In recent years, the European Space Agency (ESA) has seen a gradual expansion in its mission to now include ensuring space security. Such a change may have been favoured by the evolving needs of the EU, which is one of the ESA’s main partners and has become more and more concerned with the security and resilience of its space assets, as well as increasingly relevant in the ESA’s funding. Accordingly, ESA might be transitioning from a purely civilian and scientific organization to an institution entrusted with developing the security of space facilities against natural hazards and collision with man-made objects, both deliberate and unintended. While ESA’s new ‘defence for space’ approach has surely increased the institution’s military relevance, it is still unclear whether such a transition will benefit or impede European defence. On the one hand, profiting from the consolidated technical expertise of the ESA could afford European the armed forces the opportunity to increasingly rely on high-quality space facilities. On the other hand, institutional overlap and ensuring coordination with other EU bodies could present serious challenges, ones which could eventually hamper the efficacy of European space assets for military activities.

On 9 January 2024, Thierry Breton, Commissioner for the Internal Market and in charge of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and defence industry, announced that he was proposing a new €100 billion defence fund to strengthen the EU’s defence industry (Wax & Kayali, 2024). The statement came in the context of an apparent failure to supply Ukraine with a promised million artillery shells within a year, which he insisted that the Union would nonetheless accomplish, and as the EU’s defence sector becomes increasingly centralised. Most astonishing, however, is that the proposed sum largely surpasses any fund that EU institutions have previously devoted to the defence industry. With the most recent EU capability development tool for defence and security being the EDF, with €8 billion spread over the 2021-2027 period, talks about a newer and larger framework for EU defence funding raise numerous questions regarding framework and administration. While the new interest in defence spending at an EU level is inherently different to the EDF in that it is intended to finance the procurement of equipment rather than just its development, it appears to be an extension of the EDF framework.