Naval Drones in the Sky: How Ukraine’s Magura Fleet Is Redefining Air Superiority in Coastal Warfare 

Ukraine’s MAGURA programme shows how distributed seaborne air denial might change coastal warfare assumptions. This InfoFlash defines this concept, tracks MAGURA V5 and V7 development and examines the twin shoot-downs of Russian SU-30SM fighters and Mi-8 helicopters. By pairing low-signature hulls to R-73 or AIM-9 seekers and feeding them target data from the Delta cloud, Kyiv fielded surface craft that can outmatch aircraft whose unit cost outweighs the boats by almost 100:1. Findings indicate inverted cost-exchange ratios, condensed kill chains, and new risks for patrol routes across narrow seas. The paper argues that littoral states should replicate this networked model with off-the-shelf sensors and surplus missiles, shifting budgeting priorities from frigates and fighter wings to expendable nodes and shared data links. Recommended actions include modular procurement, joint training that integrates missile-armed USVs, reinforced ship defences, and tighter controls on seeker heads and autonomy software before proliferation broadens the threat in coming years.

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The potential consequences of cyberattacks under NATO’s Article 5: applying self-defence in cyberspace

The increasing frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks have transformed international conflicts and challenged the international legal framework regarding self-defence. Today, NATO members face security threats capable of causing widespread disruption without the use of physical force. These threats test the aptness of NATO's Article 5, which would be the legal basis for the invocation of the mutual defence clause in cyberspace. The Wales Summit Declaration and Brussels Summit Declaration recognised that cyberattacks may reach the threshold of an armed attack, potentially triggering Article 5. However, invoking Article 5 for a cyberattack raises further legal questions, particularly in relation to the attribution of responsibility and the applicability of the right to self-defence. The involvement of non-state actors and the inability to clearly prove state involvement in a cyberattack challenges the conventional way of executing retaliatory actions. International law, in its current form, fails to instruct states on how to apply self-defence in cyberspace. Hence, as NATO governments appear increasingly reliant on cyberspace for both military capabilities and public services, they should actively consider the uncertainty that would derive from a unilateral invocation of Article 5 in the case of a cyberattack.

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Operation Midnight Hammer: Tactical Triumph or Strategic Illusion?

Operation Midnight Hammer unfolded during the night of June 21 and 22, 2025, as the United States launched a coordinated strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan. The operation involved more than 125 aircraft, including seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, and has been described as the largest and longest B-2 mission since the war in Afghanistan began in 2001 (D’Urso, 2025). According to General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the operation required “months of positioning and preparation” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 3), moving “from strategic planning to global execution” within weeks (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 12). Deception played a critical role to preserve the element of surprise. Just hours before the strike, two additional B-2 bombers were dispatched westward toward Guam, serving as decoys (Holliday, 2025a). Their movements, including staged refuelling stops in Oklahoma, California, and Hawaii, were intended to draw attention away from the real strike package (Holliday, 2025b).

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A Window of Opportunity for European Defence? Rare Earths and the China – US Trade War

This paper explores the implications of China’s April 2025 Rare Earth Element (REE) export restrictions for European defence security. While targeting the US, the measures expose Europe’s reliance on both Chinese REEs and US defence technologies. The paper argues that this disruption presents a strategic opportunity for Europe to reduce critical material dependencies, strengthen its defence industrial base, and advance strategic autonomy. It assesses the role of REEs in military systems, Europe’s current vulnerabilities, and potential responses, including diversification, domestic processing, and innovation. Despite challenges such as environmental constraints and institutional fragmentation, the crisis offers a rare chance for Europe to reinforce defence resilience and redefine its role in an evolving global security landscape.

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Should the European States Reintroduce Conscription and Military Reserve Programs?

Modern-day threats, challenges and increased geopolitical tensions aimed at the European security landscape have made several European states reconsider whether to reintroduce conscription and military reserve programs to enhance their national defence capabilities. Although conscription offers a wide-range of benefits, such as ensuring a broader pool of trained individuals, enabling faster mobilisation and reducing dependence on limited professional forces it also implies many ethical, societal and economic issues. Due to this ambivalence, this paper seeks to outline all the positive and negative aspects in order to evaluate their necessity in national defence strategies.

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