Written by: Kevin Morgan Whitehead Supervised by: Elise Alsteens Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: This article examines NATO’s persistent “codification gap” in Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR). It…
Quantum computing can address problems faster than classical computing. Quantum properties like superposition, entanglement, and interference allow quantum computers to even break modern encryption, marking the end of state secrets and secure communications. To combat this, militaries must quickly implement Post-Quantum Computing and Quantum Key Distribution to protect classified information from adversary attempts to use quantum tools to harvest it. So far, Europe has done well to set bold policy targets for a quantum communication network and for institutions to implement PQC. However, it can do more by creating an enabling environment to achieve policy targets.
Romania will benefit from over €16 billion in funding through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism, the second-largest allocation established by the European Commission. This fuels a newer and unique blend of growth opportunities for its defence capabilities. Romania's defence standing, strongly shaped by the country’s strategic position and its NATO and EU membership, has significant relevance for the traditional security landscape in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area; more so in light of evolving hybrid threats posed by Russia’s destabilising attempts to extend its sphere of influence in the region. The paper assesses current structural vulnerabilities in Romania’s defence sector, and discusses how industrial cooperation with a host of European partners, if properly pursued, will allow Bucharest to strengthen the competitiveness of the state-owned company ROMARM while also mitigating the risks of external dependency on its closest ally, the U.S., for procurement of military equipment.
Since the end of European missions in the Western Sahel and the military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the security situation in the region has deteriorated significantly. Jihadists and other insurgents have gained ground, while the regimes are being kept from total collapse by the newfound influence and military presence of Russia and its new strategic ambitions through the Russian Africa Corps. The disastrous security situation in the Western Sahel and instability in West Africa threatens European Security. This threat is worsened by the presence of Russia and other hostile powers. European countries must find new, improved, and pragmatic ways to engage with the region again.
In an environment where Europe’s adversaries – non-state actors and otherwise – are using drones extensively, High-Energy Lasers (HELs) are an easy, cheap, and efficient countermeasure. However, as a speed-of-light weapon, HELs’ ability to defeat hypersonic missiles also potentially thwarts attempted nuclear first-strikes and upsets Mutually Assured Destruction calculations. It can also frustrate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts by dazzling or blinding aerial and orbital optical sensors. However, there are technical challenges of thermal blooming, power management, and line-of-sight requirements. Europe has made some effort to centralise HEL production in the TALOS-TWO project. However, multiple ongoing HEL projects risk fragmented development. Europe should further centralise such efforts by improving communication and involving more stakeholders in the development process.
