Privatisation of Security: The legal Status and Responsibilities of Private Military Companies in European Missions

The rise of Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in military or civilian missions stands as an important change in the dynamics of the security and defence world, as they change how operations can be conducted, especially for armed forces. Dating back to the Middle Ages with mercenaries, they have taken different forms throughout history. Nowadays, they deliver a large span of services (from indirect support in logistics or military counselling to taking part directly in combat). This shows how they adapted to the most modern types of conflict thanks to their business structure and flexibility in various scenarios. On the one hand, PMCs participate in combats, from troops through training or instruction programmes, having a strong impact on the development of conflicts. On the other hand, PSCs dedicate themselves to tasks related to security and guard duties like protection of facilities or personnel in at- risk zones. While they both provide services to governments, PMCs are employed in training military forces and taking part in conflict zones, and PSCs are used primarily for non-combat missions such as personnel protection abroad and site security. However, by the nature of their work, both PMCs and PSCs may be engaged in violent scenarios. Therefore, it is also generally accepted to refer to them as Private Military and Security companies (PMSCs). The employment of additional resources to the national armies is a phenomenon which requires a comprehensive regulation on a national and international level. It is necessary, however, to draw a line between PMCs and PSCs, even if the lack of regulation and the similarity of tasks unite them. If the classification of PMSCs personnel in concrete category under the Geneva Conventions seems complex, the distinction between soldiers and civilians nevertheless still has to be made to understand what they can and cannot do in conflicts, eventually having an incidence on the rules of engagement they have to follow and the protection they could be granted or not. This paper will present their blurred status in law and their duties in missions led by European Member States, taking a look at the existing legislation and tools to hold them responsible for their actions. Analysing the relevant dispositions of International Law, this paper will try to clarify the risks and potential downfalls of employing such companies for domains normally part of State responsibilities solely. Furthermore, this paper will analyse the complex and fragmented legal framework governing these companies and their employment both on a European and national level, delving into the distinction of competencies between the EU and the national sovereignty of Member States, according to their own regulation on the matter. This will also be done through practical studies of the use of PMSCs in the Balkans region in the 1990s and in the Afghan conflict in the 21st century. Moreover, the paper will tackle the urgent necessity to strengthen the rules and norms that limit the actions of PMSCs to make sure that human rights and ethical boundaries are respected while they pursue their contracts.

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NATO Multi- Domain Operations: challenges for the European Land Forces

The paper analyses NATO’s move towards Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), where cyber and space domains are incorporated into conventional warfare, moving beyond joint operations. The paper highlights the primary challenges NATO faces in implementing MDO: operational adaptability, institutional coordination, technological disparities, and command-and-control structures. Consistent military doctrines within NATO Member States, recognising their historical events and cultural differences, are necessary to avoid doctrinal impediments, stressing the importance of a shared structure and vocabulary to improve coordination and efficiency in operations. The paper outlines the institutional obstacles, like NATO’s absent role in coordinating the implementation of MDO, and how this translates into diverging pathways to operationalise the concept. Furthermore, challenges in technological disparities and budgetary contributions are outlined, followed by an analysis of the command-and-control structures indicating the need for Europe to seek models to develop an MDO- capable fighting force. The paper ends with a key findings section outlining the primary challenges and providing specific solutions to tackle them.

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Finabel’s Space Handbook

With the publication of this Food For Thought (FFT), Finabel explores various strands of the strategic domain of space in the European context, involving analyses ranging from explorations of the sector’s legal dimensions to a further dive into the lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War in the realm of space. The first paper tackles the issue of fragmentation in the EU’s space landscape, highlighting the limitations of governing the domain across numerous different organisations. The second evaluates the establishment of the EU’s Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²), while the third and fourth delve into European endeavours to bolster future capabilities in space and the upper atmosphere and the European Space Agency’s Ariane 6 Rocket, respectively. Moreover, it is here, in the fifth paper, where the space lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian War are considered. Finally, as previously touched upon, this FFT’s second section explores the legal dimensions of space in the realm of defence and security, including an examination of international space law, an exploration of anti-satellite weapons, and the future creation of EU space regulation.

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Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare

The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is evolving quickly. New artificially intelligent technologies are being developed continuously, and sometimes they can be ground-breaking. These technologies are increasingly incorporated into diverse aspects of everyday life and are becoming crucial for commercial, economic and scientific development and innovation. It is not surprising that the defence sector is also seeking to take advantage of AI and introduce these new technologies into the security arena. As explained by Murugesan (2022, p. 4), AI can be used, among other things, “for repetitive tasks to free up security staff for projects that require human ingenuity.” Furthermore, testifying to the benefits of AI, “NATO Member States have already started to invest in this technology and have incorporated it in their defence strategy” (Carlo, 2021, p. 269). Despite its benefits, AI is expected to bring “dramatic changes in the strategy, operational art, tactics and doctrines of the warring sides” (Ploumis, 2022, p. 1). On this line, changes need to be carefully considered and studied to prevent the risks they could engender. For example, AI technologies “have a substantial impact on cyber warfare, but could have an adverse effect and significantly increase the number and threat level of cyber-attacks in the future” (Kline et al., 2019). AI systems are thus expected to impact “the conduct of warfare, bring new capabilities into being, and alter power equations” (Singh Gill, 2019, p. 169). Drawing from these assumptions, this paper aims to study how AI can impact the nature of conflicts. In particular, the paper seeks to better understand the benefits and risks associated with the introduction of AI technologies in the security sector for military joint operations, considering technological compatibility and ethical considerations. How do developments of Artificial Intelligence Systems in the defence sector affect military cooperation? What are the benefits and risks associated with the inclusion of Artificial Intelligence in the defence sector?

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Convergence and Divergences: Unravelling the Challenges and Opportunities of the Future Combat Aircraft of Europe, a key element for European Interoperability

The Russian war in Ukraine has reiterated the significance of air superiority in achieving war objectives. “The war in Ukraine shows what fighting without air superiority looks like – massed armies relying on ground-based artillery firepower for their lethality, with hundreds of thousands of dead in the first year”. So, preventing long and deadly campaigns for Land Forces is critical for Europe, which strong air capabilities can accomplish. The Western world and Russia have been on the vanguard of air combat technology for decades. Since the end of the Cold War, many further countries have embarked on developing their aircraft capabilities, with China putting together one of the most severe efforts to counter Western technologies. Nowadays, building advanced aircrafts requires heavy investment in technological warfare. It is also a simultaneous sign of geopolitical strength. Thus, the possession of self-made aircrafts is proof of having not only the industrial and financial capability to reach higher levels of defence autonomy, but also the will and determination to achieve such goals. In that regard, it is worth to analyse whether Europe has the capability and determination to achieve such a milestone in defensive capabilities as having a standard combat air system.

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