Ukrainian Neptune Cruise Missiles and Sea Drones – How a Country without a Real Naval Fleet is Changing the Balance of Power in the Black Sea and the Future of Naval WarfareFrom Theory to Practice: Understanding Nuclear Deterrence and Sharing Agreements in European Security

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his open war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, most observers expected the Ukrainians to hold out for a few days in the face of a superior armed force. After two years of war, the situation on the ground remains ambiguous for Ukraine. However, in the Black Sea, Ukraine has been able to notch several successful naval strikes. The Russian Navy having lost several critical vessels, has had to withdraw from the Black Sea Fleet's headquarters in Sevastopol in Crimea and relocate several ships to Russian harbours. Additionally, it is increasingly failing in its efforts to enforce a grain embargo against Ukraine by sea. Newly developed naval drones and anti-ship missiles are likely key factors contributing to Ukraine’s successes. This Infoflash aims to analyse these new weapons systems and their impact on the Russo-Ukrainian War, the balance of power in the Black Sea and their implications for the future of maritime warfare.

Comments Off on Ukrainian Neptune Cruise Missiles and Sea Drones – How a Country without a Real Naval Fleet is Changing the Balance of Power in the Black Sea and the Future of Naval WarfareFrom Theory to Practice: Understanding Nuclear Deterrence and Sharing Agreements in European Security

The UK’s Mobilisation since the War in Ukraine: The Catalyst for Renewed UK-EU Defence Relations?

In January 2024, General Sir Patrick Sanders, the Chief of General Staff of the British Army stated that “Ukraine really matters" (Sanders, 2024). In his address at the International Armoured Vehicles exhibition in London, General Sanders emphasised the significance of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its impact on the future. The General was referencing historical failures to understand crises’ consequences and previous failures in averting conflicts and cautioned against repeating history by failing to learn from it and stressed Ukraine’s geopolitical importance. In the same speech, the general calls for a substantial increase in the British army's size, aiming to nearly double its current capacity. This initiative is part of the UK military's broader strategy to address a persistent recruitment shortage that has diminished its manpower over time (Secretary of State for Defence, 2021). Additionally, he emphasised the significance of traditional mobilisation while stressing the necessity for ordinary British citizens to be ready for a level of civic involvement similar to World War mobilisation efforts. General Sanders is not the only notable figure alerting the British public that there are dangers to come. Grant Shapps, the UK Secretary of Defence, delivered a repurposed version of former US president George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” (Bush, 2021) speech in January 2024, remarking that the world has transitioned "from a post-war era to a pre-war era" (Shapps, 2024). This InfoFlash delves into the recent speeches delivered by Sanders and Shapps, which have sparked numerous news articles centred around military conscription in the UK and the potential for its reinstatement. Additionally, this paper also explores broader defence topics, examining the evolving recent dynamics between the UK and the EU in the realm of defence cooperation.

Comments Off on The UK’s Mobilisation since the War in Ukraine: The Catalyst for Renewed UK-EU Defence Relations?

The ‘Ukraine Effect’: UK and EU Security Cooperation After the Ukraine Invasion

Theresa May’s gnomic phrase ‘Brexit means Brexit’ echoed around British and international media outlets following the 2016 British referendum to withdraw from the European Union (EU). The ‘British Exit’, or ‘Brexit’, after a process lasting three years and overseen by various Conservative Party leaders, has indeed been achieved. However, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has posed a collective threat to the continent, including the United Kingdom (UK). With a renewed effort to cooperate on security matters, the ‘Brexit means Brexit’ aphorism has seemingly become tainted. With political analysts declaring that this renewed closeness is imperative both for saving Ukraine (Blewett-Mundy, 2024) and for the freedom and security of the UK and its EU neighbours (Ricketts, 2024), it is no surprise that there is an interest in analysing the increased momentum in EU-UK security cooperation. In this context, exploring how and why the UK and the EU have resumed their security cooperation is topical.

Comments Off on The ‘Ukraine Effect’: UK and EU Security Cooperation After the Ukraine Invasion

Poland’s reaction to the Ukraine war and its effects on the European Security Architecture

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 immeasurably disturbed the European security landscape greatly fuelling fear of Russia's neo-imperialistic ambitions, particularly in the former Soviet sphere of influence. In Eastern Europe, especially in the Baltic states and Poland, these fears have grown steadily since Russia's hybrid forms of aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In particular, Poland has felt threatened by various hybrid threat scenarios since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including a potential attack on its own territory. Poland's response to the war in Ukraine has been and continues to be influenced by both geographical and historical considerations. With a border shared with Russia's exclave, Kaliningrad, and the escalating tensions since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the fear of a Russian invasion through the Suwalki Gap, a crucial Polish-Lithuanian border, emerged as a concerning potential contingency since the collapse of the Eastern bloc. As a result, Poland has decided to act decisively.  In concrete terms, this has materialised as the massive expansion of its defence forces and staunch support for its attacked neighbour.

Comments Off on Poland’s reaction to the Ukraine war and its effects on the European Security Architecture

Politics of Aid During the War on Ukraine

It is becoming difficult to analyse the 2022 conflict in Ukraine without also evaluating the political debate in Washington, D.C. This debate is becoming particularly relevant among 'America First' supporters who question the continued financial and military aid provided by the United States. Despite initial bipartisan support for aid packages, dissent has been growing, with critics arguing for fiscal caution rather than continued support. This paper outlines the aims of the ‘America First’ foreign policy. The primary aim of ‘America First’ politicians is that US allies contribute their fair share to collective deterrence in NATO and internationally. This paper highlights that since 2022, many European allies have contributed more than their fair share of defence spending. ‘America First’ poli￾ticians also demand that the foreign policy focus on cost-effectiveness. Understanding the specifics of this term is critical to measuring the success of the US aid program to Ukraine.

Comments Off on Politics of Aid During the War on Ukraine