Written by: Rodrigo Andrade Santos Supervised by: Elise Alsteens Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: The Russo-Ukrainian war has transformed Russia’s isolation into a network of pragmatic defence partnerships with China,…
Since the end of European missions in the Western Sahel and the military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the security situation in the region has deteriorated significantly. Jihadists and other insurgents have gained ground, while the regimes are being kept from total collapse by the newfound influence and military presence of Russia and its new strategic ambitions through the Russian Africa Corps. The disastrous security situation in the Western Sahel and instability in West Africa threatens European Security. This threat is worsened by the presence of Russia and other hostile powers. European countries must find new, improved, and pragmatic ways to engage with the region again.
This research explores the European Commission’s White Paper Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan within the broader legal and institutional framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It examines the Plan’s potential to foster integration in the defence sector through an €800 billion investment, while addressing legal, political and budgetary constraints. Particular attention is given to the legal framework of the EU’s external actions, the budgetary architecture of the ReArm plan and the financing restrictions imposed by Article 41(2) TEU, highlighting the shortcomings and the limits of the competences of the Union in the external actions field and how those impede the creation of a credible, common Defence Union.
Climate change has evolved into a standalone threat. This is changing the role and mission of European land forces, as they are increasingly required to perform humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as partake in conflicts that are exacerbated through climate change. This climate phenomenon is straining the personnel of European land forces, as they are forced to train and operate under more extreme weather conditions, such as above-average heat. Their equipment is also proving inadequate to respond to these new requirements. European land forces, and Europe’s militaries in general, must cooperate and communicate in order to find common solutions to the challenge of climate change.
Europe is fielding two sixth‑generation fighter families, the UK‑Italy‑Japan Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and the Franco‑German‑Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS), to reclaim strategic autonomy following F‑35 kill‑switch and data-sharing concerns. This InfoFlash frames interoperability as the decisive variable, defines the pan‑European combat cloud, and maps overlaps between GCAP, FCAS, and enabling standards such as Link16, ESSOR, EICACS and EPIIC. Making the two projects interoperable would allow Europe to fuse compress decision cycles and deny hostile vetoes over its airpower. Risks of fragmentation emerge if divergent architectures, EU–UK/Japan divides, or legacy dependencies persist. Recommendations call for a NATO‑anchored Combat Cloud Waveform task force, a federated digital‑twin lab chain, and a GCAP‑FCAS board to translate study outputs into flight‑verified standards before 2030. Achieving interoperability by design would secure European sovereignty and coalition effectiveness.
