Read more about the article <strong>Promises Made are Not Promises Kept: Pledged and Delivered Supplies to Ukraine</strong>
Info Flash

Promises Made are Not Promises Kept: Pledged and Delivered Supplies to Ukraine

Since February 24, 2022, the first day of Russian aggression against Ukraine, European countries across the continent have devoted themselves to being faithful allies of Ukraine. Some countries pledged significant financial aid, many donated necessary weapons, and nearly all have drafted sanctions against Russia. However, as war rages on in Ukraine it has all but left the front pages of newspapers in Europe in favour of the recent energy crisis, public tensions between the German and French heads of state, and the sudden resignation of Liz Truss. As a result, many civilians risk losing sight of the ongoing events in Ukraine despite their intensifying nature. Simultaneously, European countries have made fewer pledges of support and delivered less on their promises than they did at the start of the war (Ukraine Support Tracker - a Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine, 3/10/22). This report presents the recent forms of support that European countries have successfully delivered to Ukraine and the pledged support to create a conclusive summary of European military aid to Ukraine in the month of October. For full transparency, this article was finalised on November 3, 2022.

Comments Off on Promises Made are Not Promises Kept: Pledged and Delivered Supplies to Ukraine
10 November 2022
Read more about the article <strong>Consequences of the War in Ukraine on the Arctic</strong>
Info Flash

Consequences of the War in Ukraine on the Arctic

The desire to access the Arctic's vast mineral reserves has always been a major driver of international attention towards the region. The Arctic is believed to contain 1,699 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and various other fuels, equal to the entirety of Russia’s oil reserves and three times those of the US (U.S Geological Survey, 2008). On top of this, by 2050, it is believed that the region above the Polar Circle may be completely ice-free, considering the rate at which the ice sheet is shrinking and the multiplier effect of warming seas and surface temperatures (La Rocca, 2022). This potential development could further increase the international race for Arctic raw materials.

Comments Off on Consequences of the War in Ukraine on the Arctic
4 November 2022
Read more about the article The Russia – Iran Strategic Partnership in the Shadow of Ukraine’s War
Info Flash

The Russia – Iran Strategic Partnership in the Shadow of Ukraine’s War

Closer ties between Putin’s Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of security cooperation (voennoe sotrudnichestvo) has attracted significant attention from Western foreign policy-makers and academic scholars in recent years. Diplomatic isolation and commonly shared dissatisfaction with the long-established American hegemony has driven both countries into a pragmatic, stable and mutually beneficial rapprochement nearly a decade after a new chapter in their relationships was opened in 2012 (Ghadbeigy, 2017). By this time the return of Vladimir Putin to power was clearly interpreted as marking a watershed moment in Russian foreign policy doctrine and strategies that had long since been in vogue under the rule of Dmitriy Medvedev (Kozhanov, 2015).

Comments Off on The Russia – Iran Strategic Partnership in the Shadow of Ukraine’s War
28 October 2022
Read more about the article <strong>Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call</strong>
Info Flash

Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call

After the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson in August, on the 21th of September Putin launched a call for “partial mobilisation” of Russian men between the ages of 18 and 50, with the aim of enlisting 300,000 soldiers amongst the reservists and former military personnel (Il Post, 2022). Three weeks later, the recruitment operation is said to have enlisted over 200,000 people, as stated by the Russian Defence Minister Shoigu (Cancian, 2022) (Il Post, 2022). Even if it is early to say, Russia is calculating whether the new recruits should be sent to the front without proper training as “cannon fodder” (Bathon, 2022), or whether to send them to the 80 camps and 6 training centres outlined by the Russian Defence Minister (Il Post, 2022). Currently the decision appears to be somewhere in between the two, with some of the recruits trained for fewer than three days before being sent to the front, while others completing the training phase.

Comments Off on Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call
21 October 2022
Read more about the article Enhanced Cooperation Between the EU and Ukraine Through a Military Training Mission: What to Expect from the EUMAM
News

Enhanced Cooperation Between the EU and Ukraine Through a Military Training Mission: What to Expect from the EUMAM

On Wednesday, October 12, the 27 ambassadors of the EU Member States finally agreed upon the military training mission involving Ukrainian soldiers. The so-called “European Union Military Assistance Mission”, or EUMAM, which was pending since August, will allow the Member States to host training for 15.000 Ukrainian soldiers, 3.000 of whom will receive tactical combat training and specialised courses for engineers. More details will be decided during an EU Council meeting with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU members on October 17 in Luxembourg.

Comments Off on Enhanced Cooperation Between the EU and Ukraine Through a Military Training Mission: What to Expect from the EUMAM
14 October 2022