Introduction
Mid-September, diplomatic and security sources warn the international community that Mali’s military junta was close to making a deal with the Warner Group, the Russian private military company. Indeed, two months ago, French President Macron announced that the French troops would leave the Sahel and that he would put an end to Operation Barkhane. Some leaders and experts made their voices heard to protest against this strategic decision opening a window of opportunity for Russia to extend its influence in the Sahel region. This calls into question the efficacity and effectiveness of the nearly decade-long French operation and the European involvement in this region. Aware of the limits of its strategy, the EU adopted a new integrated approach towards the Sahel in April 2021, focusing more on good governance and a transactional approach to build ties and trust with the local communities. Suppose there was a strong consensus in the scientific and political communities on building and promoting coherent strategic communication in those states. In that case, the Wagner deal proves that the EU is still not putting the concrete actions needed and asked for into practice. Disinformation, interference and mercenaries are at the heart of the Russian strategy to extend its geopolitical influence in Africa. With this new deal, the EU is approaching a critical juncture in the region again. How the EU reacts will determine if the EU Strategy towards the Sahel is failing again.
France’s exit from the Sahel: a strategic failure?
At the beginning of July, French President Macron announced the end of the decade-long Operation Barkhane and the withdrawal of 5000 French troops. This counter-terrorist operation was launched in 2013 in North Mali and progressively spread across G5 Sahel States: Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (Pye, 2021, 3). However, as the security and humanitarian crisis is worsening (climate change, numerous internally displaced people, intense intercommunal violence and jihadist insurgents), reaching its worst peak in 2021, the French intervention has become more and more unpopular, perceived as a “colonial hangover” for some part of the Malian population (Al Yafai, Euractiv, 2021). Although Macron announced the end of Operation Barkhane, French troops will not completely withdraw from the Sahel. Indeed, Task Force Takuba, made of 17 EU Member States, will progressively replace Barkhane’s contingent, shifting towards a European coalition while most contributions and leadership for counter-terrorist efforts will remain French (Lebovich, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2021; Pye, 2021, 5). However, as Task Force Takuba first’s objective is to fill the gap of EUTM Mali by carrying out operations while continuing the training of the Malian armed forces and potentially other regional forces, it is not certain, yet, that other partners and contributors would agree to switch to counter-terrorism aims (Lebovich, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
The announcement of France’s “exit” from the Sahel is a risky strategy at the political and military levels. Indeed, at the political level, two French allies are no longer in power in the region: Former Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was overthrown in August 2020 after a military coup, and former Chad’s President Idriss Déby died in April 2021 (Al Yafai, Euractiv, 2021). At the military level, all French and European efforts could be ruined if the Wagner deal is signed. Indeed, the Wagner Group has already been operating at Chad’s border in CAR in Libya for years (Al Yafai, Euractiv, 2021). How long would it take for those mercenaries to look south and operate within the G5 Sahel States? For now, we cannot say, however, it may occur quickly if the EU does not react firmly and rapidly.
Initially, the Wagner deal was depicted as a rumour. Still, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov affirmed at the UNGA on 25 September that Mali asked for “a private Russian military company”, without explicitly giving a name, to help fight insurgents. On the same day, Mali’s (interim) Prime Minister Choguel Maïga explained that Mali felt abandoned by France while being at a breaking point, which is why he was seeking help to fill the gap of Barhkane (Hu, CNN, 2021; Nichols, Reuters, 2021).
Yet, no contract is signed, leaving space for the EU to react (Mackinnon, Foreign Policy, 2021). Following France’s concerns, EU High Representative Borrell firmly asserted that the Wagner deal is a red line that would imply immediate consequences on the EU-Mali cooperation (Nichols, Reuters, 2021). Germany also expressed concerns regarding its military deployment and involvement within UN and EU missions, followed by the Czech Republic, one of the three main contributors to EUTM Mali (Euractiv.com & AFP, 16 September 2021). The UK is also coming up with campaigns pressuring the Mali military’s junta to end the “alleged” deal (Akinwotu, The Guardian, 2021). ECOWAS, West Africa’s main political bloc, expressed concerns, too (Euractiv.com & Reuters, 21 September 2021).
The Wagner Group: a subversive Russian tactic
Indeed, the Wagner Group is defined as a Russian private military contractor while being closely entwined with Russian security services. It is thought to be connected and financed by an oligarch, Yevgeny Prigozhin, really close to President Putin (Hu, CNN, 2021). That deal would, allegedly, imply at least 1000 mercenaries for about 6 billion CFA francs per month, more than 9 million euros, aimed at training Malian Armed forces and protecting senior officials (Irish & Lewis, Reuters, 2021).
The presence of those Russian mercenaries is already established in several fragile African countries. Indeed, the Russian presence in Africa is bolstering Russia’s broader geopolitical aims: to increase its influence and undermine the influence of the West, in particular of the US and the EU (Lyammouri & Eddazi, 2021, 1). New African tactics consist of building military bases, deploying non-traditional security forces, arm deals, natural resources’ exploitation and disinformation campaigns (Lyammouri & Eddazi, 2021, 2). It is factually established that the Wagner Group is responsible for several human rights abuses, extrajudicial killings, rape and torture (Mackinnon, Foreign Policy, 2021). In addition, based on economic motives, those African countries represent a lucrative natural resources extraction business and huge returns. Mali is not an exception with its soil rich in gold, uranium and bauxite mines.
Moreover, Africa counts for 16% of Russian arms exports. “In targeting fragile states at moments of turbulence, Moscow has been able to pick countries off one by one”, always following the same two patterns, natural resources extraction and fragile states, such as in Syria, Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic, Madagascar and Mozambique (Mackinnon, Foreign Policy, 2021). Since 2015, Russia has enjoyed military bilateral cooperation agreements with more than 20 countries, most recently with Ethiopia and Nigeria (Mackinnon, Foreign Policy, 2021). In recent years, Russian mercenaries were already negotiating trade and arms deals with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso (Lyammouri & Eddazi, 2021, 4).
The EU’s Integrated Approach towards the Sahel
Suppose the EU does not want its new integrated approach towards the Sahel to fail again. In that case, Russia’s subversive tactics like the Wagner deal or rough disinformation campaigns should not be underestimated but closely monitored. Indeed, since 2011 the EU has been developing a plethora of strategies and action plans, such as its 2011 Sahel Strategy and 2015 Regional Action Plan, focusing on the development-security nexus but lacking political long-term objectives (Goxho, Egmont Institute, 2021). The EU’s main shortcomings are owed to its two short-term objectives: curbing migration flows and counter-terrorism (Pye, 2021, 5). The Sahel is depicted as a “laboratory for experimentation” for the EU to act and define itself as a security actor, a crisis manager and an instability manager (Pye, 2021, 3). However, the EU has reached a critical juncture since the security situation in Mali is continuously deteriorating. The scientific and political communities reached a consensus on ways and concrete actions to improve the EU’s strategy in the region, focusing on good governance, public accountability and civil society in the long run (Pye, 2021, 3). The EU considered them in its new integrated approach towards the Sahel, published in April 2021, which focuses on good governance, a transactional approach and building ties and trust with local communities (Council of the European Union, 2021). However, besides climate and humanitarian factors, the profound problem resides in the non-ability of Sahelian states to achieve their primary function of protecting their people, being accused of illegal killings, torture and other human rights violations. Therefore, the return of the state is not an end in itself. This vicious circle might lie at the heart of incentives for the Malian state to support the Wagner deal (Pye, 2021, 7).
If several good governance’s shortcomings addressed to the EU were tackled theoretically on paper, the EU failed on the field for three reasons. First, the EU failed to implement a migration plan and to define what “governance” and “ownership” mean concretely (Goxho, Egmont Institute, 2021). Therefore, the EU now needs to shift to concrete actions and implementation. Second, the EU did not address the need for strategic communication. Indeed, Russian disinformation campaigns have grown in Africa as they engage in information wars in Sudan, Guinea, Libya and Madagascar, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique. Now, Russia has a key role in broadcast media in Mali (Lyammouri & Eddazi, 2021, 4-5), with public opinion in favour of more cooperation with Russia regarding the security situation, as recent manifestations with Russian flags and anti-French slogans have shown (Irish & Lewis, Reuters, 2021). Third, the EU needs to issue sanctions and strict conditionality to its military involvement and development aid (Goxho, Egmont Institute, 2021).
Conclusion: is the EU failing again?
France’s exit from the Sahel without any warning and consultation with its European partners already has great repercussions in Mali. The Wagner Group is an “under-the-radar coercive tool” used by Russia, and the deal, if signed, will have long-term effects on Mali in terms of sovereignty, security, governance and foreign policy with a spillover effect for the broader region (Siegle & Eizenga, Africa Center, 2021). It will definitely be a failure for both military (counter-terrorism efforts) and political objectives (the democratic transition leading to the elections in February 2022 in Mali) (Irish & Lewis, Reuters, 2021).
However, the deal is not signed yet, and the EU has a key role to play. Russia, Turkey and China, are trying to extend their influence in the Sahel but do not surpass the EU in terms of experience, commitments and capital (Pye, 2021, 6). Russia cannot compete at the economic and trade level of China, the US or the EU or the growing interests of Turkey, Japan and Brazil (Lyammouri & Eddazi, 2021, 3).
Is the Wagner deal a strategic failure for the EU in the region? Not yet. How the EU will react in the coming weeks will determine if the EU Strategy towards the Sahel is failing forward again. However, Russia will use any window of opportunity: simply exiting from the Sahel would never be the solution. It’s time for the EU to use its power, focusing on efficient sanctions and attaching strict conditionality to its military involvement and development aid in Mali.
Written by Téa Coen
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