The New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Can the EU walk the talk?

On March 5, 2024, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the first European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS, hereafter ‘the Strategy’) that she had announced in the 2023 State of the Union speech (European Commission, 2023; 2024b). The Strategy is an important milestone in the EU’s efforts to establish itself as a prominent security and defence actor. It sets out an ambitious plan to scale up the EU’s defence industry to improve the Union’s overall defence capability. EDIS signals the European Commission’s determination to assume a more prominent role in defence amid efforts for a greater European component in defence to navigate increasingly volatile world politics and the return of conventional warfare to European soil. Nevertheless, EDIS bears unresolved issues, most notably pertaining to the Strategy’s budget. It remains undecided and unclear where the financing necessary to pursue and implement the Strategy’s objectives will come from. The main obstacles here are a lack of political unity and differing member state priorities, as well as a lack of trust between the defence industries and governments. This paper examines the EDIS and assesses the EU’s ability to implement the Strategy’s objectives and address emerging challenges while accounting for differing member state perspectives. For the EU to “walk the talk” and live up to its commitments, there is a need for long-term financial incentives at the EU level and strong support from the Capitals to compensate for a previous deficit in defence spending in the past and make the Union a capable actor in security and defence.

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Convergence and Divergences: Unravelling the Challenges and Opportunities of the Future Combat Aircraft of Europe, a key element for European Interoperability

The Russian war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of air superiority in achieving war objectives, demonstrating that fighting without it involves massed armies relying on ground-based artillery firepower, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths in the first year. Preventing prolonged and deadly campaigns for Land Forces is critical for Europe, a goal achievable through strong air capabilities. The Western world and Russia have long led in air combat technology. Since the Cold War, other nations, notably China, have advanced their aircraft capabilities to counter Western technologies. Building advanced aircraft requires significant investment in technological warfare and serves as a marker of geopolitical strength. Possessing self-made aircraft demonstrates industrial and financial capacity, as well as determination to achieve defence autonomy. Thus, it is worth analyzing whether Europe has the capability and determination to develop a standard combat air system.

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A Threatening Heat for the European Defence: How the EU Shaped its Defence Policy to Adapt to Climate Change: Assessing the Recent Defence Policies

As stated by the European Environment Agency (EEA) in 2020, our environment is disastrous and immediate action is required. In an environment where individuals have to flee uninhabitable areas and conflicts arise over key natural resources, the question raises how the EU intends to prepare the military to enable a green transition and how European defence policies adapted the militaries for the challenges caused by climate change.

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Sweden Strengthens Military Ties with France

On 31 January 2024, Sweden and France signed an agreement to deepen their partnership, engage in strategic dialogue on security and defence issues, expand cooperation in the field of research and development and advance their overall defence capabilities (Government of Sweden , 2024b). The cooperation extends to their armament industries and includes the production of essential supplies such as ammunitions, propellants, and explosives, thus rendering the European defence technological and industrial base more innovative, competitive, and resilient (Government of Sweden , 2024b). It is worth mentioning that France-Sweden defence cooperation is well- established, dating back to September 2021, when the two issued a joint declaration of intent concerning intensified defence cooperation in international operations and material provision (Government of Sweden , 2024a). Furthermore, in April 2023, they signed a framework arrangement to develop a common, improved version of a medium-range missile, paving the way for further collaboration in anti-tank missiles (Shepard News Team, 2024).

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Wagner’s Strategic Control in Africa: Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Legacy

Following the recent death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the former leader of the Wagner Group, uncertainty clouds the future trajectory of this mercenary group and its strategic operations across Africa. Wagner has long been shrouded in ambiguity, often categorized as a Private Military Group (PMC), a Private Security Company (PSC), or simply a band of mercenaries. However, some analysts argue that it extends beyond these definitions, asserting that its influence campaigns are orchestrated on behalf of the Russian government to bolster Russia’s position in strategic competition with the West (Pokalova, 2023).  Over the past decade, the Wagner Group has wielded substantial influence across Africa, utilising defence and security services to obtain access to strategically vital natural resources. Moreover, emerging evidence from Russian documents suggests a deliberate endeavour by the Kremlin to reshape Africa’s mining sector, with the aim of sidelining Western competitors from critical strategic areas. Despite Prigozhin’s demise, the Wagner Group’s continued expansion across various African nations, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Sudan, underscores its persistent pursuit of objectives with unwavering determination. After setting the context for Wagner's activities under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin, this paper will explore the current situation of the mercenary group's operations in three African countries (CAR, Mali, and Sudan). It will illustrate how the group offers security services in exchange for access to natural resources and how it has gained momentum in these contexts, partly due to the absence of a Western presence.

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