Toward Hybrid Deterrence: Conceptual Foundations and the Evolution of NATO Response

Hybrid threats, leveraging ambiguity and asymmetry, increasingly challenge NATO’s deterrence and credibility. This paper critically examines NATO’s doctrinal evolution and responses to hybrid threats since first acknowledging cyber challenges in 2002. Despite doctrinal progress and tools like Counter-Hybrid Support Teams (CHSTs) and initiatives such as Baltic Sentry, NATO’s response remains largely reactive and fragmented, activated only post-crisis rather than proactively deterring threats. Ambiguous attribution and contested thresholds further hinder collective action. The analysis highlights persistent strategic gaps and concludes by asserting that credible hybrid deterrence cannot be improvised post hoc but must be embedded systematically into NATO’s doctrine and operational architecture, a concept that will be further developed in a forthcoming companion article.

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Operation Spiderweb: under Russia’s nose

On 1 June 2025, Ukraine launched Operation Spiderweb, the most effective drone attack against Russian airfields since the start of the war. A total of 117 drones were used to strike airbases across five regions – Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions –, with the aim of inflicting maximum damage on Russian aircraft far away from the frontier (Al Jazeera, 2025; Horowitz, 2025). Reports suggest that 41 aircrafts – including A-50, Tu-95, Tu-22 M3 and Tu-160 – have been hit in the operation along with a third of Russian bombers that are currently used as cruise-missile carriers (Horowitz, 2025; Security Service of Ukraine, 2025; Zoria, 2025).

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From Cape to Kazan? Russia’s Contemporary Use of Colonial Warfare in Africa

The scale of the war in Ukraine has overshadowed Russia’s other overseas military ventures. This includes the multiple operations across Africa which began with Libya in 2016, and has since expanded to Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, among others. Such operations were a key source of notoriety for the Wagner group before its deployment to Ukraine, which has since dominated coverage and analysis of the group’s conduct. Hence, in comparison to their conduct in Eastern Europe, the modus operandi of Russian state and private forces in Africa has received comparatively less attention. This paper aims to fill this lacuna and provide a taxonomical framework for this conduct, arguing that the military methods utilised by Russia in Africa are classifiable as colonial warfare, akin to the warfare waged by Europeans in the region two centuries earlier. It will elaborate on colonial warfare as a distinct practice of violence and how Russia’s conduct fits in with this framework. Furthermore, this paper will elaborate on the risks that the use of these methods directly and indirectly poses to European security.

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Resilience and Rearmament: A Comparative Analysis of Russia’s Defence Industrial Base in 2025

This paper provides a comparative analysis of Russian and European defence industrial capacities in the aftermath of the 2022 Ukraine invasion amid the ongoing retreat of U.S. global security commitments. While Russia has demonstrated short-term resilience through mass production of tanks, artillery, and drones, it remains vulnerable due to technological dependencies and supply chain constraints. In contrast, the European Union, despite structural fragmentation, is mobilising towards strategic autonomy through initiatives like ASAP and EDIS. The study argues that Russia’s high-volume model may face sustainability limits, whereas Europe’s innovation-oriented, collaborative framework could offer long-term strategic depth. The research evaluates production trends, budgetary shifts, and geopolitical implications to assess the trajectory of both blocs in the emerging post-American security order.

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Strategic Autonomy in Action: Europe’s Reassurance Force

On 10 April 2025, NATO hosted the last of a series of meetings of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ (Gray & Van Overstraeten, 2025). The initiative, spearheaded by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and supported by French President Emmanuel Macron, was first introduced at the London Summit on Ukraine in March (Davies, 2025). Bringing together defence ministers from 30 nations, including Canada and Australia but excluding the United States (US), the coalition aims to establish a ‘reassurance force’ for Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire with Russia (Melkozerova, 2025). The group seeks a credible and lasting European-made peace, reducing the chances of a future invasion from Russia even without US security guarantees promised to the war-torn country. In the words of the British Defence Secretary, the aim is to “put Ukraine in the strongest possible position, to protect its sovereignty and deter further Russian aggression” (Gray & Van Overstraeten, 2025). The urgency of the project has grown amid declining U.S. support under the Trump administration, which has pushed Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security as Washington pivots its strategic focus toward the Pacific.

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