Romania’s Defence Industry at a Crossroads: Modernising Capabilities and Mitigating Dependencies through SAFE Funding

Romania will benefit from over €16 billion in funding through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism, the second-largest allocation established by the European Commission. This fuels a newer and unique blend of growth opportunities for its defence capabilities. Romania's defence standing, strongly shaped by the country’s strategic position and its NATO and EU membership, has significant relevance for the traditional security landscape in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area; more so in light of evolving hybrid threats posed by Russia’s destabilising attempts to extend its sphere of influence in the region. The paper assesses current structural vulnerabilities in Romania’s defence sector, and discusses how industrial cooperation with a host of European partners, if properly pursued, will allow Bucharest to strengthen the competitiveness of the state-owned company ROMARM while also mitigating the risks of external dependency on its closest ally, the U.S., for procurement of military equipment.

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The role of PMSCs in the EU’s Security and Defence Policy: a temporary complementary tool

The following paper will examine the European Union’s reliance on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). By analysing regulatory frameworks, parliamentary initiatives, and case studies, namely Operation Atalanta and EULEX Kosovo, it highlights both the operational benefits and the political, legal, and ethical challenges of outsourcing security functions. The paper will show that PMSCs can provide rapid deployment, specialised expertise, and logistical support, but cannot replace core military tasks reserved to States. Gaps in regulation, accountability, and oversight risk undermining parliamentary and democratic control together with the EU’s credibility. The paper concludes that PMSCs should remain a complementary tool within EU security and defence policy, integrated through common standards, and binding and common legislation.

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Outpaced at Sea? What AUKUS Reveals About Europe’s Strategic Drift

The AUKUS pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States has swiftly shifted the international dialogue on naval power (Hellyer & Stevens, 2022). For the first time, a non-nuclear weapon state is being armed with nuclear-powered submarines, thus changing not only the Indo-Pacific security environment but, additionally, opening a new chapter in strategic defence cooperation (Cheng, 2022). Whilst London and Washington were putting importance on the strategic need of countering China, Europe wаs left watching from afar: particularly France, whose billion-euro submarine deal with Australia had quickly collаpsed overnight (Tertrais, 2021). This аrticle explores how AUKUS redefines traditional defence norms and remodels the global nuclear submarine balance (Hellyer & Stevens, 2022). Likewise, it examines the implications for the European Union, which has long aimed for larger strategic autonomy, yet still struggles to coordinate effectively at sea (Fiott et al., 2021). Geographically speaking, AUKUS may be a distant pact, however, its message to Europe is as clear as day: naval power matters, and partnerships formed on trust, swiftness, as well as strategic clarity, are already setting the pace (Fiott, 2018).

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Naval Drones in the Sky: How Ukraine’s Magura Fleet Is Redefining Air Superiority in Coastal Warfare 

Ukraine’s MAGURA programme shows how distributed seaborne air denial might change coastal warfare assumptions. This InfoFlash defines this concept, tracks MAGURA V5 and V7 development and examines the twin shoot-downs of Russian SU-30SM fighters and Mi-8 helicopters. By pairing low-signature hulls to R-73 or AIM-9 seekers and feeding them target data from the Delta cloud, Kyiv fielded surface craft that can outmatch aircraft whose unit cost outweighs the boats by almost 100:1. Findings indicate inverted cost-exchange ratios, condensed kill chains, and new risks for patrol routes across narrow seas. The paper argues that littoral states should replicate this networked model with off-the-shelf sensors and surplus missiles, shifting budgeting priorities from frigates and fighter wings to expendable nodes and shared data links. Recommended actions include modular procurement, joint training that integrates missile-armed USVs, reinforced ship defences, and tighter controls on seeker heads and autonomy software before proliferation broadens the threat in coming years.

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The potential consequences of cyberattacks under NATO’s Article 5: applying self-defence in cyberspace

The increasing frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks have transformed international conflicts and challenged the international legal framework regarding self-defence. Today, NATO members face security threats capable of causing widespread disruption without the use of physical force. These threats test the aptness of NATO's Article 5, which would be the legal basis for the invocation of the mutual defence clause in cyberspace. The Wales Summit Declaration and Brussels Summit Declaration recognised that cyberattacks may reach the threshold of an armed attack, potentially triggering Article 5. However, invoking Article 5 for a cyberattack raises further legal questions, particularly in relation to the attribution of responsibility and the applicability of the right to self-defence. The involvement of non-state actors and the inability to clearly prove state involvement in a cyberattack challenges the conventional way of executing retaliatory actions. International law, in its current form, fails to instruct states on how to apply self-defence in cyberspace. Hence, as NATO governments appear increasingly reliant on cyberspace for both military capabilities and public services, they should actively consider the uncertainty that would derive from a unilateral invocation of Article 5 in the case of a cyberattack.

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