24 June 2021
This year, the EU has faced many unforeseeable threats that have caused member states to reinforce their defence and security policies and the EU’s defence systems. In turn, fourteen countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) have joined together to propose a rapid military response team called First Entry Force. This proposal has been debated in the first in-person meeting of the year by EU defence ministers (“EU moots creation”, 2021). Notably, the military response force would aid in de-escalating or preventing conflict in foreign democratic nations. The military team would also aid in tackling the EU’s gap of capabilities in early action. Indeed, the European Union Global Strategy has claimed that early warning holds no advantage if there is no early action (Shared vision, common action, 2017).
The proposal calls for the recruitment of 5,000 trained military personnel, including aircrafts and ships. The proposal was discussed in a regular meeting led by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borrel. The proposal has come to the forefront due to the multiple critiques that the EU has received regarding their lack of disposition to intervene abroad, particularly when EU intervention is urgent and extremely needed. Following these critiques, Borrell has strongly advocated for the EU to have more muscle and be a more active participant in the international scene. Indeed, most recently, he called for an EU training mission in Mozambique to help tackle the terrorist groups that have killed hundreds of Mozambicans and continue to instil fear in the country (Emmott, 2021).
Furthermore, Ukraine has recently appealed to western nations for urgent intervention as Russia has significantly increased its military presence in its Ukrainian territory (Balestrieri, 2021). Furthermore, in a recent Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Borell has reinforced the necessity of EU military presence in the Western Balkans to show the world that the EU is committed to ensuring their security, as the former is great geostrategic importance (Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 2021). Necessary EU military action and presence are required in multiple regions, and the First Entry Force would greatly help the EU achieve these geopolitical goals.
Similar efforts to form an EU rapid military team have been attempted by the EU in the past and have unfortunately been unsuccessful. In fact, in 1995, Italy, Portugal, France, and Spain had provided military forces to form the European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) (Machado, 2010). This task force was composed of 12,000 military personnel and had its main engagements in Albania and North Macedonia. EUROFOR was later transformed into one of the EU’s battlegroup forces which are part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), however, they have yet to be deployed. Indeed, due to member states’ lack of military personnel contributions, the battlegroups have reduced significantly (The Economist, 2013). As of July 2012, EUROFOR has since been dissolved. Member states struggle to be consistent in their military contributions as well as lack the political will to take action when international conflicts are occurring (Alarabiya News, 2021). However, consensus over EU military developments is not as far-reaching today as it was a few years ago. Indeed, the EU has even proposed to use these battlegroups to form the EU First Entry Force and therefore increase their military capabilities (Balestrieri, 2021).
Currently, the EU has loudly expressed its defence concerns, including its military weaknesses. Consequently, member states have decided to significantly increase their defence budget, as seen by the European Defence Fund. Additionally, the EU has decided to take a greater role in stimulating the defence industry by enacting the Defence Procurement Directive. EU leaders have also shown great enthusiasm towards the EU’s defence project, the ‘Strategic Compass’, which is set to come into place in 2022 (Brzozowski, 2021). The Strategic Compass will provide a comprehensive analysis and the necessary tools to find potential threats, identify weaknesses, and define the EU’s security ambitions. Indeed, it will somewhat resemble the existent NATO’s Strategic Concept. Its development is of a certain urgency as the EU is attempting to become more effective and quicker in launching military operations. French President Emmanuel Macron has also called for the creation of an EU civil defence team that would respond to urgent calls of aid in situations of natural disaster (Balestrieri, 2021). These achievements aim to show how member states are actively attempting to increase their geopolitical role. Lastly, the EU has also developed the European Peace Facility under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which will allow the EU to have a larger role in aiding member states by providing military equipment and assistance.
These developments demonstrate the EU’s commitment to becoming a stronger global actor, particularly in security and defence, showing the world that the EU can be counted on in international issues such as preserving peace and preventing international conflict. The EU’s economic presence has been felt worldwide, which has aided in its geopolitical influence and helped the EU flaunt its soft power. However, the former can be extremely undermined and circumvented if the EU lacks a military and security presence (Emmott, 2021).
Talks about developing the Rapid Military Response team have also arisen due to comments made by former US President Donald Trump. He critiqued the EU for heavily relying on NATO military action led by the US instead of taking a role for itself, particularly when the security threat is presented on its borders (Emmott, 2021).
Brexit has also given new impetus to the EU in refining and improving their defence and security policies, as the United Kingdom had previously placed many constraints on the EU. These constraints were due to fears of the creation of an EU army and, therefore, fears of losing sovereignty over their own external affairs (Emmott, 2021). Since the UK is no longer an EU member state, the bloc’s defence ministers will face less resistance when attempting to strengthen the EU’s military capabilities. However, there have been claims of contention by NATO military leaders, who fear that if the EU keeps developing its military capabilities, this would duplicate or even surpass the strengths and capabilities of the existing alliance with NATO (Balestrieri, 2021).
Written by Rita BARBOSA LOBO, Legal Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre
Sources
Alarabiya News. (2021). “EU to discuss plans to create of 5000 – strong rapid reaction force”. [online] Available at https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2021/05/05/EU-to-discuss-plans-to-create-of-5-000-strong-rapid-reaction-force
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Brzozowski, A. (2021). “EU and NATO leaders aim to expand cooperation, despite dreams of ‘strategic autonomy’”. Euroactiv. [online] Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/eu-and-nato-leaders-aim-to-expand-cooperation-despite-dreams-of-strategic-autonomy/
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