a certain target, it would have to be stopped immediately. Otherwise, it risks hitting everything in its path, including civilians and civilian objects. In any case, the actual practical use of laser weapons will eventually show whether these weapons are a step forward or a step backwards in terms of IHL.
In conclusion, the development and use of laser weapons raise opportunities and challenges in the face of humanitarian principles governing the means of warfare. The technology allows for almost flawless precision in targeting and can reduce suffering and injury on the battlefield. They can therefore be considered as an opportunity to align weapon systems more with humanitarian principles. At the same time, there are still challenges and question marks in the light of these principles. As states have the obligation to assess the legality of new weapons, more opportunities and challenges might reveal themselves (W.H. Boothby, 2018). Regardless, it remains to be seen how these weapons will be further developed and used and whether states and arms manufacturers will seize the opportunities of technological advancement in ways that adhere closer to the humanitarian principles on the means of warfare.
Written by Wout DECLERCQ, Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre
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