Explosive Devices in Lebanon: an analysis of lawfulness in modern warfare 

This article studies the events surrounding the explosive attacks in Lebanon on September 17th and 18th through the lens of IHL, uncovering significant concerns about Israel’s adherence to IHL regarding the lawful use of weapons. The lack of distinction between military objectives and civilian objects, coupled with the high number of civilian casualties, underscores the failure to comply with fundamental principles of IHL. This article explains how the implicit use of devices such as pagers, mobile phones, and laptops as explosive weapons hinders the ability to target combatants while minimising harm to civilians, making the use of this new method of warfare unlawful. This case exemplifies a broader and worrying trend of rising civilian harm in conflicts globally, as seen in Ukraine, the Middle East, and beyond. The analysis underscores the need for respect for the most basic principles of IHL, particularly distinction and caution, when developing and using new methods of warfare, and serves as a call for respect and accountability for the principles that aim to make conflicts more humane by safeguarding the lives of civilians.

Comments Off on Explosive Devices in Lebanon: an analysis of lawfulness in modern warfare 

Rethinking the Concept of Air Superiority: From Sine Qua Non Towards Interoperability 

For decades, gaining and maintaining air superiority has been a linchpin for the Western perception of military power. In contrast, due to geopolitical and technological factors, Russia has historically relied on air power as a supplementary tool for achieving victory on the ground (Grimshaw, 2017). Developments of the 21st century, especially within the technological realm, have, however, proven both of these doctrines to be incapable of reflecting modern battlefield challenges. The evolution of air defences, massive deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and modernized electronic warfare (EW) tools are making the third domain more complex and restricted than ever. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has proven that uncontested dominance of the skies is neither guaranteed nor a sustainable task. Lethal air defence, a subdomain of air littoral consisting of thousands of drones and limited air sorties, have forced both sides to rethink the concept of air dominance and its role within the conflict. While the definition of air superiority remains clear, the necessity of achieving this objective as the sine qua non is diminishing as a new subdomain of the air littoral dominated by UAVs is emerging. Thus, rather than fully controlling and freely manoeuvring within the air domain, both sides pursue so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ (Gunzinger, 2024). This paper argues that the traditional view of air supremacy, central to Western military thinking, is no longer an adequate strategy against the peer or predominant opponent. The failure of the Russian Air Force (VVS) to establish air superiority on the first day of aggression was surprising and gave valuable lessons for military strategists. This conflict underlines the challenges in achieving total air dominance in the face of advanced air defence, UAV proliferation and EW capabilities. Thus, there is an essential need to rethink the air power concept, arguing for focusing on limited air superiority in times and places of choosing. In this context, Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences operations appear to be a crucial strategy. Finally, this paper underlines the implications for Western military thinking regarding air power theory, which is needed to operate within growingly contested airspace. In the face of the modern operational environment, emphasis on joint operations and interoperability in executing successful air campaigns is crucial.

Comments Off on Rethinking the Concept of Air Superiority: From Sine Qua Non Towards Interoperability 

 Kursk Operation: Legal Perspectives of a Counter Offensive

The ‘Kursk Operation’ marks a pivotal moment in the War in Ukraine, shifting the dynamics of this conflict and raising some legal questions regarding the Ukrainian incursion into Russian Territory. This paper will examine the context that prompts what might be the third phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, examining the legal arguments that make this act lawful and compliant with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants States the right to self-defence. By analysing the right to self-defence, alongside the principles of proportionality and necessity, this paper argues that the Kursk Operation can be lawfully considered an act of self-defence. Lastly, it examines the definition of "occupation" to clarify the legal distinctions relevant to this operation.

Comments Off on  Kursk Operation: Legal Perspectives of a Counter Offensive

The Evolution of Ukraine’s Defence Industry and Lessons for the European Union 

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is entering its third year, and the debate around aiding the war-torn country is increasingly shifting towards empowering Ukraine’s domestic defence industry, to make it more autonomous against a larger and more resourceful opponent. At the same time, in 2023 the former Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin suggested that the EU could also benefit from this process by learning from the evolution of Ukraine’s defence industry (EDA, 2023). This paper will thus give a brief overview of the condition of the country’s industry before and after the war with Russia and summarise the main lessons that the EU can incorporate from the Ukrainian experience.

Comments Off on The Evolution of Ukraine’s Defence Industry and Lessons for the European Union 

The Modernisation of the Estonian Armed Forces – A New Approach to Baltic Security

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sparked a renewed concern for Baltic security. Given the hard-earned independence process of Baltic countries, Russia’s aggression and hostile rhetoric push Baltic countries to boost their defensive capabilities. Until 2022 (or the Annexation of Crimea in 2014), Baltic states have relied heavily upon ally stationing and hosting NATO troops in joint operations. However, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the defence strategy of these countries quickly shifted towards increasing their offensive measures and modernising the current inventory. While Baltic countries have always cooperated in many fields since their independence (Vaiksnoras, 2002), military spending requires national-level importance and adaptation. Between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the case of Estonia carries specific attention, as it is the smallest nation (population approx. 1.3 million) and has the highest GDP per capita. The economic advantage also pushes the Estonian Government to test different approaches to the concept of military strategy and be able to deliver better technological advancement to its units.  Estonia’s approach to security presents an interesting case for the Baltic security framework. Unlike traditional firepower or manpower superiority, Estonia relies on a civil-military orientation strategy in which the concept of security expands in different domains (Karabeshkin, 2007). Like the Finnish model, Estonia applies mandatory military service to every male citizen after the age of 18, which enables the mobilisation of the nation as a reserve in case of war, even after military service is finished (Besch & Westgaard, 2024). The Estonian conscription system is also made-up of a part-time volunteer body, which is composed of citizens wishing to stay in the military after their service, and receiving military training for war or crisis management cases. Women can also be a part of the volunteer service under Naiskodukaitse (Women`s voluntary defence organization), taking different roles (Kaitseliit, n.d.) However, the country’s successful branding as an internet-intelligent nation also allows for the local development of technological domains in the defence sector, such as cybersecurity, AI or robotics  (Jermalavičius & Hurt, 2021). The recent success of first-person view (herein FPV) drones, integration of cyber defence command chain and volunteer units with technological know-how are all part of this new “modernisation” process that this paper will discuss.

Comments Off on The Modernisation of the Estonian Armed Forces – A New Approach to Baltic Security