The New Portfolio of Defence and Space Commissioner: Key Priorities and Challenges Ahead

In this paper, Marek Gallo analyses the implications of the newly created post of Defence and Space Commissioner (DaSC) for the European security architecture. The appointment of Andrius Kubilius reflects a strategic shift aimed at bolstering the EU’s defence industry and achieving greater strategic autonomy in response to Russian aggression and global instability. However, this paper argues that while the DaSC role emphasises joint procurement and enhanced interoperability, the portfolio lacks the authority to drive substantial defence reforms. At the same time, Kubilius' success depends on securing resources, overcoming institutional hesitancy, and fostering collaboration with NATO. Additionally, the EU’s cost-effective space policy focuses on regulatory leadership and space programmes continuity, rather than militarisation. This paper constructively highlights the challenges Kubilius will face in aligning immediate security concerns with long-term strategic objectives, positioning the DaSC as a symbolic yet limited step in strengthening Europe’s defence posture.

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Rethinking the Concept of Air Superiority: From Sine Qua Non Towards Interoperability 

For decades, gaining and maintaining air superiority has been a linchpin for the Western perception of military power. In contrast, due to geopolitical and technological factors, Russia has historically relied on air power as a supplementary tool for achieving victory on the ground (Grimshaw, 2017). Developments of the 21st century, especially within the technological realm, have, however, proven both of these doctrines to be incapable of reflecting modern battlefield challenges. The evolution of air defences, massive deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and modernized electronic warfare (EW) tools are making the third domain more complex and restricted than ever. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has proven that uncontested dominance of the skies is neither guaranteed nor a sustainable task. Lethal air defence, a subdomain of air littoral consisting of thousands of drones and limited air sorties, have forced both sides to rethink the concept of air dominance and its role within the conflict. While the definition of air superiority remains clear, the necessity of achieving this objective as the sine qua non is diminishing as a new subdomain of the air littoral dominated by UAVs is emerging. Thus, rather than fully controlling and freely manoeuvring within the air domain, both sides pursue so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ (Gunzinger, 2024). This paper argues that the traditional view of air supremacy, central to Western military thinking, is no longer an adequate strategy against the peer or predominant opponent. The failure of the Russian Air Force (VVS) to establish air superiority on the first day of aggression was surprising and gave valuable lessons for military strategists. This conflict underlines the challenges in achieving total air dominance in the face of advanced air defence, UAV proliferation and EW capabilities. Thus, there is an essential need to rethink the air power concept, arguing for focusing on limited air superiority in times and places of choosing. In this context, Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences operations appear to be a crucial strategy. Finally, this paper underlines the implications for Western military thinking regarding air power theory, which is needed to operate within growingly contested airspace. In the face of the modern operational environment, emphasis on joint operations and interoperability in executing successful air campaigns is crucial.

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 Kursk Operation: Legal Perspectives of a Counter Offensive

The ‘Kursk Operation’ marks a pivotal moment in the War in Ukraine, shifting the dynamics of this conflict and raising some legal questions regarding the Ukrainian incursion into Russian Territory. This paper will examine the context that prompts what might be the third phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, examining the legal arguments that make this act lawful and compliant with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants States the right to self-defence. By analysing the right to self-defence, alongside the principles of proportionality and necessity, this paper argues that the Kursk Operation can be lawfully considered an act of self-defence. Lastly, it examines the definition of "occupation" to clarify the legal distinctions relevant to this operation.

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The Evolution of Ukraine’s Defence Industry and Lessons for the European Union 

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is entering its third year, and the debate around aiding the war-torn country is increasingly shifting towards empowering Ukraine’s domestic defence industry, to make it more autonomous against a larger and more resourceful opponent. At the same time, in 2023 the former Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin suggested that the EU could also benefit from this process by learning from the evolution of Ukraine’s defence industry (EDA, 2023). This paper will thus give a brief overview of the condition of the country’s industry before and after the war with Russia and summarise the main lessons that the EU can incorporate from the Ukrainian experience.

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Poland’s Military Surge: Strategic Investments and Recent Developments in Polish Armed Forces

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland has been among the most active countries in supporting its eastern neighbour to halt the advance of Russian forces and to conduct its counteroffensive. This decision was consistent with Polish strategic objectives, allowing Poland to launch its modernisation project and expand its military capabilities. Although Poland’s strategic rationales vary depending on the political stance of its elites (Pawłuszko, 2022), there are three common denominators: the intent to deter Russia, the need to secure US support, and the ambition to become the Central-Eastern European region’s leading power.  Poland considers strengthening its armed forces as essential for achieving these goals. In fact, Warsaw aspires to build the most potent European land force by the beginning of 2026 (Tilles, 2023). While this objective is ambitious, the Russian invasion has catalysed the modernisation of the Polish military and its arms industry (Cucino & Scarazzato, 2023).This paper will address Poland’s recent strategic investments, aimed at developing multiple components of its armed forces, including land, air, sea, drone, and anti-missile forces, and analyse the potential challenges that such a rapid upgrade and amplification of its military capabilities entail.

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