Introduction

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sparked a renewed concern for Baltic security. Given the hard-earned independence process of Baltic countries, Russia’s aggression and hostile rhetoric push Baltic countries to boost their defensive capabilities. Until 2022 (or the Annexation of Crimea in 2014), Baltic states have relied heavily upon ally stationing and hosting NATO troops in joint operations. However, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the defence strategy of these countries quickly shifted towards increasing their offensive measures and modernising the current inventory.

While Baltic countries have always cooperated in many fields since their independence (Vaiksnoras, 2002), military spending requires national-level importance and adaptation. Between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the case of Estonia carries specific attention, as it is the smallest nation (population approx. 1.3 million) and has the highest GDP per capita. The economic advantage also pushes the Estonian Government to test different approaches to the concept of military strategy and be able to deliver better technological advancement to its units. 

Estonia’s approach to security presents an interesting case for the Baltic security framework. Unlike traditional firepower or manpower superiority, Estonia relies on a civil-military orientation strategy in which the concept of security expands in different domains (Karabeshkin, 2007). Like the Finnish model, Estonia applies mandatory military service to every male citizen after the age of 18, which enables the mobilisation of the nation as a reserve in case of war, even after military service is finished (Besch & Westgaard, 2024). The Estonian conscription system is also made-up of a part-time volunteer body, which is composed of citizens wishing to stay in the military after their service, and receiving military training for war or crisis management cases. Women can also be a part of the volunteer service under Naiskodukaitse (Women`s voluntary defence organization), taking different roles (Kaitseliit, n.d.)

However, the country’s successful branding as an internet-intelligent nation also allows for the local development of technological domains in the defence sector, such as cybersecurity, AI or robotics  (Jermalavičius & Hurt, 2021). The recent success of first-person view (herein FPV) drones, integration of cyber defence command chain and volunteer units with technological know-how are all part of this new “modernisation” process that this paper will discuss.