Read more about the article The Western Balkans: a Crossroads of Interests of the EU, Russia, and China
Info Flash

The Western Balkans: a Crossroads of Interests of the EU, Russia, and China

Western Balkans is a term that refers to seven countries in Southern and Eastern Europe: Republic of Albania, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Croatia, and Republic of Serbia (Bugajski, 2019). This report aims to analyse Russian and EU influence on Western European countries, also taking into account China's growing engagement in the region and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Lastly, in light of these considerations, the paper provides some insights into the strategy the EU adopts in the Western Balkans.

Comments Off on The Western Balkans: a Crossroads of Interests of the EU, Russia, and China
10 November 2022
Read more about the article <strong>Consequences of the War in Ukraine on the Arctic</strong>
Info Flash

Consequences of the War in Ukraine on the Arctic

The desire to access the Arctic's vast mineral reserves has always been a major driver of international attention towards the region. The Arctic is believed to contain 1,699 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and various other fuels, equal to the entirety of Russia’s oil reserves and three times those of the US (U.S Geological Survey, 2008). On top of this, by 2050, it is believed that the region above the Polar Circle may be completely ice-free, considering the rate at which the ice sheet is shrinking and the multiplier effect of warming seas and surface temperatures (La Rocca, 2022). This potential development could further increase the international race for Arctic raw materials.

Comments Off on Consequences of the War in Ukraine on the Arctic
4 November 2022
Read more about the article <strong>Russia’s Rosoboronexport in Visit to DefExpo India 2022 for Joint Production of AK-203 Assault Rifles</strong>
News

Russia’s Rosoboronexport in Visit to DefExpo India 2022 for Joint Production of AK-203 Assault Rifles

According to the Financial Express Online, a special delegation from Rosoboronexport, the sole state agency for Russia’s export and imports of weapons and one of the leading actors in international arms trade, took part in the DefExpo India 2022 that was held from October 18th to 22nd in Gandhinagar (Siddiqi, 2022). The exhibition represented a formidable opportunity for the Russian delegates to discuss the future local production of Kalashnikov AK-203 assault rifles within the framework of the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) (Orujie Rossii, 2022).

Comments Off on Russia’s Rosoboronexport in Visit to DefExpo India 2022 for Joint Production of AK-203 Assault Rifles
3 November 2022
Read more about the article The Russia – Iran Strategic Partnership in the Shadow of Ukraine’s War
Info Flash

The Russia – Iran Strategic Partnership in the Shadow of Ukraine’s War

Closer ties between Putin’s Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of security cooperation (voennoe sotrudnichestvo) has attracted significant attention from Western foreign policy-makers and academic scholars in recent years. Diplomatic isolation and commonly shared dissatisfaction with the long-established American hegemony has driven both countries into a pragmatic, stable and mutually beneficial rapprochement nearly a decade after a new chapter in their relationships was opened in 2012 (Ghadbeigy, 2017). By this time the return of Vladimir Putin to power was clearly interpreted as marking a watershed moment in Russian foreign policy doctrine and strategies that had long since been in vogue under the rule of Dmitriy Medvedev (Kozhanov, 2015).

Comments Off on The Russia – Iran Strategic Partnership in the Shadow of Ukraine’s War
28 October 2022
Read more about the article <strong>Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call</strong>
Info Flash

Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call

After the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson in August, on the 21th of September Putin launched a call for “partial mobilisation” of Russian men between the ages of 18 and 50, with the aim of enlisting 300,000 soldiers amongst the reservists and former military personnel (Il Post, 2022). Three weeks later, the recruitment operation is said to have enlisted over 200,000 people, as stated by the Russian Defence Minister Shoigu (Cancian, 2022) (Il Post, 2022). Even if it is early to say, Russia is calculating whether the new recruits should be sent to the front without proper training as “cannon fodder” (Bathon, 2022), or whether to send them to the 80 camps and 6 training centres outlined by the Russian Defence Minister (Il Post, 2022). Currently the decision appears to be somewhere in between the two, with some of the recruits trained for fewer than three days before being sent to the front, while others completing the training phase.

Comments Off on Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call
21 October 2022