Explosive Devices in Lebanon: an analysis of lawfulness in modern warfare 

This article studies the events surrounding the explosive attacks in Lebanon on September 17th and 18th through the lens of IHL, uncovering significant concerns about Israel’s adherence to IHL regarding the lawful use of weapons. The lack of distinction between military objectives and civilian objects, coupled with the high number of civilian casualties, underscores the failure to comply with fundamental principles of IHL. This article explains how the implicit use of devices such as pagers, mobile phones, and laptops as explosive weapons hinders the ability to target combatants while minimising harm to civilians, making the use of this new method of warfare unlawful. This case exemplifies a broader and worrying trend of rising civilian harm in conflicts globally, as seen in Ukraine, the Middle East, and beyond. The analysis underscores the need for respect for the most basic principles of IHL, particularly distinction and caution, when developing and using new methods of warfare, and serves as a call for respect and accountability for the principles that aim to make conflicts more humane by safeguarding the lives of civilians.

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Privatisation of Security: The legal Status and Responsibilities of Private Military Companies in European Missions

The rise of Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in military or civilian missions stands as an important change in the dynamics of the security and defence world, as they change how operations can be conducted, especially for armed forces. Dating back to the Middle Ages with mercenaries, they have taken different forms throughout history. Nowadays, they deliver a large span of services (from indirect support in logistics or military counselling to taking part directly in combat). This shows how they adapted to the most modern types of conflict thanks to their business structure and flexibility in various scenarios. On the one hand, PMCs participate in combats, from troops through training or instruction programmes, having a strong impact on the development of conflicts. On the other hand, PSCs dedicate themselves to tasks related to security and guard duties like protection of facilities or personnel in at- risk zones. While they both provide services to governments, PMCs are employed in training military forces and taking part in conflict zones, and PSCs are used primarily for non-combat missions such as personnel protection abroad and site security. However, by the nature of their work, both PMCs and PSCs may be engaged in violent scenarios. Therefore, it is also generally accepted to refer to them as Private Military and Security companies (PMSCs). The employment of additional resources to the national armies is a phenomenon which requires a comprehensive regulation on a national and international level. It is necessary, however, to draw a line between PMCs and PSCs, even if the lack of regulation and the similarity of tasks unite them. If the classification of PMSCs personnel in concrete category under the Geneva Conventions seems complex, the distinction between soldiers and civilians nevertheless still has to be made to understand what they can and cannot do in conflicts, eventually having an incidence on the rules of engagement they have to follow and the protection they could be granted or not. This paper will present their blurred status in law and their duties in missions led by European Member States, taking a look at the existing legislation and tools to hold them responsible for their actions. Analysing the relevant dispositions of International Law, this paper will try to clarify the risks and potential downfalls of employing such companies for domains normally part of State responsibilities solely. Furthermore, this paper will analyse the complex and fragmented legal framework governing these companies and their employment both on a European and national level, delving into the distinction of competencies between the EU and the national sovereignty of Member States, according to their own regulation on the matter. This will also be done through practical studies of the use of PMSCs in the Balkans region in the 1990s and in the Afghan conflict in the 21st century. Moreover, the paper will tackle the urgent necessity to strengthen the rules and norms that limit the actions of PMSCs to make sure that human rights and ethical boundaries are respected while they pursue their contracts.

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Rethinking the Concept of Air Superiority: From Sine Qua Non Towards Interoperability 

For decades, gaining and maintaining air superiority has been a linchpin for the Western perception of military power. In contrast, due to geopolitical and technological factors, Russia has historically relied on air power as a supplementary tool for achieving victory on the ground (Grimshaw, 2017). Developments of the 21st century, especially within the technological realm, have, however, proven both of these doctrines to be incapable of reflecting modern battlefield challenges. The evolution of air defences, massive deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and modernized electronic warfare (EW) tools are making the third domain more complex and restricted than ever. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has proven that uncontested dominance of the skies is neither guaranteed nor a sustainable task. Lethal air defence, a subdomain of air littoral consisting of thousands of drones and limited air sorties, have forced both sides to rethink the concept of air dominance and its role within the conflict. While the definition of air superiority remains clear, the necessity of achieving this objective as the sine qua non is diminishing as a new subdomain of the air littoral dominated by UAVs is emerging. Thus, rather than fully controlling and freely manoeuvring within the air domain, both sides pursue so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ (Gunzinger, 2024). This paper argues that the traditional view of air supremacy, central to Western military thinking, is no longer an adequate strategy against the peer or predominant opponent. The failure of the Russian Air Force (VVS) to establish air superiority on the first day of aggression was surprising and gave valuable lessons for military strategists. This conflict underlines the challenges in achieving total air dominance in the face of advanced air defence, UAV proliferation and EW capabilities. Thus, there is an essential need to rethink the air power concept, arguing for focusing on limited air superiority in times and places of choosing. In this context, Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences operations appear to be a crucial strategy. Finally, this paper underlines the implications for Western military thinking regarding air power theory, which is needed to operate within growingly contested airspace. In the face of the modern operational environment, emphasis on joint operations and interoperability in executing successful air campaigns is crucial.

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NATO Multi- Domain Operations: challenges for the European Land Forces

The paper analyses NATO’s move towards Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), where cyber and space domains are incorporated into conventional warfare, moving beyond joint operations. The paper highlights the primary challenges NATO faces in implementing MDO: operational adaptability, institutional coordination, technological disparities, and command-and-control structures. Consistent military doctrines within NATO Member States, recognising their historical events and cultural differences, are necessary to avoid doctrinal impediments, stressing the importance of a shared structure and vocabulary to improve coordination and efficiency in operations. The paper outlines the institutional obstacles, like NATO’s absent role in coordinating the implementation of MDO, and how this translates into diverging pathways to operationalise the concept. Furthermore, challenges in technological disparities and budgetary contributions are outlined, followed by an analysis of the command-and-control structures indicating the need for Europe to seek models to develop an MDO- capable fighting force. The paper ends with a key findings section outlining the primary challenges and providing specific solutions to tackle them.

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 Kursk Operation: Legal Perspectives of a Counter Offensive

The ‘Kursk Operation’ marks a pivotal moment in the War in Ukraine, shifting the dynamics of this conflict and raising some legal questions regarding the Ukrainian incursion into Russian Territory. This paper will examine the context that prompts what might be the third phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, examining the legal arguments that make this act lawful and compliant with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants States the right to self-defence. By analysing the right to self-defence, alongside the principles of proportionality and necessity, this paper argues that the Kursk Operation can be lawfully considered an act of self-defence. Lastly, it examines the definition of "occupation" to clarify the legal distinctions relevant to this operation.

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