The potential consequences of cyberattacks under NATO’s Article 5: applying self-defence in cyberspace

The increasing frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks have transformed international conflicts and challenged the international legal framework regarding self-defence. Today, NATO members face security threats capable of causing widespread disruption without the use of physical force. These threats test the aptness of NATO's Article 5, which would be the legal basis for the invocation of the mutual defence clause in cyberspace. The Wales Summit Declaration and Brussels Summit Declaration recognised that cyberattacks may reach the threshold of an armed attack, potentially triggering Article 5. However, invoking Article 5 for a cyberattack raises further legal questions, particularly in relation to the attribution of responsibility and the applicability of the right to self-defence. The involvement of non-state actors and the inability to clearly prove state involvement in a cyberattack challenges the conventional way of executing retaliatory actions. International law, in its current form, fails to instruct states on how to apply self-defence in cyberspace. Hence, as NATO governments appear increasingly reliant on cyberspace for both military capabilities and public services, they should actively consider the uncertainty that would derive from a unilateral invocation of Article 5 in the case of a cyberattack.

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Operation Midnight Hammer: Tactical Triumph or Strategic Illusion?

Operation Midnight Hammer unfolded during the night of June 21 and 22, 2025, as the United States launched a coordinated strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan. The operation involved more than 125 aircraft, including seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, and has been described as the largest and longest B-2 mission since the war in Afghanistan began in 2001 (D’Urso, 2025). According to General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the operation required “months of positioning and preparation” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 3), moving “from strategic planning to global execution” within weeks (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 12). Deception played a critical role to preserve the element of surprise. Just hours before the strike, two additional B-2 bombers were dispatched westward toward Guam, serving as decoys (Holliday, 2025a). Their movements, including staged refuelling stops in Oklahoma, California, and Hawaii, were intended to draw attention away from the real strike package (Holliday, 2025b).

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Should the European States Reintroduce Conscription and Military Reserve Programs?

Modern-day threats, challenges and increased geopolitical tensions aimed at the European security landscape have made several European states reconsider whether to reintroduce conscription and military reserve programs to enhance their national defence capabilities. Although conscription offers a wide-range of benefits, such as ensuring a broader pool of trained individuals, enabling faster mobilisation and reducing dependence on limited professional forces it also implies many ethical, societal and economic issues. Due to this ambivalence, this paper seeks to outline all the positive and negative aspects in order to evaluate their necessity in national defence strategies.

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Toward Hybrid Deterrence: Conceptual Foundations and the Evolution of NATO Response

Hybrid threats, leveraging ambiguity and asymmetry, increasingly challenge NATO’s deterrence and credibility. This paper critically examines NATO’s doctrinal evolution and responses to hybrid threats since first acknowledging cyber challenges in 2002. Despite doctrinal progress and tools like Counter-Hybrid Support Teams (CHSTs) and initiatives such as Baltic Sentry, NATO’s response remains largely reactive and fragmented, activated only post-crisis rather than proactively deterring threats. Ambiguous attribution and contested thresholds further hinder collective action. The analysis highlights persistent strategic gaps and concludes by asserting that credible hybrid deterrence cannot be improvised post hoc but must be embedded systematically into NATO’s doctrine and operational architecture, a concept that will be further developed in a forthcoming companion article.

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Renegotiating Alliances: Trump’s America’s first foreign policy and the European Union’s quest for strategic autonomy

In light of Donald Trump’s second administration and its transactional America-first foreign policy, this paper considers the implications for European strategic autonomy amid the heightened importance of US security commitments and defence capabilities. Trump’s foreign policy is driven by the belief that Europeans have taken advantage of the US within the NATO alliance and international trade, and seeks to renegotiate trade agreements, returning manufacturing to the US and shifting its strategic orientation towards Asia. In the short term, this can constrain Europe’s strategic autonomy, as European capitals are pressured to accommodate the America-first agenda to ensure the US retains vital military capabilities in Europe and continues to provide military support to Ukraine. However, in the long term, the Trump administration’s pressure on allies to spend more on defence and a degree of ambiguity over security commitments reinforces the need for European strategic autonomy and accelerates the development of capacities that enable Europe to pursue its interests more independently.

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