The 2022 Russia-Ukraine War as a Test of Resolve: Challenges in Deterring Future Russian Aggression

The Russia-Ukraine War (2022) brought an unprecedented degree of unity and scale to the responses to Russia’s invasion among European Union member states and the United States, in a way that was incomparable to their responses to the Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2022) crises. A weak resolve – the firmness of those responses and the underpinning willingness to incur costs – in the preceding crises may have fostered an expectation in the Kremlin that Washington and European capitals' responses to future aggression would follow a similar path. Hence, this paper examines the challenges for resolve in responding to the Russia-Ukraine War (2022), in order to discourage future aggression. It finds that, throughout the three crises, concerns over escalatory risks and disunity in responses between European capitals and Washington constitute two persistent challenges. Maintaining unity can become increasingly fraught as the economic and political costs increase, especially in countries that have historically held closer cultural and economic ties with Russia.

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Resilience and Rearmament: A Comparative Analysis of Russia’s Defence Industrial Base in 2025

This paper provides a comparative analysis of Russian and European defence industrial capacities in the aftermath of the 2022 Ukraine invasion amid the ongoing retreat of U.S. global security commitments. While Russia has demonstrated short-term resilience through mass production of tanks, artillery, and drones, it remains vulnerable due to technological dependencies and supply chain constraints. In contrast, the European Union, despite structural fragmentation, is mobilising towards strategic autonomy through initiatives like ASAP and EDIS. The study argues that Russia’s high-volume model may face sustainability limits, whereas Europe’s innovation-oriented, collaborative framework could offer long-term strategic depth. The research evaluates production trends, budgetary shifts, and geopolitical implications to assess the trajectory of both blocs in the emerging post-American security order.

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Can France’s Nuclear Deterrent Be Extended to Europe?

The Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric towards Europe, its seeming reluctance to uphold the United States’ (US) security guarantees, and Russia’s assertive behaviour on the international stage have led to a profound strategic debate on nuclear deterrence amongst Europeans. Some European leaders have questioned whether France could fill the nuclear deterrence gap left by the US, and Emmanuel Macron has initiated a strategic debate to this end. Extending the French nuclear deterrent to protect Europe will require it to be complemented by the United Kingdom’s (UK) own deterrent. It is a process that necessitates careful consulting between European allies, as well as an appropriate framework and doctrine in order to be effective. The question will also be whether France’s nuclear deterrent must complement or replace the US’. For European land forces, this shift signals a closer strategic alignment between European NATO allies and will influence the likeliness of high-intensity conflict in the future.

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The Future of European Deterrence: a Three-Pillar Approach for Advancing Capability Development and Interoperability

On 24 February 2022, when Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe experienced an apparent fog-clearing moment. (Besch & Quencez, 2022). For several years, the European Security debate followed a caricatured binary opposition between the US-led transatlantic security and the need for EU autonomy as a geopolitical power, partly motivated by the notion of an imminent US retreat from Europe (Tocci, 2021). Now, while the war (temporarily) restored general confidence in American commitment to European security, it also revealed how dependent European states are on the US for their defence (Puglierin, 2024). As a result, after more than two years of conflict, the subjects of the binary intellectual confrontation have emerged with more defined roles: NATO has reaffirmed its prerogative in conventional deterrence, while the EU has given proof of its crisis management abilities, primarily through financial tools (Weber, 2023). Accepting the transatlantic partnership as the sole and definitive European deterrence strategy is imprudent and short-sighted. The US’ shifting priorities and waning leadership require Europe to decide on a path forward to more strategic responsibility. Among the priorities, an increased commitment to NATO is imperative – especially with a Republican in the White House. At the same time, efforts must be made to reconsider the US national commitment and investments in European deterrence, as well as the role of the EU and its initiatives.

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Strengthening the Defence Sector through Circular Economy Initiatives

Circular economy principles are already widely adopted in the civil sector, however, the defence sector lags behind, facing several challenges that hinder its uptake. Western countries are increasing defence expenditures despite financial constraints, resulting in a steady rise in carbon emissions from military processes. Circular economy practices, which are not yet widespread in this sector, present an attractive long-term solution to both these concerns. In a turbulent security landscape, amid an environmental crisis, a shift from the ‘take-make-waste’ (Knight, 2023) approach to a circular economy model is crucial as it offers the sector economic resilience, autonomy, operational efficiency and civil-military synergies in times of instability, strengthening the sector overall. As the European Defence Agency argues, ‘strengthening Europe's security capabilities is a challenge that requires strategic planning and an efficient use of resources’ (Katainen, 2016). The Incubation Forum for Circular Economy in European Defence (IF CEED), established by the European Defence Agency in 2021, plays a crucial role in applying the circularity principles of the EU Green Deal to the European defence sector (European Defence Agency, 2023). The goal of the IF CEED is to apply principles and policies from the civilian sector to the defence sector, under the premise that a European circular economy can only be achieved through the participation of all sectors (European Defence Agency, n.d.). This paper starts with the definition of circular economy. It then analyses the current state of military expenditure and carbon emissions. Finally, it presents three project ideas of the IF CEED - Circular Data, Additive Manufacturing and Circular Materials for Textiles (European Defence Agency, n.d.) and the value they bring to the European defence sector.

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