Circular economy principles are already widely adopted in the civil sector, however, the defence sector lags behind, facing several challenges that hinder its uptake. Western countries are increasing defence expenditures despite financial constraints, resulting in a steady rise in carbon emissions from military processes. Circular economy practices, which are not yet widespread in this sector, present an attractive long-term solution to both these concerns. In a turbulent security landscape, amid an environmental crisis, a shift from the ‘take-make-waste’ (Knight, 2023) approach to a circular economy model is crucial as it offers the sector economic resilience, autonomy, operational efficiency and civil-military synergies in times of instability, strengthening the sector overall. As the European Defence Agency argues, ‘strengthening Europe's security capabilities is a challenge that requires strategic planning and an efficient use of resources’ (Katainen, 2016). The Incubation Forum for Circular Economy in European Defence (IF CEED), established by the European Defence Agency in 2021, plays a crucial role in applying the circularity principles of the EU Green Deal to the European defence sector (European Defence Agency, 2023). The goal of the IF CEED is to apply principles and policies from the civilian sector to the defence sector, under the premise that a European circular economy can only be achieved through the participation of all sectors (European Defence Agency, n.d.). This paper starts with the definition of circular economy. It then analyses the current state of military expenditure and carbon emissions. Finally, it presents three project ideas of the IF CEED - Circular Data, Additive Manufacturing and Circular Materials for Textiles (European Defence Agency, n.d.) and the value they bring to the European defence sector.

For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia announced the beginning of a two-phase tactical nuclear exercise in Southern Russia, near Rostov-on-Don and close to parts of Ukraine currently under control by Russian forces. The drills included the participation of Belarus troops and simulated the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons with the upgraded ‘Iskander ballistic missile systems and ‘Khinzal’ hypersonic missiles. Moscow states that the military drill is a direct response to 'militant statements' from Western leaders, especially from the United States, France and Britain, who have recently reiterated their continued financial and military support to Ukraine (Trevelyan, 2024). However, the pattern and timing of these exercises point towards a bigger strategic objective. Beyond the official statements, these exercises are a strategic move intended to intimidate the West and divide NATO from within. Russia is trying to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities and readiness, thereby frightening those Western countries who are showing support to Ukraine. The move serves as a message to NATO nations weighing further military aid in the region. These drills are going on against a backdrop of heightened global tensions, with nuclear language seeing a resurgence in international communication and collaboration. These exercises not only display military strength but also assess the extent to which Western nations are willing to stand up to or cooperate with Russia (Trevelyan, 2024). The paper will first detail the specifics of the Russian tactical nuclear exercise, explaining in depth the two phases that characterised this exercise, its motives and objectives. Then, the paper will assess potential future threats and analyse the strategic response of the West as it once again comes to terms with Russian nuclear rhetoric.