Proxy Warfare in a Post-Covid World
Written by Alberto Rizzi At first glance, defence would rarely be seen as a domain affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet, the disruption brought by the virus into our societies…
Written by Alberto Rizzi At first glance, defence would rarely be seen as a domain affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet, the disruption brought by the virus into our societies…
The launch of the €7.9 billion European Defence Fund (EDF) materialises years of talks and debates over the emergence of a European defence industrial and technological cooperation. The EDF is set to finance defence capability and critical technologies projects such as the next generation of aircraft fighters, tanks, semiconductors, cybersecurity, or communication systems.
Consensus on the regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in defence has hardly been achieved throughout the European Union (EU). Indeed, many EU states are strictly opposed to AI in defence, whereas others have mildly advocated for and promoted research and development (R&D) in AI (Stauffer, 2020). The European Defence Agency (EDA) held a workshop on ‘Defence Applications of Artificial Intelligence’ in the last week of June 2021 (European Defence Agency, 2021), during which experts from all member states (MS) came to discuss R&D of AI in defence. Indeed, this is a prominent topic this year, as R&D of AI is considered the future. Many third countries such as China and the US have already dedicated significant time and resources into R&D of autonomous weapons and are even said to produce this technology (Chan, 2019).
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a global infrastructure development strategy launched by the Chinese government in 2013 to invest in 70 countries (World Bank, 2018) to promote economic development and enhance connectivity between China and Central-East Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. Around 150 countries have joined BRI so far, including 18 EU members (BRI Center, 2021). What recently happened in Montenegro raised several concerns within the EU about Beijing’s approach, labelled by some observers as a sinocentric international trade network potentially harmful to the independence of some countries at the EU’s doorsteps. What then is the standpoint of both BRI and EU members? Can different attitudes towards the Chinese projects cause a fracture within an already diverse EU in terms of policies, paces to reach goals, and economic indicators? To what extent is BRI a tool in the hands of Beijing to leverage European countries by proposing offers of development that, at first glance, cannot be declined?
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a strong impact on most of the world, and Europe is no exception. The European economy was deeply affected in several sectors. Business-related to defence, security, and European defence cooperation was one of the hardest-hit sectors.