Soft Borders, Hard Lessons: Moldova, Hybrid Warfare and the New Eastern Threat

Moldova is facing growing hybrid threats, аs the Russian Federation continues to deploy coordinated disinformation, cyber operations, political interference, energy coercion and the manipulation of unresolved territorial conflicts. All these actions are meant to destabilise the state, in addition to complicating its Euro-Atlantic integration (Wesslau, 2024; Maitland et al., 2025; Dhojnacki, 2025). NATO and the EU have responded with corresponding yet diverse strategies: with NATO concentrating on defence capacity-building and hybrid resilience, and the EU stressing on governance reforms and institutional strengthening (NATO, 2024a; European Council, 2025). This piece examines Russia’s hybrid toolkit, all the while evaluating the effectiveness of NATO and the EU’s responses and offering policy recommendations for strengthening Moldova’s security within the broader Black Sea strategy.

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The Role of Strategic Culture in Germany’s Zeitenwende

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 constituted a watershed moment for European security and triggered a fundamental transformation in Germany’s defence policy. Chancellor Scholz’s announcement of a “Zeitenwende” marked a sharp departure from decades of military restraint, initiating significant investments in the Bundeswehr and a commitment to NATO’s defence spending targets. This research examines how Germany’s strategic culture, traditionally characterised by moderation and ambivalence toward military power, both enabled and constrained this policy shift. Utilising the conceptual lens of strategic culture, the paper analyses the historical and ideational underpinnings that shaped Germany’s approach to crisis management and territorial defence, arguing that the swift pivot post-2022 reflects a return to deeply embedded national traditions rather than a revolutionary change. Ultimately, the study emphasises the enduring influence of strategic culture on Germany’s ability to adapt to shifting security demands in Europe.

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European Sky Shield Initiative: Evolution and Challenges in Multi-Layer Air-Defence Against Drone Saturation and Hypersonic Missiles

This InfoFlash assesses how the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) can adapt while advancing EU strategic autonomy and retaining full interoperability with NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD). Europe must stay ready to face saturation drone attacks, massed cruise and ballistic missiles, and emergent hypersonic threats that compress decision cycles and invert defender cost calculus. It frames a triad of space-based missile early warning, a common BM/C2 layer, and missile interceptors as the decisive lever to cut decision time and raise deterrence. It maps current layers (Skyranger 30, IRIS-T, Patriot, Arrow 3) and gaps in stockpiles, costs, cross-border command and data-sharing. It argues for anchoring ESSI to NATINAMDS, accelerating ODIN’S EYE II, TWISTER, HYDIS and HYDEF projects, and adopting any-sensor/any-shooter standards. Recommendations include bundled procurement, EU-level financing, passive/multistatic feeds, and a common operating system to close C2 gaps.

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Simulation-Based Assessment of Passive Airbase Defences in Peer Warfare

The proliferation of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) poses a critical threat to NATO airbases, where concentrated high-value assets are vulnerable to saturation missile strikes. While active defences such as the Patriot system can intercept a portion of incoming threats, their finite capacity and unfavourable cost-exchange ratios underscore the need for complementary passive measures. This study employs a probabilistic, Monte Carlo–based simulation to quantify the protective value of Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) under high-intensity attack conditions. Using Ämari Air Base, Estonia, as a representative NATO installation, the model integrates missile targeting logic, blast damage physics, active defence interception probabilities, and HAS degradation mechanics across 10,000 attack iterations. Two configurations are compared: the current shelter allocation versus an enhanced posture with additional HAS-protected aircraft. Results indicate that increased HAS utilisation reduces average aircraft losses by 4.6%, lowers exposed-to-sheltered loss ratios from 1.85:1 to 1.54:1, and decreases high-value asset kill probabilities by ~7%. While gains exhibit diminishing returns, HAS density also distributes targeting probability, indirectly enhancing survivability across the base. The findings affirm the continued relevance of Cold War-era hardening strategies in modern threat environments and support integrated, layered defence concepts combining active interception, sheltering, and deception to maximise operational resilience under saturation strike conditions.

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Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Plan — Legal Framework and the Limits to a Way Forward for the Defence Union

This research explores the European Commission’s White Paper Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan within the broader legal and institutional framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It examines the Plan’s potential to foster integration in the defence sector through an €800 billion investment, while addressing legal, political and budgetary constraints. Particular attention is given to the legal framework of the EU’s external actions, the budgetary architecture of the ReArm plan and the financing restrictions imposed by Article 41(2) TEU, highlighting the shortcomings and the limits of the competences of the Union in the external actions field and how those impede the creation of a credible, common Defence Union.

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