Read more about the article The Evolution of Neutrality in Europe
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The Evolution of Neutrality in Europe

Neutrality is not a static concept but has evolved significantly, reflecting changes in political, military, and economic contexts over time. This paper argues how neutrality has changed in Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland, particularly in response to the invasion of Ukraine. These European case studies highlight neutrality as a complex, dynamic and multifaceted concept, which has transitioned from a rigid principle to a dynamic and adaptable practice across military and political realms that evolves in response to shifting geopolitical contexts, public opinion and growing alliances. This paper reveals how increased spending, expanding alliances and shifting public opinion have redefined the concept and practice of neutrality in Europe By redefining the territorial boundaries of NATO’s Article 5, which commits members to collective defence measures, new borders with potential adversaries are introduced, creating new vulnerabilities and opportunities for defence.  The paper will begin by giving a brief account of the historical development of neutrality in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries to contextualised the following discussions. For each case study, the dynamic nature of neutrality will be revealed, with a particular focus on developments following the invasion of Ukraine.

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6 August 2024
Read more about the article The Baltic States’ Military Support to Ukraine
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The Baltic States’ Military Support to Ukraine

On February 24, 2022, when the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic States - Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia - were among the first to respond to the request for military and humanitarian assistance. According to the Ukraine Support Tracker, between January 24, 2022, and January 15, 2023, they were among the largest providers of military aid to Ukraine relative to their GDP – Estonia - 1.469%, Latvia - 1.128%, and Lithuania - 1.145% (Trebesch et al., 2023). One of the most important motivating factors could be the common historical past connecting the countries: the states were all part of the Soviet Union, and later, they secured their independence (Simpson, 2023). Therefore, the population of these countries, understanding the price of freedom, strives to support Ukraine on the way to its victory comprehensively. The historical experience of the Baltic States, which were under occupation until the collapse of the USSR, and the ongoing war in Ukraine have significantly influenced the perception of their security and the possible threat from Russia today. For instance, understanding the security challenges connected with the war in Ukraine, in 2023, the Latvian government adopted a law on compulsory military service, which had been abolished in 2006. This law restores mandatory military service for men and voluntary military service for women from January 1, 2024 (Fremer, 2023). Moreover, in 2024, the Baltic States and Poland called on the EU to build a defence line on the border with Russia and Belarus to prevent possible military and hybrid threats (Brzozowski, 2024).

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3 August 2024
Read more about the article Dehumanising trends in Humanitarian Law: the breach of the obligation to protect medical units. Violations of IHL during the war in Ukraine
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Dehumanising trends in Humanitarian Law: the breach of the obligation to protect medical units. Violations of IHL during the war in Ukraine

On July 8th 2024, the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv suffered an airstrike that killed at least 42 civilians, five of them children, and injured at least 190 (HRW, 2024). The hospital was hit during a wave of Russian Federation missile attacks on different cities in Ukraine (UNSC, 2024). Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has sustained at least 9,560 civilian casualties, and 21,450 more injuries, including 1,796 children (594 killed and 1202 injured) (HRW, 2024). The Russian Federation claims that it was an accident, going so far as to declare that: “claims about a deliberate Russian strike on civilian targets in Kyiv are not true. The destruction was caused by the fall of a Ukrainian air defence missile [...] If this were a Russian strike, there would have been nothing left of the building and all the children would have been killed and not wounded”, as stated in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting the day after the attack (UNSC, 2024). This is one aggression in a long list of strikes on hospitals and medical facilities, which are places that enjoy a special regime of protection within International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This paper explores the norms that protect these spaces and the people inside them, aiming to shed light on a worrying trend of unlawful warfare. Firstly, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols are examined, with Article 14 of the IV Geneva Conventions as the backbone foundation upon which the legal protection is built. Secondly, an account of the prohibition of attacks on hospitals and safety zones is explored, which proposes different options in which this breach of IHL could be prosecuted. Lastly, this article briefly oversees the international community’s response to the aforementioned attack and compares it to other conflicts in which similar attacks have occurred.

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30 July 2024
Read more about the article Intelligence Sharing in the EU: Legal Implications and the Role of the European Union Military Staff
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Intelligence Sharing in the EU: Legal Implications and the Role of the European Union Military Staff

The term intelligence refers to the process of collecting, analysing, evaluating, and presenting information to decision-makers to prevent tactical or strategic disruptions (Şeniz, 2015). Specifically, military intelligence is a component of intelligence with its own rules, procedures and intelligence tools. It refers to military threats, armed violence and military operations involving States and non-state actors in traditional armed conflicts as well as in asymmetric warfare. Intelligence has long been part of tactical and operational command and control in order to reduce the uncertainties of the battlefield, which Carl von Clausewitz referred to as the “fog of war”, and to assist military decision-makers in making effective decisions. Intelligence was initially conceived to provide information and analysis to assist the commander in making more effective decisions during conflicts (Rolington, 2013). Nowadays, military intelligence aims to study potential or actual adversaries and identify the risks or dangers in operational areas. Primarily, it aims to support the chain of command at strategic, operational and tactical levels, involving both political institutions and military staff. Military intelligence in the EU is linked to the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) and reflects the ideological construction of the EU’s identity and international action (Gruszczak, 2023).

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29 July 2024
Read more about the article The Future of European Deterrence: a Three-Pillar Approach for Advancing Capability Development and Interoperability
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The Future of European Deterrence: a Three-Pillar Approach for Advancing Capability Development and Interoperability

On 24 February 2022, when Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe experienced an apparent fog-clearing moment. (Besch & Quencez, 2022). For several years, the European Security debate followed a caricatured binary opposition between the US-led transatlantic security and the need for EU autonomy as a geopolitical power, partly motivated by the notion of an imminent US retreat from Europe (Tocci, 2021). Now, while the war (temporarily) restored general confidence in American commitment to European security, it also revealed how dependent European states are on the US for their defence (Puglierin, 2024). As a result, after more than two years of conflict, the subjects of the binary intellectual confrontation have emerged with more defined roles: NATO has reaffirmed its prerogative in conventional deterrence, while the EU has given proof of its crisis management abilities, primarily through financial tools (Weber, 2023). Accepting the transatlantic partnership as the sole and definitive European deterrence strategy is imprudent and short-sighted. The US’ shifting priorities and waning leadership require Europe to decide on a path forward to more strategic responsibility. Among the priorities, an increased commitment to NATO is imperative – especially with a Republican in the White House. At the same time, efforts must be made to reconsider the US national commitment and investments in European deterrence, as well as the role of the EU and its initiatives.

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24 July 2024