The Impact of Regional and Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCA) on EU Security and Defence Cohesion: Causing Divisions or Promoting European Defence?  The Cases of the Nordic Defence Cooperation and US-Nordics DCAs

Between 2016 and 2023, the US signed extensive bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) with Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway as part of a strategy conceived to ensure regional security. The evolving security challenges in the Nordic and Baltic regions, exacerbated by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, paved the way for the conclusion of the DCAs. These agreements were crucial to Finland and Sweden’s entry to NATO, as they had already legitimised and governed US presence on their territories. Under the DCAs, the US Armed Forces have been granted unrestricted access to almost all military infrastructures and bases of these countries (Edvardsen, 2023). In addition to that, these agreements aim to enhance defence capabilities through joint exercises, training missions and logistical support. From the jurisdictional point of view, all Nordic countries renounced their right to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over US military personnel. The Nordic countries are not the only ones who have signed bilateral agreements in the field of defence with the United States. For instance, Poland and the Baltic states have both recently concluded similar treaties. Consequently, it is necessary to consider this phenomenon not as a series of isolated events but as a part of a broader pattern of bilateral defence cooperation agreements designed to increase the American presence in the Nordic-Baltic region. This, in turn, facilitates the deployment of equipment and personnel in the event of an emergency. This paper will analyse the influence of bilateral defence cooperation agreements on the European Union’s security and defence framework, with a focus on those between the US and Nordic countries,. In this regard, some argue that this kind of cooperation undermines the Union’s efforts to advance towards a real common security and defence policy through separate negotiations with the Transatlantic partners. Others claim that the DCAs with the Nordic states enhance European security. In fact, leveraging their EU membership / as EU Member States, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland could act as catalysts for a more cohesive European Defence integration framework. The paper also examines the evolution of Nordic countries’ relations with the United States in the defence field, as well as their type of regional cooperation within the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). In any case, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that, due to the current challenges and the slow advancement of the EU in the field, the Nordic countries did not have other choice but to pursue this course of action, even though this system can lead to several inefficiencies at the European level.

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Restoring Conscription in Germany: Lessons from Scandinavian Models and Key Considerations

The Russo-Ukrainian War has heightened security concerns across Europe. In response, European countries are not only looking to enhance their capabilities to face modern types of warfare but also experiencing a resurgence of interest in traditional security measures such as military conscription. This shift is evident as nations reassess their defence capabilities, both within multinational alliances such as NATO and by bolstering their national defence. In response to these evolving security needs, the German government has turned its attention to the recently restored Scandinavian conscription systems as a role model to embark on the process of reintroducing conscription. The success of these Scandinavian systems, which makes them attractive to other European countries, lies in adapting to their changing societies by presenting innovative models of conscription. Furthermore, this type of draft is based on choosing the best and most motivated people. The highly selective draft is helping these countries to move from military service as something men were forced to do to something now people select to do for their personal and professional growth. Following the success factor of Scandinavian models in reflecting changing societies and making it attractive for professional growth, the reintroduction of conscription in Germany presents significant challenges, with wider social implications in terms of making the Bundeswehr an inclusive and attractive model for professional and personal growth for youth. A reformed conscription system in Germany can be achieved by focusing not only on intermediate security needs but on how the military can provide opportunities for youth. Germany’s government should consider including the essential elements that make Scandinavian models successful, such as being highly selective or competitive in the job market. Moreover, in Germany’s particular case, an essential element to reflect its social reality is the inclusion of migrants or inhabitants with a “migrant background”. This would help to foster greater social cohesion and counter recent events where nationalist sentiments have resurfaced. The latter is of paramount importance given Germany’s historical context and the risk of the military’s potentiality to fuel nationalist sentiments. The careful management of nationalist discourse within recruitment campaigns is essential. The first section of this paper provides an overview of the Swedish and Norwegian conscription models highlighting the elements of success that are necessary to achieve a renovated conscription system in Germany. The second section briefly presents the context of conscription in Germany. Then the paper outlines a key consideration for restoring conscription in Germany when trying to reflect their current social reality.

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SpaceX Involvement in Military Operations and EU Space Policy

The space sector in the EU has long been geared toward civilian, scientific, and commercial use. Accordingly, private companies and scientific associations have played a substantial role in space technology innovation (Kriege & Russo, 2000, p.34). However, space is becoming increasingly securitised and militarised, and armed forces are investing more consistently in space assets (Calcagno et al., 2022). Moreover, space technology’s dual-use and slow-to-develop nature leads to a tendency to adapt existing space products and assets to military use and the direct involvement of private and non-defence space companies in military operations. SpaceX, in particular, has become central to several states’ militaries through Starlink, a large-scale low-orbit satellite internet and communication service (Rousselle, 2024). After seeing widespread Ukrainian civilian and military use of Starlink, SpaceX services have been considered by several governments and regional organisations. The EU itself has recently turned to SpaceX to launch four of its Galileo satellites. However, planned and ongoing American military use of SpaceX technologies and assets raises questions over how appropriate EU reliance on SpaceX for rocketry and connectivity would be. First, the agreement with SpaceX undermines the EU’s strategic autonomy, as it delegates fundamental launching services to a private company outside EU jurisdiction. Secondly, it increases dependence on the US both because it is the country that has jurisdiction over SpaceX, and because the launching operations take place from American soil. Thirdly, relying on SpaceX and on the US undermines the autonomist intent of the EU Space Programme, especially of the Galileo project which was meant to become a European alternative to the American navigation system. Fourthly, increasing SpaceX's involvement in US military operations entails broader implications for European defence by increasing the risk of an orbital arms race.

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Ukraine-Russia Conflict Enters Third Year: Reflecting on Two Years of Warfare

The war between Ukraine and Russia has now entered its third year since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a ‘Special Military Operation’ on 24 February 2022. The seeds of this conflict date back to 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in south-eastern Ukraine.

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Sweden Strengthens Military Ties with France

On 31 January 2024, Sweden and France signed an agreement to deepen their partnership, engage in strategic dialogue on security and defence issues, expand cooperation in the field of research and development and advance their overall defence capabilities (Government of Sweden , 2024b). The cooperation extends to their armament industries and includes the production of essential supplies such as ammunitions, propellants, and explosives, thus rendering the European defence technological and industrial base more innovative, competitive, and resilient (Government of Sweden , 2024b). It is worth mentioning that France-Sweden defence cooperation is well- established, dating back to September 2021, when the two issued a joint declaration of intent concerning intensified defence cooperation in international operations and material provision (Government of Sweden , 2024a). Furthermore, in April 2023, they signed a framework arrangement to develop a common, improved version of a medium-range missile, paving the way for further collaboration in anti-tank missiles (Shepard News Team, 2024).

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