Read more about the article Can France’s Nuclear Deterrent Be Extended to Europe?
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Can France’s Nuclear Deterrent Be Extended to Europe?

The Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric towards Europe, its seeming reluctance to uphold the United States’ (US) security guarantees, and Russia’s assertive behaviour on the international stage have led to a profound strategic debate on nuclear deterrence amongst Europeans. Some European leaders have questioned whether France could fill the nuclear deterrence gap left by the US, and Emmanuel Macron has initiated a strategic debate to this end. Extending the French nuclear deterrent to protect Europe will require it to be complemented by the United Kingdom’s (UK) own deterrent. It is a process that necessitates careful consulting between European allies, as well as an appropriate framework and doctrine in order to be effective. The question will also be whether France’s nuclear deterrent must complement or replace the US’. For European land forces, this shift signals a closer strategic alignment between European NATO allies and will influence the likeliness of high-intensity conflict in the future.

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30 April 2025
Read more about the article From Theory to Practice: Understanding Nuclear Deterrence and Sharing Agreements in European Security
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From Theory to Practice: Understanding Nuclear Deterrence and Sharing Agreements in European Security

The European Union faces the imperative of increased defence autonomy. As geopolitical dynamics evolve and traditional alliances undergo scrutiny, the EU must assert its strategic independence by bolstering its defence capabilities.  Over the years, statements by European leaders, including but not limited to President Emmanuel Macron (President of the French Republic, 2022), Chancellor Angela Merkel (Chancellor of Germany, 2018), and President Ursula von der Leyen (President of the European Commission, 2023), often stress the need for the EU to reduce its reliance on external actors, particularly in defence and security matters.

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20 March 2024
Read more about the article The Intersection between Outer-Space Security and Cybersecurity
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The Intersection between Outer-Space Security and Cybersecurity

The concept of space security first appeared during the Cold War, in the context of the space race between the USA and the USSR. Since the 1990s, the number of space actors has significantly increased, including new national, international and private stakeholders. Space technologies, especially satellites, have gained importance for several aspects of everyday life, and are crucial for commercial purposes, public services and military operations. Particularly in the latter case, space technologies represent a major asset for communication, surveillance and planning.

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17 July 2023
Read more about the article The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Nuclear Deterrence
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The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Nuclear Deterrence

The world is experiencing the fourth industrial revolution. Significant progress in computing power is facilitating the development of many new and ground-breaking technologies (Kroenig, 2021, p. 59). Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of these technologies that increasingly impacts society, as well as military operations. In the next quarter century, AI and other emerging technologies are also expected to have a massive effect on international security and strategic stability (Geist & Lohn, 2018, p. 1). They are already reshaping the global nuclear order and our understanding of nuclear strategy and deterrence (Futter, 2020, p. 27).

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13 July 2023
Read more about the article <strong>Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call</strong>
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Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call

After the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson in August, on the 21th of September Putin launched a call for “partial mobilisation” of Russian men between the ages of 18 and 50, with the aim of enlisting 300,000 soldiers amongst the reservists and former military personnel (Il Post, 2022). Three weeks later, the recruitment operation is said to have enlisted over 200,000 people, as stated by the Russian Defence Minister Shoigu (Cancian, 2022) (Il Post, 2022). Even if it is early to say, Russia is calculating whether the new recruits should be sent to the front without proper training as “cannon fodder” (Bathon, 2022), or whether to send them to the 80 camps and 6 training centres outlined by the Russian Defence Minister (Il Post, 2022). Currently the decision appears to be somewhere in between the two, with some of the recruits trained for fewer than three days before being sent to the front, while others completing the training phase.

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21 October 2022