Written by: Philip Sääw
Edited by: Caterina Panzetti
Supervised by: Victoriano Vicente Botella Berenguer
“I would have liked to have spared you this difficult decision, especially in times like these, when uncertainty is growing” (Von der Burchard, 2024). With these words, Olaf Scholz, the Chancellor of Germany, informed the world of the collapse of the ‘Traffic Light’ coalition late on November 6th. It marked the end of a government characterised by in-fighting and accompanied by emerging global crises right from the start.
The accumulation of these circumstances led to what had been increasingly seen as an inevitable breakup (Stroud, 2024). Amid inflation, an emerging automobile crisis and the Ukraine War, the three parties making up the coalition were unable to agree on the federal budget for 2025, an outcome previously likened to “an impasse at the worst possible time” by Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck of the Green Party (Nöstlinger, 2024). Christian Lindner, the Minister of Finance of the neoliberal Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), refused to increase spending, suggesting a snap election instead, which led Olaf Scholz to fire him. Consequently, the FDP removed itself from the government, effectively leaving Germany with a centre-left minority government consisting of Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party. With no majority in the parliament, Germany faces an uncertain near future, particularly concerning Ukraine and the present geopolitical situation.
The War on Ukraine and aid expenditures being a significant factor in the context of the troubles of the 2025 household is sparking a reasonable fear that disunity among the democratic parties could emblazon the anti-war sentiment fuelled by the far-right extremist Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) and the Putin-friendly populist party Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW). This fear and the uncertainty caused by the government’s collapse have major implications for EU Security. In the National Security Strategy outlined in June 2023, the Federal Government underlines the ‘special responsibility’ for peace that Germany has as the largest economy and most populous nation in Europe and that this ‘special responsibility’ can be achieved by a resilient safeguarding of German and European values through inner strength, in combination with a strong friendship with France and a strong transatlantic partnership with the USA (Federal Foreign Office, 2023). With economic uncertainty within Germany, a struggling pro-Europe president in France and a US president-elect with a firm ‘America First’ stance, the proposed anchor for EU Security is not only crumbling but sparks anxiety that, as Dr Thu Nguyen argues, “a more pro-Russian, or less green” vision of the EU could be pushed by leaders such as Viktor Orban and Giorgia Meloni in light of the crises facing Germany and France (Stroud, 2024).
A compromise having been made between the Conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) and the SPD, a vote of confidence on December 16th will be followed by elections on February 23rd, which means that the German government will at least be able to function for the following months. There is, however, no doubt that Scholz’s Zeitenwende has failed. With it, the need to lead Germany into this new age of new challenges will likely lie with a new chancellor, who will have to recognise that the scaffolding of the post-1945 economic world and the post-Cold War security has been dismantled and has left Germany facing “a new reality” (Dempsey, 2024, p. 4). For the sake of European Security and its future, Germany now needs to face this reality and reaffirm its commitment to Ukraine, Europe and NATO by making serious investments in its defence while being able to weather the storm of the current ‘economic headwind’ (Schröder & van Rij, 2024). This will be as vital as it seems complicated.
Bibliography
Dempsey, J. (2024, January 23). ‘Germany’s Paralysis Holds Back Europe’. Carnegie Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/01/germanys-paralysis-holds-back-europe?lang=en.
German Federal Foreign Office (2023). ‘Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany’. https://www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/National-Security-Strategy-EN.pdf
Nöstlinger, N. (2024, November 4). ‘German Government faces Make-or-Break Moment in Shadow of US Election’.Politico EU. https://www.politico.eu/article/german-government-us-election-olaf-scholz-robert-habeck-fdp-greens-spd-global-politics/
Schröder, P. & van Rij A. (2024, November 13). ‘The Break-Up of Scholz’s Coalition Government signals the End of Germany’s Old Economic Model’. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/11/break-scholzs-coalition-government-signals-end-germanys-old-economic-model
Stroud, L. (2024, November 7). ‘How the German Government’s Collapse impacts the EU’. Euro News. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/11/07/how-the-german-governments-collapse-impacts-the-eu
Von der Burchard, H. (2024, November 6). ‘Scholz sets Stage for German Snap Election as Government collapses’.Politico EU. https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-coalition-government-collapse-olaf-scholz-finance-minister-christian-lindner/
