On 24 February 2022, when Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe experienced an apparent fog-clearing moment. (Besch & Quencez, 2022). For several years, the European Security debate followed a caricatured binary opposition between the US-led transatlantic security and the need for EU autonomy as a geopolitical power, partly motivated by the notion of an imminent US retreat from Europe (Tocci, 2021). Now, while the war (temporarily) restored general confidence in American commitment to European security, it also revealed how dependent European states are on the US for their defence (Puglierin, 2024). As a result, after more than two years of conflict, the subjects of the binary intellectual confrontation have emerged with more defined roles: NATO has reaffirmed its prerogative in conventional deterrence, while the EU has given proof of its crisis management abilities, primarily through financial tools (Weber, 2023). Accepting the transatlantic partnership as the sole and definitive European deterrence strategy is imprudent and short-sighted. The US’ shifting priorities and waning leadership require Europe to decide on a path forward to more strategic responsibility. Among the priorities, an increased commitment to NATO is imperative – especially with a Republican in the White House. At the same time, efforts must be made to reconsider the US national commitment and investments in European deterrence, as well as the role of the EU and its initiatives.