European Defence giants Leonardo and Rheinmetall form a 50/50 Joint Venture for the development of the next Land Defence Systems

The Italian manufacturer Leonardo and the German arms maker Rheinmetall signed a strategic partnership on 3 July 2024 to establish a 50/50 joint venture for the industrial development and the subsequent commercialisation of a new battle tank for the Italian Army’s ground system programs. The new-born entity will be based in Italy, where 60 % of the overall production will take place (Leonardo, 2024). Over the next ten years, the two industrial groups aim to win contracts worth an estimated 20 billion euros from the Italian Army (Dragoni, 2024). The terms of the agreement will have a positive impact on the Italian supply chain as a whole and could capitalise more than 50 billion US dollars on the European market, as preannounced by Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger (Reuters, 2024). The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the two counterparts is now subject to approval by the European Commission and national competition authorities.

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The Impact of Regional and Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCA) on EU Security and Defence Cohesion: Causing Divisions or Promoting European Defence?  The Cases of the Nordic Defence Cooperation and US-Nordics DCAs

Between 2016 and 2023, the US signed extensive bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) with Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway as part of a strategy conceived to ensure regional security. The evolving security challenges in the Nordic and Baltic regions, exacerbated by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, paved the way for the conclusion of the DCAs. These agreements were crucial to Finland and Sweden’s entry to NATO, as they had already legitimised and governed US presence on their territories. Under the DCAs, the US Armed Forces have been granted unrestricted access to almost all military infrastructures and bases of these countries (Edvardsen, 2023). In addition to that, these agreements aim to enhance defence capabilities through joint exercises, training missions and logistical support. From the jurisdictional point of view, all Nordic countries renounced their right to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over US military personnel. The Nordic countries are not the only ones who have signed bilateral agreements in the field of defence with the United States. For instance, Poland and the Baltic states have both recently concluded similar treaties. Consequently, it is necessary to consider this phenomenon not as a series of isolated events but as a part of a broader pattern of bilateral defence cooperation agreements designed to increase the American presence in the Nordic-Baltic region. This, in turn, facilitates the deployment of equipment and personnel in the event of an emergency. This paper will analyse the influence of bilateral defence cooperation agreements on the European Union’s security and defence framework, with a focus on those between the US and Nordic countries,. In this regard, some argue that this kind of cooperation undermines the Union’s efforts to advance towards a real common security and defence policy through separate negotiations with the Transatlantic partners. Others claim that the DCAs with the Nordic states enhance European security. In fact, leveraging their EU membership / as EU Member States, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland could act as catalysts for a more cohesive European Defence integration framework. The paper also examines the evolution of Nordic countries’ relations with the United States in the defence field, as well as their type of regional cooperation within the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). In any case, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that, due to the current challenges and the slow advancement of the EU in the field, the Nordic countries did not have other choice but to pursue this course of action, even though this system can lead to several inefficiencies at the European level.

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Episode 3: Is Conscription Returning to Europe?

Since the end of the Cold War, most European countries have suspended compulsory military service, reducing their militaries to a relatively small force of volunteers. The consequences of the cuts…

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Restoring Conscription in Germany: Lessons from Scandinavian Models and Key Considerations

The Russo-Ukrainian War has heightened security concerns across Europe. In response, European countries are not only looking to enhance their capabilities to face modern types of warfare but also experiencing a resurgence of interest in traditional security measures such as military conscription. This shift is evident as nations reassess their defence capabilities, both within multinational alliances such as NATO and by bolstering their national defence. In response to these evolving security needs, the German government has turned its attention to the recently restored Scandinavian conscription systems as a role model to embark on the process of reintroducing conscription. The success of these Scandinavian systems, which makes them attractive to other European countries, lies in adapting to their changing societies by presenting innovative models of conscription. Furthermore, this type of draft is based on choosing the best and most motivated people. The highly selective draft is helping these countries to move from military service as something men were forced to do to something now people select to do for their personal and professional growth. Following the success factor of Scandinavian models in reflecting changing societies and making it attractive for professional growth, the reintroduction of conscription in Germany presents significant challenges, with wider social implications in terms of making the Bundeswehr an inclusive and attractive model for professional and personal growth for youth. A reformed conscription system in Germany can be achieved by focusing not only on intermediate security needs but on how the military can provide opportunities for youth. Germany’s government should consider including the essential elements that make Scandinavian models successful, such as being highly selective or competitive in the job market. Moreover, in Germany’s particular case, an essential element to reflect its social reality is the inclusion of migrants or inhabitants with a “migrant background”. This would help to foster greater social cohesion and counter recent events where nationalist sentiments have resurfaced. The latter is of paramount importance given Germany’s historical context and the risk of the military’s potentiality to fuel nationalist sentiments. The careful management of nationalist discourse within recruitment campaigns is essential. The first section of this paper provides an overview of the Swedish and Norwegian conscription models highlighting the elements of success that are necessary to achieve a renovated conscription system in Germany. The second section briefly presents the context of conscription in Germany. Then the paper outlines a key consideration for restoring conscription in Germany when trying to reflect their current social reality.

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What is in the Inbox of the EU’s Next Foreign Policy Representative, Kaja Kallas?

At the European Council Summit in Brussels on the 27th of June, EU leaders gathered to approve the bloc’s new leadership following the outcome of the European elections. Among the appointments, Kaja Kallas was tapped as the EU’s next High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, succeeding the Spanish Josep Borrell. Currently the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kallas recognised the “enormous responsibility” she is entrusted with and reiterated her commitment to strengthening the EU’s defence capabilities (Kallas, 2024). Before being talked about for this position, her name had floated to lead NATO, as well as for the proposed role of EU Defense Commissioner, which Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised to create if re-elected (McElvoy, 2024). Just like Von der Leyen and future EU Council President Antonio Costa, Kallas will need to get formal approval from EU lawmakers and the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in the next fall (Nardelli and Tammik, 2024).

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