A Cor Cinniúnach? Ireland’s Defence Policy since 2022

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strategic position of many European governments has undergone a dramatic reorganisation, encapsulated by then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende address to the Bundestag three days after the invasion. Although far less prominent in this sea of change, similar debates on the country’s defensive future in this new European security environment also occured in Ireland. This study will examine if the changes proposed or implemented in Ireland’s defence and security policies since Russia’s invasion represent a real shift in the Republic’s defence policy -an Irish Zeitenwende or Cor Cinniúnach- or if this is a case of rhetoric overshadowing action. The paper will analyse the shift in the Irish security landscape both domestically and in the country’s international relations, from the invasion to the present, taking into account the release of the new Programme for Government following the general election in 2024, as well as the potential impact of future changes in the country’s internal politics and relations with Northern Ireland.

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Resilience and Rearmament: A Comparative Analysis of Russia’s Defence Industrial Base in 2025

This paper provides a comparative analysis of Russian and European defence industrial capacities in the aftermath of the 2022 Ukraine invasion amid the ongoing retreat of U.S. global security commitments. While Russia has demonstrated short-term resilience through mass production of tanks, artillery, and drones, it remains vulnerable due to technological dependencies and supply chain constraints. In contrast, the European Union, despite structural fragmentation, is mobilising towards strategic autonomy through initiatives like ASAP and EDIS. The study argues that Russia’s high-volume model may face sustainability limits, whereas Europe’s innovation-oriented, collaborative framework could offer long-term strategic depth. The research evaluates production trends, budgetary shifts, and geopolitical implications to assess the trajectory of both blocs in the emerging post-American security order.

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Strategic Autonomy in Action: Europe’s Reassurance Force

On 10 April 2025, NATO hosted the last of a series of meetings of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ (Gray & Van Overstraeten, 2025). The initiative, spearheaded by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and supported by French President Emmanuel Macron, was first introduced at the London Summit on Ukraine in March (Davies, 2025). Bringing together defence ministers from 30 nations, including Canada and Australia but excluding the United States (US), the coalition aims to establish a ‘reassurance force’ for Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire with Russia (Melkozerova, 2025). The group seeks a credible and lasting European-made peace, reducing the chances of a future invasion from Russia even without US security guarantees promised to the war-torn country. In the words of the British Defence Secretary, the aim is to “put Ukraine in the strongest possible position, to protect its sovereignty and deter further Russian aggression” (Gray & Van Overstraeten, 2025). The urgency of the project has grown amid declining U.S. support under the Trump administration, which has pushed Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security as Washington pivots its strategic focus toward the Pacific.

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Can France’s Nuclear Deterrent Be Extended to Europe?

The Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric towards Europe, its seeming reluctance to uphold the United States’ (US) security guarantees, and Russia’s assertive behaviour on the international stage have led to a profound strategic debate on nuclear deterrence amongst Europeans. Some European leaders have questioned whether France could fill the nuclear deterrence gap left by the US, and Emmanuel Macron has initiated a strategic debate to this end. Extending the French nuclear deterrent to protect Europe will require it to be complemented by the United Kingdom’s (UK) own deterrent. It is a process that necessitates careful consulting between European allies, as well as an appropriate framework and doctrine in order to be effective. The question will also be whether France’s nuclear deterrent must complement or replace the US’. For European land forces, this shift signals a closer strategic alignment between European NATO allies and will influence the likeliness of high-intensity conflict in the future.

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Greece’s Military Modernisation Process: Is the EU Ready to Follow?

On 2 April 2025, during a session in Parliament, the Greek government announced the largest military spending plan in its history: €25 billion over the next twelve years (Stamouli, 2025). This decision comes after years of budget cuts following the 2009-2018 financial crisis. The investment, which amounts to around three-and-a-half percent of Greece’s GDP, largely exceeds NATO’s two percent defence spending requirement and reflects the broader European shift in increased spending. Following Donald Trump’s re-election, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has repeatedly stressed the importance of meeting the two percent spending threshold to maintain effective deterrence (Cook, 2024).

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