Written by: Nicola Bonsegna
Supervised by: Margot Littlefair
Edited by: Cesar Arnold
Operation Midnight Hammer unfolded during the night of June 21 and 22, 2025, as the United States launched a coordinated strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan. The operation involved more than 125 aircraft, including seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, and has been described as the largest and longest B-2 mission since the war in Afghanistan began in 2001 (D’Urso, 2025). According to General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the operation required “months of positioning and preparation” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 3), moving “from strategic planning to global execution” within weeks (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 12). Deception played a critical role to preserve the element of surprise. Just hours before the strike, two additional B-2 bombers were dispatched westward toward Guam, serving as decoys (Holliday, 2025a). Their movements, including staged refuelling stops in Oklahoma, California, and Hawaii, were intended to draw attention away from the real strike package (Holliday, 2025b).
Given that refuelling aircraft represents a vulnerability in stealth operations due to their size and radar signature, the U.S. Air Force conducted a large-scale prepositioning of about 30 tankers across Europe and the Azores in the days leading up to the mission (D’Urso, 2025). This ensured that the B-2s could complete their long-range strike without compromising stealth. Ahead of the bombers, the Air Force deployed a wide array of fighter aircraft– including F-22 Raptors, F-35 Lightning IIs, F-15E Strike Eagles, and F-16 Fighting Falcons– to the Middle East (D’Urso, 2025). These aircraft flew ahead of the bombers at high altitude and speed, sweeping the airspace for potential threats and suppressing enemy air defences (D’Urso, 2025; Holliday, 2025b). Using AGM-88 HARM and AGM-88E AARGM missiles, these Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) assets targeted Iranian radar and surface-to-air missile systems (D’Urso, 2025). Their deployment ahead of the bomber was essential to ensure a safe corridor for the B-2s and maintain the strike’s surprise effect.
Other assets contributing to the operation included a guided missile submarine, launching Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles against the Esfahan nuclear site, and a full array of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, with reports confirming that heavy electronic jamming occurred across the electromagnetic spectrum (Britzky & Robinson, 2025). Altogether, the coordinated use of these assets enabled U.S. forces to maintain the element of surprise, with Iran reportedly unable to respond to the massive strikes. Underscoring the operation’s successful stealth and suppression, General Caine stated that “Iran’s fighters did not fly, and it appears that its surface-to-air missile systems did not see us” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 9).
To strike Iran’s most fortified nuclear sites, the United States employed the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the largest conventional bunker-busting bomb in the world (D’Urso, 2025). Designed specifically to destroy deeply buried facilities, the GBU-57 remains the only conventional weapon capable of targeting the kind of hardened underground infrastructure found at Fordow and Natanz. Israel, which lacks this capability, had reportedly requested the U.S. complete the mission using it (Britzky & Robinson, 2025). In total, B-2 bombers dropped 14 GBU-57s on the two sites, marking the weapon’s first-ever operational use (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para 8). The Esfahan nuclear site was instead struck by Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from a U.S. submarine, as the facility’s underground depth was deemed too great even for the GBU-57 to penetrate effectively (Britzky & Robinson, 2025).
The day after the strike, Iran retaliated by launching ballistic missiles at the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the primary hub for American air operations in the region (Seddon & Pomeroy, 2025). Reports on the number of missiles launched varied: Qatar reported 19, the U.S. confirmed 14, while Iran claimed that 6 hit their intended targets. However, no casualties were reported as the majority of the missiles were intercepted by Patriot and other air defence systems (Panella, 2025). The attack formed part of a broader, largely symbolic response that also included low-intensity drone and missile activity in Iraq. Analysts quickly framed the strike as performative; a calculated move to demonstrate retaliation without escalating the conflict further (Ryan, 2025). In line with past practice, Iran reportedly gave warnings through diplomatic channels to both U.S. and Qatari officials (Mills, Hafezi, & Cornwell, 2025). Such notifications are often used to signal intent domestically while leaving space for diplomatic de-escalation.
Overall, while the strike represented a major operational success from a military execution standpoint, whether it achieved the broader strategic objective of disabling Iran’s nuclear capabilities remains uncertain. U.S. officials initially claimed total obliteration of Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons, with General Caine stating that “all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 10). However, no further details were publicly provided. Contradicting these official statements, a leaked intelligence assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) suggests that the strikes may have fallen short of their intended effect. According to sources cited by CNN, the core components of Iran’s nuclear program, including centrifuges and enriched uranium stockpiles, were not destroyed or were likely relocated prior to the attack (Britzky & Robinson, 2025). The damage appears to have been largely limited to aboveground infrastructure such as power systems and support facilities. The assessment, based on post-strike analysis by U.S. Central Command, remains ongoing but early findings sharply diverge from public claims made by President Trump and Secretary of Defense Hegseth.
Supporting this more cautious view, Israeli sources have also reported that the level of destruction at Fordow was less than anticipated. This has raised concerns that Iran’s nuclear program has only been set back by a matter of months, rather than being ‘obliterated’ or set back by years. Amid these doubts, there is growing apprehension that Tehran may use the current pause to make a determined and rapid push towards assembling a nuclear device (Ryan, 2025). While Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated the scale and precision of U.S. military capabilities, its strategic outcome thus remains uncertain. In the days ahead, follow-on intelligence and regional reactions will reveal whether this strike changed the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear quest or merely paused it.
Bibliography
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