The potential consequences of cyberattacks under NATO’s Article 5: applying self-defence in cyberspace

The increasing frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks have transformed international conflicts and challenged the international legal framework regarding self-defence. Today, NATO members face security threats capable of causing widespread disruption without the use of physical force. These threats test the aptness of NATO's Article 5, which would be the legal basis for the invocation of the mutual defence clause in cyberspace. The Wales Summit Declaration and Brussels Summit Declaration recognised that cyberattacks may reach the threshold of an armed attack, potentially triggering Article 5. However, invoking Article 5 for a cyberattack raises further legal questions, particularly in relation to the attribution of responsibility and the applicability of the right to self-defence. The involvement of non-state actors and the inability to clearly prove state involvement in a cyberattack challenges the conventional way of executing retaliatory actions. International law, in its current form, fails to instruct states on how to apply self-defence in cyberspace. Hence, as NATO governments appear increasingly reliant on cyberspace for both military capabilities and public services, they should actively consider the uncertainty that would derive from a unilateral invocation of Article 5 in the case of a cyberattack.

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Toward Hybrid Deterrence: Conceptual Foundations and the Evolution of NATO Response

Hybrid threats, leveraging ambiguity and asymmetry, increasingly challenge NATO’s deterrence and credibility. This paper critically examines NATO’s doctrinal evolution and responses to hybrid threats since first acknowledging cyber challenges in 2002. Despite doctrinal progress and tools like Counter-Hybrid Support Teams (CHSTs) and initiatives such as Baltic Sentry, NATO’s response remains largely reactive and fragmented, activated only post-crisis rather than proactively deterring threats. Ambiguous attribution and contested thresholds further hinder collective action. The analysis highlights persistent strategic gaps and concludes by asserting that credible hybrid deterrence cannot be improvised post hoc but must be embedded systematically into NATO’s doctrine and operational architecture, a concept that will be further developed in a forthcoming companion article.

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FACT – The importance of European cyber resilience in hybrid warfare

This article studies the Federated Advanced Cyber Physical Test range (FACT), a new initiative launched by the European Defence Fund (EDF) in December 2023 to develop a next-generation European cyber test-bed capability. The dependence of military and civil-urban infrastructures on digital and IoT systems underscores the need for and importance of a European cyber range to test military equipment on its cyber resilience. The article addresses the cyber vulnerability of these infrastructures under the current context of hybrid warfare and foreign cyber potential. The FACT case study underlines how this initiative embodies a capability that has yet to be achieved in the current EU framework by creating a shared cyber range test-bed. The analysis of pertinent EU-based NATO-owned cyber infrastructure also emphasises the existing future potential for appropriation and integration into a new European cyber architecture.  Finally, the article stresses how FACT shows the potential and political willingness to change European cyber-resilience and interoperability in the long-term.  

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Read more about the article Towards a New EU Quantum Communication Infrastructure
https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/en/2021/05/a-consortium-of-european-digital-players-to-design-the-future-eu-quantum-internet.html#media-list-image-image-all_ml_0)

Towards a New EU Quantum Communication Infrastructure

In the era of the information revolution and the dominance of big data, ensuring full communication security is not an easy task. The major world powers have therefore begun to invest more resources in the field of quantum physics, exploiting its enormous potential to make unprecedented progress in several strategic areas, including cybersecurity, logistics, communication, healthcare, and others. The European Union also decided to row in the same direction. Indeed, on 31 May 2021, the European Commission finally selected a consortium led by Airbus and composed of several companies and research institutes, including Leonardo, PwC France and Maghreb, Orange, Telespazio, the Istituto Nazionale di Ricerca Metrologica (Inrim) and the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR) to study and design the future EU quantum communication network (Airbus, 2021). Through the new European Quantum Communication Infrastructure (EuroQCI), the EU aims to ensure ultra-secure communication between government institutions and critical infrastructures across the Union.

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