Written by: Kevin Morgan Whitehead
Supervised by: Elise Alsteens
Edited by: Theodora Posta
Abstract:
This article examines NATO’s persistent “codification gap” in Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR). It shows how the Alliance often comes to improvise ISR solutions during crises, but struggles to translate them into binding standards and enforceable mechanisms. This is shown by drawing on lessons from both NATO operations and actions in Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. While Libya highlighted the risks of ad hoc reliance on U.S. assets, Afghanistan demonstrated the potential of federated networks, whereas Ukraine revealed both proactive reforms and continuous reliance on voluntary contributions. Technical interoperability shortfalls, political barriers, and institutional weaknesses are pointed out as being catalysts of the codification gap. The paper argues that codifying ISR targets, readiness metrics, regular integration exercises, and a tiered release policy are necessary to ensure NATO’s deterrence posture, readiness, and cohesion in future crises.
