Natural and Artificial Intelligence in Armed Conflict: Exploring Settled and Open Legal Questions with Dustin A. Lewis

Based in The Hague, the T.M.C. Asser Instituut is a distinguished organization funded in 1965 that conducts independent, policy-oriented research in International and European law. The centre promotes expertise through different initiatives, including two noteworthy lecture series, “Designing International Law and Ethics into Military and Artificial Intelligence” (DILEMA), and “Hague Initiative for Law and Armed Conflict” (HILAC). At the intersection of the two educational programs, on Thursday July 11th, researcher Dustin A. Lewis gave a lecture on ‘Natural and artificial intelligence in armed conflict’. The DILEMA-HILAC lecture, held by Dustin A. Lewis, explored and analysed fundamental settled and open legal questions related to natural and artificial intelligence in armed conflict. Dustin A. Lewis is the current Research Director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC), as well as an Associate Senior Researcher in the Governance of Artificial Intelligence Program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). On Thursday’s lecture, the researcher presented a wide range of potential applications of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military domain, exploring the legal relationship between natural and artificial intelligence in armed conflict. In a timely discussion, Mr. Lewis reflected on the need for regulations concerning the military use of AI, States’ legal obligations and the importance of accountability.

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Anticipating Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict

Since the end of the Cold War, the amount of private military and security companies (PMSCs) involved in armed conflicts has increased rapidly. In armed conflicts, the PMSCs carry out tasks that used to be performed by governmentally armed forces. These include non-coercive as well as coercive activities, ranging from military training and intelligence analysis to offensive combat and interrogation of prisoners (Tonkin, 2012, 1). Meanwhile, it remains unclear to what extent PMSCs increase the severity of armed conflicts (Lees and Petersohn, 2021, 1). It is clear, however, that the activities of PMSCs in armed conflicts impact European land forces and their objectives. In Libya, for instance, Russia has backed the Libyan National Army (LNA) with PMSC forces, among other things. Allegedly, Russian leaders hoped this could help them gain control over oil reserves in Libya, on which several European countries depend. Besides, Libya is located strategically on NATO’s southern flank (Cragin and MacKenzie, 2020). This is just one example of a country where foreign PMSCs and European armed forces are involved in a conflict. The question is how European land forces can anticipate the presence of foreign PMSCs in armed conflicts in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Therefore, this article will focus on the operational rather than the legal and ethical aspects of the activities of PMSCs in armed conflict.

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