Written by: Arvid William Olink Supervised by: Elise Alsteens Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: The EU–ROK strategic partnership deepened significantly under President Yoon Suk Yeo’s value-based diplomacy, particularly in the wake of the…
The Arctic is emerging as a region of critical geopolitical importance, mainly due to the wide effects of climate change, which are opening the Russian Arctic to economic and military expansion, and attracting Chinese investments. NATO has been engaged in the region since its creation; however, in recent times, it began to recalibrate its strategic posture to address the new growing challenges. This paper investigates the Alliance’s renewed commitment to the High North, putting it into context with the emergence of new, pressing security challenges in the region. First, after discussing NATO’s historical security stance in the Arctic, the focus is shifted to the threat-multiplying effect climate change has on regional security. Next, the paper emphasizes the expanding influence of Russia and the rising role of China as key actors in the Arctic. These security challenges lay the ground for the analysis of the Alliance’s expanding commitment and reinforced focus on its northern flank.
This paper explores the implications of China’s April 2025 Rare Earth Element (REE) export restrictions for European defence security. While targeting the US, the measures expose Europe’s reliance on both Chinese REEs and US defence technologies. The paper argues that this disruption presents a strategic opportunity for Europe to reduce critical material dependencies, strengthen its defence industrial base, and advance strategic autonomy. It assesses the role of REEs in military systems, Europe’s current vulnerabilities, and potential responses, including diversification, domestic processing, and innovation. Despite challenges such as environmental constraints and institutional fragmentation, the crisis offers a rare chance for Europe to reinforce defence resilience and redefine its role in an evolving global security landscape.
This paper examines the European Union’s evolving cyber defence strategy in response to the growing integration of cyber operations into hybrid warfare. It traces the EU’s doctrinal shift from a reactive, resilience-based posture to one that increasingly embraces proactive deterrence, including the potential use of offensive capabilities. By analysing key strategic documents and highlighting the case of France, the study illustrates both progress and limitations. While conceptual advances are evident, practical implementation remains a national competence. The paper concludes that translating strategic ambition into credible cyber deterrence will require legal clarity, interoperability, and coordinated capability development.
This paper explores the evolving landscape of intelligentised warfare, focusing on the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), cybernetics, and cognitive warfare into modern military strategy. It examines how China and the European Union (EU) approach AI-driven military development, highlighting the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) intelligentised warfare doctrine, its emphasis on autonomous systems, AI-enhanced command structures and information dominance, as well as its strategic implications for Taiwan and future conflicts. Meanwhile, Europe’s perspective is shaped by ethical AI governance, NATO’s military AI strategy, and cognitive warfare countermeasures, reflecting tensions between technological sovereignty and regulatory constraints. The study also investigates the role of cybernetic control loops in AI warfare, the PLA’s cyber transformation, and the impact of AI-enabled disinformation, deepfake propaganda, and automated battlefield logistics on military engagement. Ultimately, the paper argues that intelligentised warfare represents not just an evolution in military technology but a fundamental shift in the nature of conflict, where the lines between physical war, cyber operations, and psychological warfare are increasingly blurred. The findings underscore the need for robust international AI governance to mitigate risks associated with autonomous military escalation and cognitive warfare strategies.
