17 February 2021
Recent French Armed Forces losses in the Sahel have given rise to a debate regarding France’s posture in the Sahel. France launched the “Operation Serval” in January 2013 to support the Malian government in the face of insurgencies and Tuareg separatism in the North. The so-called “Operation Barkhane” followed in August 2014, targeting jihadists in the entire Sahel region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Tchad (“G5 Sahel”). If the operation was initially and relatively welcomed by the local populations (Poncet, 2021), the public opinion in both continents was becoming increasingly lukewarm. In France, especially, Operation Barkhane had generated long discussions and strong disapproval in public opinion (Ifop, 2021). Consequently, Barkhane, as an illustration, leads to question the notion of democratic representation and transparency in the case of External Operations.
From indifference to distrust
Since Operation Serval was launched in 2013, 51 French soldiers have lost their lives, thirty of them in the past two years alone (Tull, 2021). The losses of two soldiers in January 2021 triggered a debate on the immediate future of France’s presence in the Sahel. The French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP), in collaboration with the newspaper Le Point, published a survey in January 2021 on the following question: “Are you personally completely favourable, rather favourable, rather not favourable, or not at all favourable to this French military intervention?” (Ifop, 2021).
51% responded as non-favourable in January 2021 compared to 37% in January 2013 (Ibid, 2021). Consequently, over the past eight years, public opinion on Barkhane has shifted drastically, stressing a lack of trust between civil population and politico-military decision-makers. Yet, these figures may also highlight an absence of a nuanced understanding amongst French citizens of the French posture in the Sahel. Indeed, the survey was limited to operations in Mali (Poncet, 2021), excluding the remaining G5 Sahel states. Thus, for many citizens, security and defence issues often remain abstract and complex (Manigart, 1998). High media coverage and the degree of division among the political elites tend to further influence the public to pay more attention to these problems. Therefore, we should wonder if this 51% disapproval rate could and should be enough to influence the government’s decisions on external operations, according to democratic representation and transparency principles.
History has shown that public opinion plays a fundamental role in defence decision-making and legitimation, questioning the legal basis of France’s interventions and the share of budget devoted to these missions (Boniface, 2008). Thus, the legality of the French intervention rests on international legal concepts and the lex ferenda of the law of armed conflict. Specifically, (a) the U.N. Security Council’s implied authorisation for the intervention, and (b) the notion of intervention by invitation in an internal armed conflict. The actual invitation by Malian authorities to the French Army, provide a meritorious legal basis for French military action (Stigall 2015).
Barkhane: a challenge to interoperability
Yet, public distrust occurs amid a stronger presence and greater interoperability in the Sahel. In January 2020, following a Summit in Pau, the number of French forces increased by 600 additional soldiers (5,100 in total). Combat effectiveness has improved thanks to the acquisition of drones, notably the MQ-9 Reaper (Tull, 2021). The German think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) noted that “More than 40% of Barkhane’s air strikes are now conducted by drones” (Tull, 2021), contributing to the tactical successes of the operation since January 2020.
At the same time, France initiated “Task Force Takuba”, a Europe-wide project to advise and assist the Malian Armed forces in the fight against the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), in the three-border zone between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Task Force Takuba was quickly joined by the Estonian and the Czech Armed Forces but the deployment was delayed until 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The project was also signed by Italy, and considered by Belgium and Greece, but the commitment of Member States armed forces remains uncertain (Gros-Verheyde, 2021). On the other hand, the British Army rejected a proposal to integrate the Task Force Takuba and, instead, joined the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA in December 2020. The “Operation Bourrasque”, led of France, included 1,600 French Soldiers, 1,400 Malian and Nigerian partners, and was supported by British, American, and Danish aerial assets (Ministère des Armées, 2020). In total, 2,900 non-French, European soldiers, are currently deployed in the Sahel, either on bilateral missions, MINUSMA, European Union Training Mission (EUTM Mali) and/or Task Force Takuba (Ministère des Armées, 2020).
Operations Serval and Barkhane seem to have neutralised an important number of jihadists. Recently, during “Mission Eclipse” in January 2021 both French and Malian Armed Forces, killed one hundred jihadists in the centre of Mali (Maillard, 2021). However, the duration of Operation Barkhane raises technical questions on the likelihood for conventional armed forces to tackle asymmetrical threats (Vircoulon, 2021). Indeed, it remains difficult to distinguish between local insurgencies, ethnic rivalries, and jihadism on such a complex political, social, ethnic, and religious map as the Sahel. Furthermore, Malian mistrust against the French is increasing. This can be seen in movements such as Yèrèwolo-Debout sur les remparts (Ben Ahmed, 2021). Local disapprobation of the French presence leads to questions of the legitimacy and the legality of this intervention. These are mainly justified by terrorism prevention and the arguable “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), a noble, yet not legally binding notion under International Law (Rudolph, 2014).
If no political ambitions were attached to Barkhane, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian, has started to question diplomacy as a continuation of war with other means. On her side, the Minister of Armed Forces, Florence Parly, has reassured that France “do[es] not have a vocation to be eternal in Mali and we know that it is a demanding, difficult presence”. Yet, France will remain “as much as necessary to allow the local armies to ensure security” (Poncet, 2021).
This position was confirmed during the Summit in N’Djamena, Chad, held in February 2021 by the G5 Sahel (Élysée, 2021). Regarding the international legal framework and given the complexity of modern conflicts such as the Sahel, within the international legal system, countries will have to deal with more strict and detailed measures with respect to the military intervention, the use of force, and counter-terrorism measures.
Ultimately, if the long-term future of the Operation Barkhane is uncertain, a consensus seems to be reached between the different states involved in the Sahel: Barkhane cannot be withdrawn abruptly for the sake of security and stability.
Written by Sahar LAHDIFI, Communication and Public Relations Trainee at Finabel – European Army Interoperability Centre
Sources
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