Since the end of the Cold War, most European countries have suspended compulsory military service, reducing their militaries to a relatively small force of volunteers. The consequences of the cuts…
The Russo-Ukrainian War has heightened security concerns across Europe. In response, European countries are not only looking to enhance their capabilities to face modern types of warfare but also experiencing a resurgence of interest in traditional security measures such as military conscription. This shift is evident as nations reassess their defence capabilities, both within multinational alliances such as NATO and by bolstering their national defence. In response to these evolving security needs, the German government has turned its attention to the recently restored Scandinavian conscription systems as a role model to embark on the process of reintroducing conscription. The success of these Scandinavian systems, which makes them attractive to other European countries, lies in adapting to their changing societies by presenting innovative models of conscription. Furthermore, this type of draft is based on choosing the best and most motivated people. The highly selective draft is helping these countries to move from military service as something men were forced to do to something now people select to do for their personal and professional growth. Following the success factor of Scandinavian models in reflecting changing societies and making it attractive for professional growth, the reintroduction of conscription in Germany presents significant challenges, with wider social implications in terms of making the Bundeswehr an inclusive and attractive model for professional and personal growth for youth. A reformed conscription system in Germany can be achieved by focusing not only on intermediate security needs but on how the military can provide opportunities for youth. Germany’s government should consider including the essential elements that make Scandinavian models successful, such as being highly selective or competitive in the job market. Moreover, in Germany’s particular case, an essential element to reflect its social reality is the inclusion of migrants or inhabitants with a “migrant background”. This would help to foster greater social cohesion and counter recent events where nationalist sentiments have resurfaced. The latter is of paramount importance given Germany’s historical context and the risk of the military’s potentiality to fuel nationalist sentiments. The careful management of nationalist discourse within recruitment campaigns is essential. The first section of this paper provides an overview of the Swedish and Norwegian conscription models highlighting the elements of success that are necessary to achieve a renovated conscription system in Germany. The second section briefly presents the context of conscription in Germany. Then the paper outlines a key consideration for restoring conscription in Germany when trying to reflect their current social reality.
At the European Council Summit in Brussels on the 27th of June, EU leaders gathered to approve the bloc’s new leadership following the outcome of the European elections. Among the appointments, Kaja Kallas was tapped as the EU’s next High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, succeeding the Spanish Josep Borrell. Currently the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kallas recognised the “enormous responsibility” she is entrusted with and reiterated her commitment to strengthening the EU’s defence capabilities (Kallas, 2024). Before being talked about for this position, her name had floated to lead NATO, as well as for the proposed role of EU Defense Commissioner, which Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised to create if re-elected (McElvoy, 2024). Just like Von der Leyen and future EU Council President Antonio Costa, Kallas will need to get formal approval from EU lawmakers and the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in the next fall (Nardelli and Tammik, 2024).
Circular economy principles are already widely adopted in the civil sector, however, the defence sector lags behind, facing several challenges that hinder its uptake. Western countries are increasing defence expenditures despite financial constraints, resulting in a steady rise in carbon emissions from military processes. Circular economy practices, which are not yet widespread in this sector, present an attractive long-term solution to both these concerns. In a turbulent security landscape, amid an environmental crisis, a shift from the ‘take-make-waste’ (Knight, 2023) approach to a circular economy model is crucial as it offers the sector economic resilience, autonomy, operational efficiency and civil-military synergies in times of instability, strengthening the sector overall. As the European Defence Agency argues, ‘strengthening Europe's security capabilities is a challenge that requires strategic planning and an efficient use of resources’ (Katainen, 2016). The Incubation Forum for Circular Economy in European Defence (IF CEED), established by the European Defence Agency in 2021, plays a crucial role in applying the circularity principles of the EU Green Deal to the European defence sector (European Defence Agency, 2023). The goal of the IF CEED is to apply principles and policies from the civilian sector to the defence sector, under the premise that a European circular economy can only be achieved through the participation of all sectors (European Defence Agency, n.d.). This paper starts with the definition of circular economy. It then analyses the current state of military expenditure and carbon emissions. Finally, it presents three project ideas of the IF CEED - Circular Data, Additive Manufacturing and Circular Materials for Textiles (European Defence Agency, n.d.) and the value they bring to the European defence sector.
For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia announced the beginning of a two-phase tactical nuclear exercise in Southern Russia, near Rostov-on-Don and close to parts of Ukraine currently under control by Russian forces. The drills included the participation of Belarus troops and simulated the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons with the upgraded ‘Iskander ballistic missile systems and ‘Khinzal’ hypersonic missiles. Moscow states that the military drill is a direct response to 'militant statements' from Western leaders, especially from the United States, France and Britain, who have recently reiterated their continued financial and military support to Ukraine (Trevelyan, 2024). However, the pattern and timing of these exercises point towards a bigger strategic objective. Beyond the official statements, these exercises are a strategic move intended to intimidate the West and divide NATO from within. Russia is trying to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities and readiness, thereby frightening those Western countries who are showing support to Ukraine. The move serves as a message to NATO nations weighing further military aid in the region. These drills are going on against a backdrop of heightened global tensions, with nuclear language seeing a resurgence in international communication and collaboration. These exercises not only display military strength but also assess the extent to which Western nations are willing to stand up to or cooperate with Russia (Trevelyan, 2024). The paper will first detail the specifics of the Russian tactical nuclear exercise, explaining in depth the two phases that characterised this exercise, its motives and objectives. Then, the paper will assess potential future threats and analyse the strategic response of the West as it once again comes to terms with Russian nuclear rhetoric.
