Illusory or substantive? Analysing the European Union’s Support to the International Criminal Court

This paper explores whether the European Union’s support for the International Criminal Court (ICC) is substantive or illusory. By examining legal and policy commitments alongside the case studies of Ukraine and Libya, the research shows that EU support is context-dependent. In Ukraine, where judicial and political interests align, the EU provides tangible, substantive support. In Libya, stability and migration control take precedence, resulting in symbolic engagement and undermined cooperation. The paper argues that this difference stems from differing institutional logics: generally, the ICC pursues principles of justice and fairness, while the EU often prioritises political consequences.

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Toward Hybrid Deterrence: Conceptual Foundations and the Evolution of NATO Response

Hybrid threats, leveraging ambiguity and asymmetry, increasingly challenge NATO’s deterrence and credibility. This paper critically examines NATO’s doctrinal evolution and responses to hybrid threats since first acknowledging cyber challenges in 2002. Despite doctrinal progress and tools like Counter-Hybrid Support Teams (CHSTs) and initiatives such as Baltic Sentry, NATO’s response remains largely reactive and fragmented, activated only post-crisis rather than proactively deterring threats. Ambiguous attribution and contested thresholds further hinder collective action. The analysis highlights persistent strategic gaps and concludes by asserting that credible hybrid deterrence cannot be improvised post hoc but must be embedded systematically into NATO’s doctrine and operational architecture, a concept that will be further developed in a forthcoming companion article.

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Renegotiating Alliances: Trump’s America’s first foreign policy and the European Union’s quest for strategic autonomy

In light of Donald Trump’s second administration and its transactional America-first foreign policy, this paper considers the implications for European strategic autonomy amid the heightened importance of US security commitments and defence capabilities. Trump’s foreign policy is driven by the belief that Europeans have taken advantage of the US within the NATO alliance and international trade, and seeks to renegotiate trade agreements, returning manufacturing to the US and shifting its strategic orientation towards Asia. In the short term, this can constrain Europe’s strategic autonomy, as European capitals are pressured to accommodate the America-first agenda to ensure the US retains vital military capabilities in Europe and continues to provide military support to Ukraine. However, in the long term, the Trump administration’s pressure on allies to spend more on defence and a degree of ambiguity over security commitments reinforces the need for European strategic autonomy and accelerates the development of capacities that enable Europe to pursue its interests more independently.

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Operation Spiderweb: under Russia’s nose

On 1 June 2025, Ukraine launched Operation Spiderweb, the most effective drone attack against Russian airfields since the start of the war. A total of 117 drones were used to strike airbases across five regions – Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions –, with the aim of inflicting maximum damage on Russian aircraft far away from the frontier (Al Jazeera, 2025; Horowitz, 2025). Reports suggest that 41 aircrafts – including A-50, Tu-95, Tu-22 M3 and Tu-160 – have been hit in the operation along with a third of Russian bombers that are currently used as cruise-missile carriers (Horowitz, 2025; Security Service of Ukraine, 2025; Zoria, 2025).

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The Acceleration of Command and Control Through Artificial Intelligence and its Implications for European Land Forces

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming an ever more important part of command and control (C2) and the decision-making connected to it. AI systems are crucial in supporting commanders in their decision-making, allowing them to act on data and the information it carries faster and more efficiently than ever before. These systems are complex, their results are often difficult to understand or verify, and they struggle with ethical considerations. To offset these disadvantages, humans need not concur with every decision AI makes, but they should retain control and be able to intervene and stop certain decisions as they see fit. Given the faster speed that AI gives C2 activities, continuing to exercise this control will prove challenging for commanders and their staff.

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